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This thesis investigates a number of inter-related issues pertaining to the relationship 
between corporate governance and dividend policy in China, including how the two-
tier supervisory board and corporate ownership structures influence the likelihood of 
dividend payouts by listed firms in the Chinese stock market, whilst taking account of 
the influence of state-controlled and concentrated (or controlling) shareholders. A 
central aim of the thesis is to examine the influence of a combination of corporate 
governance and stock market factors, including investor sentiment and stock liquidity, 
in an attempt to uncover any mediating influences in the impact of two-tier supervisory 
board and corporate ownership structures on the propensity of the Chinese listed firms 
to pay cash dividends.  
The estimation methodologies employed are logit/probit, tobit and OLS regressions 
to examine the influence of the above factors on the propensity to pay dividends, on the 
level of dividend payments, and on changes in dividend payments, respectively, based 
on a sample of data for Chinese listed firms covering the period 2008-2016. The main 
results show that, first, the two-tier supervisory board structure has limited influence on 
dividend policy, except where the interests of controlling shareholders are involved; 
second, investor sentiment increases the incentives of state-controlled companies, but 
inhibits the incentives of controlling shareholders, to pay dividends; lastly, as China’s 
stock market operates under an opaque information environment with weak disclosure 
requirements, stock liquidity is found to have little impact on the ability of state-
controlled and majority shareholders to influence dividend policy.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction   
Dividend policy has had a long history of development. It refers to the ways in which 
firms return capital to their equity investors and involves many corporate issues (Lease  
et al. 1999). In corporate finance, managers must concentrate not only on firms’ 
investment decisions but also on how to maximise the wealth of shareholders. The study 
of dividend policy attempts to solve issues pertaining to dividends and to formulate 
dividend theories explaining corporate dividend behaviour. There are various 
determinants of dividend policy, such as corporate governance, ownership structure, 
firm characteristics, and stock market reaction (Denis & Osobov 2008; Baker & Powell 
2000 Gill, Biger & Tibrewala 2010; Mehta 2012). Broadly defined, corporate 
governance concerns both the running of external and internal governance mechanisms 
to maximise firm value and to satisfy the mutual benefit not only of shareholders but 
also other potential stakeholders (Freeman & Reed 1983; Cadbury 1999; West 2006; 
Mallin 2009). The models of corporate governance contain one-tier and two-tier 
systems, which differ in terms of board size, compensation, and shareholder versus 
stakeholder interests. Hence, corporate governance is one of the important determinants 
of dividend policy decisions. The ownership structure is also a significant determinant 
of dividend policy. Companies are owned by different types of investors, who also 
contribute to accomplishing firms’ financial objectives. Moreover, the distribution of 
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stock among shareholders has a significant impact on corporate actions that are 
dependent on shareholder voting. Majority control gives larger shareholders 
considerable power and discretion over key decisions, such as dividend decisions and 
payout ratios (Gugler 2003). Therefore, how different types of ownership impact 
dividend decisions according to their demands has long been an area of discussion.  
It should be noted that, in addition to the above factors, there might be other 
influences of corporate board structure and stock market environment (such as investor 
confidence, shareholder rights protection, default risk, board diversity, information 
asymmetry, etc.) which could influence corporate dividend policy. However, it has to 
be borne in mind that some factors (e.g. investor confidence) are hard to measure 
accurately, while others (e.g. information asymmetry) are included as relevant control 
variables, but they are not the main focus of interest in this research. Moreover, other 
factors, for example, shareholder rights protection and board diversity, have been 
examined in markets where the rule of law and the transparency of the corporate 
environment are strong (e.g. the US or European stock markets). Given the opaque 
nature of the Chinese system, these considerations may be important in other respects, 
but, in this context of dividend policy, they are less relevant and this study considers 
investor sentiment and stock liquidity, along with the influence of corporate board 
structure, as more relevant.  
Combining the above factors, this thesis investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance and dividend policy, including how corporate structure, 
specifically the supervisory board and corporate ownership, with reference to 
concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, influence dividend policy on the 
Chinese stock market. Moreover, corporate governance is combined with stock market 
factors, namely investor sentiment and stock liquidity, to further discover how the 
impacts of board structure and ownership are enhanced or weakened according to the 
reaction and variation in the stock market. The research develops based on the Chinese 
stock market, first, because Chinese-listed firms are required to run a two-tier system, 
which contains both the board of directors and the supervisory board. Second, 
controlling and state shareholders are pervasive in the case of Chinese-listed firms (Bae, 
Kang, & Kim 2002; Lee & Xiao 2004; Chang & Shin 2007). As a result, the Chinese 
market provides a suitable setting with appropriate availability of data for pursuing this 
research.  
Following an overview of the literature on the dividend policy of firms (Chapter 2) 
and the discussion on the methodology for testing relevant hypotheses (Chapter 3), 
three empirical chapters form the bulk of this thesis. The underlying motivation for 
investigating these issues including the contributions are explained in the remainder of 
the chapter. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigates the effects of the 
supervisory board on dividend policy decisions, including the propensity for, the level 
of and the change in cash dividend based on a sample of Chinese-listed firms. As 
Chinese supervisory boards are based on, but different from, German supervisory 
boards, this fact could influence different aspects of dividend payout policy, an issue 
that warrants further investigation for reasons explained below. The results show how 
Chinese supervisory boards affect cash dividends. The second empirical chapter 
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(Chapter 5) investigates the relationship between investor sentiment, corporate 
ownership, with reference to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, and 
dividend policy, including decisions on and changes to cash dividends based on a 
sample of Chinese-listed firms. Following previous research, we built on logit and OLS 
models to investigate how concentrated ownership and the state ownership influence 
dividend policy based on investor sentiment affects the likelihood of dividend policy. 
The third empirical chapter investigates the relationship between stock liquidity, 
corporate ownership, with reference to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, 
and dividend policy, including the decisions on and changes to cash dividends, based 
on a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Ass with the previous chapter, logit and OLS 
models are built to examine how specific ownership, concentrated or state, influences 
dividend policy based on stock liquidity.   
  
1.2 Research Motivation, Objectives and Key Findings  
1.2.1  Supervisory Boards and Dividend Policy  
The investigation of the effects of the supervisory board on dividend policy decisions, 
including the propensity for, the level of and the change in cash dividends is based on 
a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Following previous research, we build upon logit and  
OLS models to examine how the features of the Chinese supervisory board, including 
its size (Guest 2009; Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 2009; Lublin 2014); acceptance 
of emoluments (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003); employee 
representation (Faccio, Lang, & Yong 2001; La Porta et al. 2002); shareholding ratio 
(Weisbenner 2000; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kahle 2002); and dependent director 
representatives, which refers to the supervisors who have a close working relationship  
with the board of directors, such as the chairman, secretary and the chairman’s assistant 
(Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; Adams & Feirrera 2007), will influence cash dividend 
payments.   
There are three reasons to study the Chinese supervisory board. First, the authority 
and status of the Chinese supervisory board are weak. The Chinese board is less 
independent and mostly powerless to influence dividend policy. Second, the members 
of the Chinese supervisory board, such as the employee representatives, lack support 
and protection from relevant organisations. Finally, the business operations in Chinese 
companies are more complex and the specificities of Chinese ownership, such as the 
SOEs, could influence the function of the supervisory board in some way. Although 
previous research has studied how the Chinese supervisory board impacts dividend 
policy from aspects such as board size and the background and shareholding ratio of 
the members, the evidence in this respect is mixed; moreover, some aspects of research 
on dividend policy, such as the effect of emolument incentives and supervisory board 
independence, have been underexplored. As a result, the Chinese supervisory board 
may influence dividend payout policy in different and unknown ways, thereby 
warranting further investigation.  
The results of this empirical chapter first show how the aspects of the Chinese 
supervisory board impacts cash dividends, and second, what board problems need to 
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be improved and solved. The detailed results are presented, and the main findings are 
concluded in the empirical Chapter 4.  
  
1.2.2  Investor Sentiment, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy  
Investigation of the relationship between investor sentiment, corporate ownership, and 
dividend policy is pursued in the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) with reference 
to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, covering policy decisions based on, 
and changes to, cash dividends, using a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Following 
previous research, we estimate logit and OLS models to investigate how concentrated 
and the state ownership influence dividend policy based on investor sentiment. Previous 
research suggests that dividend policy is solely determined by investor sentiment 
(Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006). This research aims to examine the effects of 
investor sentiment on the propensity of the controlling and state-controlled shareholders 
to pay cash dividends.   
Previous research explores the relationship between either investor sentiment 
(Frankfurter & Wood 2002; Baker & Wurgler 2004; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006) or 
ownership of the company (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, 
Wei, & Yang 2011) and dividend policy. According to agency theory, the controlling 
inside shareholders could expropriate not only minority shareholders but also outside 
ones by manipulating dividend policy (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 
2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011). However, they still need to be concerned with 
investors’ requirements and firm value (Truong & Heaney 2007). In addition, investor 
sentiment reflects investors’ demands, as well as influencing dividend payment. As a 
result, an important research question is whether and how investor sentiment influences 
the incentives of majority shareholders’ with regard to cash dividend payments. This 
study aims to research this topic. Moreover, we focus on Chinese-listed firms with 
highly concentrated state-controlled ownership, meaning that many Chinese listed 
firms’ share distributions are not only highly concentrated but also state-owned. Hence, 
we also test whether investor sentiment influences SOEs’ decisions on cash dividends.  
In this research, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to build an investor 
sentiment index and define it as the first principal component of the correlation matrix 
of five variables, namely share turnover, IPO number, first-day returns on IPOs, the 
equity share ratio, and dividend premium, following Baker & Wurgler (2007), Zhu & 
Niu (2016), Ding et al. (2017). The results of this empirical analysis show the 
relationship between investor sentiment and cash dividend payment as well as how 
investor sentiment influences the propensity of state-controlled and majority 
shareholders to pay cash dividends. The detailed analysis and the main conclusion are 
discussed in the empirical Chapter 5.   
 
1.2.3  Stock Liquidity, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy  
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) investigates the relationship between stock 
liquidity, corporate ownership, with reference to concentrated and state-controlled 
shareholders, and dividend policy, including the decisions on and changes to cash 
dividends, based on a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Following previous research, we 
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utilise logit and OLS models to investigate how concentrated and the state ownership 
influence dividend policy based on the level of stock liquidity. Previous research 
explores the relationship between either stock liquidity (La Porta et al. 2002; Li & Zhao  
2008; Petrasek 2012) or ownership of the company (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, 
Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011) and dividend policy. Consequently, the 
gap related to how specific ownership, concentrated or state, influences dividend policy 
based on stock liquidity is covered in this research.  
The results and conclusions of this chapter indicate that stock liquidity in fact has 
no significant impact on cash dividend payment or the propensity of state-controlled or 
majority shareholders to pay dividends in the Chinese stock market. In other words, 
Chinese companies with concentrated state-controlled shareholders are not sensitive to 
stock liquidity. The details are described in the empirical Chapter 6.  
  
1.3 Contributions of the Research  
1.3.1  Contributions to Literature  
First, this thesis extends and complements the extant literature on supervisory boards 
and dividend policy. Previous research has studied how the German and Chinese 
supervisory boards impact dividend policy from aspects such as board size and the 
background and shareholding ratio of the members (Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; Faccio,  
Lang, & Young 2001; La Porta et al. 2002; Fich 2005; Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & 
Hopt 2009; Block & Gerstner, 2016). However, some aspects of supervisory 
characteristics, such as emolument incentive and supervisory board independence, 
especially in the Chinese stock market, have not been explored. As a result, in this 
research, we examine how features of the Chinese supervisory board, including size 
(Guest 2009; Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 2009; Lublin 2014); receipt of 
emoluments (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003); employee 
representatives (Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001; La Porta et al. 2002); shareholding ratio 
(Weisbenner 2000; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kahle 2002); and dependent director 
representatives (Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; Adams & Feirrera 2007), influence cash 
dividend payments.   
The second contribution of this thesis is to extend and complement the extant 
literature on investor sentiment and dividend policy from a different perspective. 
contrary to the findings of previous research, there is a significant negative relationship 
between investor sentiment and cash dividend payment in the Chinese market, which 
is not consistent with catering theory, but instead supports signalling theory. The 
research result suggests that companies will tend to pay cash dividends to deliver 
positive signalling and to attract investors when the investor sentiment is low, which 
means investors have no confidence or expectations of the stock market (Bhattacharya, 
1979; Miller & Rock, 1985). The empirical analysis also provides literature evidence 
of the effects of investor sentiment on the propensity of the controlling and 
statecontrolled shareholders to pay cash dividends, an issue which has been little 
studied in previous research. Investor sentiment influences the inventives of state-
controlled and majority shareholers, that help to reduce the agency problems between 
different types of shareholders (Stein 1997; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Gugler 2003; Peng 
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et al. 2011; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013) and protect shareholders right (Mardani & 
Indrawati 2018).  
The final contribution of the thesis is to extend and complement the extant literature 
on stock liquidity and dividend policy from different viewpoints supported by evidence 
from the Chinese stock market. Previous research explains the relationship between 
stock liquidity and dividend policy by different theories such as the clientele transaction 
cost view (Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 2007), the informational effect (Kyle 1985; 
Stiglitz 2000; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki 2003; La Porta et al. 2002) and the lifecycle 
theory (Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 2007). However, our research results demonstrate 
that the value of the coefficient of stock liquidity is significantly positive but close to 0, 
which give a new view that in practice it has little influence on the dividend policy of 
Chinese firms. We provide an explanation for the findings based on the actual situation, 
in that, first, China has a stock market with a more opaque information environment 
(Allen, Qian, & Qian 2005; Jiang et al. 2017), and second, that there is a serious agency 
problem caused by Chinese concentrated ownership (Gu, Yang, & Yu 2013; Dong et 
al. 2014; Li et al. 2015).  
   
1.3.2  Contributions to Practice  
Our results and conclusions of Chapter 4 also make contributions to practice and show 
what the Chinese supervisory board problems need to be improved and solved. First, 
supervisors who are also shareholders could increase agency problems when  they are 
eager to gain cash dividends for personal advantages (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen,  
Bernardo, & Welch 2000). Second, employee representatives can not work effectively.  
Third, the Chinese supervisory board lacks independence. In fact, the so called “twotier 
system” in China is in effect a one-tier system in nature. As a result, relevant regulations 
and laws should be formulated and codetermination need to be introduced to support 
the operation of the Chinese supervisory board (Meissel & Fogel 1975; Baums & Frick 
1997; Dilger 2003). Finally, our results of Chpater 6 indicate that the opaque 
information environment and the serious agency problem caused by Chinese 
concentrated ownership should be noticed and improved to make a better dividend 
policy and protect shareholders right (Allen, Qian, & Qian 2005; Gu, Yang, & Yu 2013; 
Dong et al. 2014; Li et al. 2015; Jiang et al. 2017).  
 
1.4 Organization of the Study  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
related literature, including the theories of dividend policy and corporate governance, 
and descriptions of corporate ownership, investor sentiment and market liquidity. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology employed in the empirical analysis. Specifically, 
after a brief discussion of research philosophy and approaches, this chapter presents the 
data for the empirical analysis and outlines its collection process, discusses the 
econometric estimation process, and provides the variable descriptions.   
The next three chapters present the detailed empirical analysis as discussed above. 
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between the supervisory board and dividend 
policy. Chapter 5 studies the relationship between investor sentiment, ownership and 
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dividend policy. Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship between market liquidity, 
ownership and dividend policy. These empirical chapters follow a common framework: 
first, the hypotheses are proposed; second, the methodology is outlined, and third, the 
descriptive statistics are presented followed by a discussion of the regression results 
and robustness tests aimed to corroborate the findings of the main analysis. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes the key findings of the thesis and discusses the implications and 













Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction  
Dividend policy refers to the ways that firms return capital to their equity investors and 
involves many corporate issues, such as firms’ share price, investment and value (Allen 
& Michaely 1995; Lease et al. 1999; Gul et al. 2012). Managers use dividend policy as  
part of overall firms’ investment decisions on how to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders (Baker, Farrelly & Edelman 1985; Adjaoud & Ben-Amar 2010). There are 
several types of dividend distributions, such as cash dividends, stock dividends, and 
property dividends. A company could pay earnings to investors in the form of cash or 
fair market value of assets, or by offering its shareholders the option of tendering shares 
directly at a fixed price.  
The issue of corporate dividends has a long history. In the early stages, it was seen 
that managers realised the importance of high and stable dividend payments to 
maximise shareholder wealth (Frankfurter & Wood 1997). As more research developed 
on the subject, dividends were also seen as an important form of information to be 
conveyed about a firm’s performance. For example, firms convey relevant information, 
such as their true value, quality and future development, to the market and investors 
through dividend payments (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & Rock 1985; Allen, Bernardo, 
& Welch 2000; Al-Malkawi, Rafferty, & Pillai 2010). At the same time, managers are 
also expected to balance different conflicts of interest between various types of capital 
suppliers by paying dividends (e.g., Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Alli, Khan, & 
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Ramirez 1993). In summary, the study of dividend policy attempts to solve issues 
pertaining to why and how dividends are paid and to apply relevant theories to explain 
corporate dividend behaviour.   
There is now extensive literature on both the theoretical and empirical research into 
dividend policy. Such a policy is bound up with the development of the corporate form. 
As financial markets have developed, the issue of why firms pay dividends has become 
a matter of intense academic debate since the irrelevance hypothesis questioned the 
reasons why firms pay dividends. The literature highlights various management 
attributes including corporate governance and ownership structures that are pertinent in 
influencing dividend policy. At the same time, the development of financial markets 
has brought forth issues of investor sentiment and stock market liquidity that are also 
found to be relevant in influencing dividend policy. The object of this chapter is to 
provide a comprehensive review of all the relevant factors appropriate for this research.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 covers various dividend 
theories while section 2.3 covers corporate governance theories complementing the 
factors explaining dividend policy. Section 2.4 discusses the practical arrangements 
(models) of firm-level corporate governance that exist in modern economies, including 
the two-tier system in China. Section 2.5 discusses different types of ownership 
structures while Section 2.6 focusses on how corporate ownership concentration 
influences dividend policy. Section 2.7 concentrates on the characteristics of corporate 
ownership in China. Section 2.8 discusses issues of investor sentiment with related 
evidence on dividend policy while section 2.9 discusses the same on stock market 
liquidity. Finally, section 2.10 concludes the chapter.    
  
2.2 Dividend Theories  
This section discusses dividend theories beginning with the dividend irrelevance 
hypothesis, together with MM theory, “The bird in the hand” theory, tax effect, clientele 
effect, signalling theory, agency theory, lifecycle theory, catering theory and tunnelling 
theory, containing the developments of the theories from both theoretical and empirical 
points of view.  
  
2.2.1  Miller and Modigliani (MM) Theory  
The MM theory, which postulated the dividend irrelevance hypothesis, is one of the 
early theories based on the neoclassical assumptions. Miller and Modigliani (1961)  
proposed the irrelevance theory, which relates to a firm’s investment policy being fixed 
in a frictionless market, meaning that the capital market is perfect, without asymmetric 
information, taxes, nor transaction or agency costs; the price of securities cannot be 
influenced by investors or firms, and payout policy is irrelevant to firm value. In a 
frictionless market, investors will hold the same complete information which could 
influence the stock price and they can make a stock deal without any costs. In addition, 
the operating cash flow of a firm will be used to pay the dividend and invest in the 
future. If a firm invests a large amount of cash, this will influence an increase in stock 
price. Investors can sell stocks for cash if they wish, even though the dividend is 
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relatively lower; if the firm chooses to pay a higher dividend, investors can buy more 
stocks to gain further profit. As a result, investors have no preference for either dividend 
distribution or capital gain. Since they have no interest in dividend payment, only the 
profitability or rate of return on future investments will influence the firm value, which 
is why payout policy is irrelevant to firm value.   
The MM theory provided the basic foundation for subsequent research into 
dividend policy. Some researchers provided evidence to support the MM irrelevance 
hypothesis that neither high-yield nor low-yield payout policy will influence stock 
prices (Black & Scholes 1974; Hess 1981; Miller & Scholes 1982; Miller 1986; 
Bernstein 1996). However, other research does not support this approach or even 
provides direct evidence to challenge the MM theory. Ball et al. (1979) state that its 
design is hard to prove. Researchers such as Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985), 
Partington (1985), Siddiqi (1995), Baker and Powell (1999) and Casey and Dickens 
(2000) all find strong evidence from through research to support the view that payout 
policy affects stock prices.  
  In fact, in a real market, payout policy appears to follow systematic patterns.  
Moreover, changes in payout policy will also influence firm value in predictable ways. 
There are various factors which could impact dividend policy, such as taxes, agency 
relationship, and asymmetric information. As a consequence, the MM theory may be 
argued to be an untenable proposition. DeAngel, DeAngelo, & Stulz (2006) criticised 
the MM theory from several aspects. They believed that payout policy was not 
irrelevant, as first, the market cannot be perfect, and second, even in a frictionless 
market, if retention with the NPV (Net Present Value) of investment policy fixed is 
allowed, a firm can reduce its value by paying out less than the full present value of 
FCF (Free Cash Flow). However, managers will always choose the best payout policy, 
and in such cases, this policy does indeed matter, and investment policy is no longer 
the sole determinant of a firm’s value.  
 
2.2.2  The “Bird in The Hand” Theory  
 
Another important traditional theory, “the bird in the hand” theory, was developed by 
Gordon (1959), which is opposed to MM theory, suggesting that dividend payout policy 
will influence firm value, especially the cost of capital. Investors prefer dividends to 
the return from future capital gain because they believe that the income from dividends 
is more certain, while the income from capital gain comes with risks, which will be 
greater as time goes on. As a result, investors require a higher rate of future returns to 
cover their risks. Therefore, they prefer cash dividends, while firms have to pay high 
dividends periodically to keep their high market value. The bird in the hand theory has 
been studied and proven by various researchers (Lintner 1962; Gordon 1963; Walter 
1963). For instance, Fisher (1961) and Gordon (1963) found that a higher dividend 
influences the lower cost of equity or return on equity.  
Gordon's (1959) theory is also based on several assumptions, which are that firms 
only have equities but no debts, that retaining earning is the only way to finance, and 
that returns are constant, as well as the cost of capital. As with the MM theory, the 
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assumptions of the bird in the hand theory are difficult to achieve in a real market. 
Furthermore, some research argues that the reasoning underlying the theory is 
fallacious. For example, the MM theory argues that firm risk is determined by the 
riskiness of operating cash flow, but not by ways to distribute earnings. Researchers 
such as Friend and Puckett (1964), Bhattacharya (1979), Rozeff (1982) and Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992) found a negative relationship between firm risk and dividend 
payment because increases in the risk of a firm’s operation or cash flow could influence 
dividends, but increasing dividends cannot reduce firm risk. Moreover, other research 
suggests that investors are disadvantaged by receiving cash dividends, based on the tax 
effect hypothesis (Litzenberger & Ramaswamy 1979). Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002) 
also found no support for the bird in the hand explanation for paying dividends by 
conducting a questionnaire.   
  
2.2.3  Tax Effect   
The tax effect, the final early-stage traditional theory, was first proposed by Farrar, 
Farrar, and Selwyn (1967), who argue that a lower payout policy should be adopted if 
the tax on dividends is higher than the tax on a capital gain. In the United States and 
many other countries, the tax on dividends is higher than that on long-term capital gains, 
and in most cases, capital gains will not be taxed until they are realized. Therefore, 
investors prefer capital return because they can defer tax payment and ask for a higher 
required rate of return to gain more interest to cover their costs. As a result, in order to 
maximise both firms’ and investors’ interests, a low payout policy should be adopted.   
Brennan (1970) built a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to test the theory. He 
assumed that the taxes on both capital gains and dividends must be paid in each period 
and found that the pretax excess return of the security was positively related to its 
system risk and dividend yield. As the taxes on dividends are assumed to be paid in 
each period, a lower dividend results in lower taxes. Later research tested the CAPM 
model to understand the relationship between dividend payments and stock returns. 
Some research found evidence to support Brennan’s (1970) model, while other studies 
challenged the conclusion of the model. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) extended 
Brennan’s (1970) model and found a significant positive coefficient on dividend yield 
using a long-run measure of yield, which supports the model and concludes that firms 
can increase share prices by reducing dividends. Keim (1985) developed a 
SharpeLintner CAPM to examine the relationship between dividend yields and stock 
returns, with the results suggesting a yield-related tax effect. In Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy’s (1982) re-examination and other researchers’ analyses, such as that of 
Poterba and Summers (1984) and Kalay and Michaely (2000), evidence that strongly 
supports the tax effect hypothesis is provided.  
  
However, Black and Sholes (1974) also tested Brenna’s (1970) model but were 
unable to find evidence of the tax effect. Furthermore, Hess (1981) and Miller and 
Scholes (1982) challenged Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s (1982) conclusion. They 
argued that the information effect is ignored by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) 
and that the coefficient of dividend yield is not statistically significant. Morgan and 
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Thomas (1998) drew on Keim’s (1985) methodology and suggested that there was a 
non-linear relationship between dividend yield and risk-adjusted return, which is 
contrary to Brennan’s model and tax effect theory. Baker et al.’s (2002) questionnaire 
also provides weak support for the tax effect theory.  
  
2.2.4  Clientele Effect  
The clientele effect proposes that in practice specific investors may face different tax 
treatments, transaction costs, or various other situations and that they are attracted to 
firms that suit their particular situations. Meanwhile, these different clienteles will be 
attracted by different company dividend policies. There are different types of clientele 
effect, such as the tax-induced and transaction cost-induced.   
The essence of a tax-induced clientele effect is the fact that the different tax 
treatments of dividends and capital gains could lead to different choices by investors. 
For example, ceteris paribus, investors in low tax brackets who rely on regular and 
steady income prefer high and stable dividends, while some corporate or institutional 
investors are more interested in high-dividend stocks (Han, Lee, & Suk 1999; Dhaliwal, 
Erickson, & Trezevant 1999; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002). In comparison, investors 
in high tax brackets would prefer to invest their income in companies to obtain potential 
capital gains and defer tax obligations (Al-Malkawi, Rafferty, & Pillar 2010).   
With regard to the transaction cost-induced clientele effect, dividend policy could 
influence different clientele to shift their portfolio allocation, resulting in transaction 
costs. Small investors, such as retirees and income-oriented ones, who rely on dividend 
income, may be attracted to stocks paying high and stable dividends, while investors 
who do not need their share portfolios to satisfy liquidity needs prefer low dividend 
payouts to avoid transaction costs when they reinvest the proceeds of dividends in the 
future (Bishop et al. 2000). Besides investors, companies are also affected by 
transaction costs. When new equity issuing costs are significant for a company, it is 
more likely to rely on retained earnings rather than external financing (Fazzari, Hubbard, 
& Petersen, 1988). Meanwhile, to avoid inducing shareholders to modify their 
portfolios and entail transaction costs, firms should attempt to adopt a stable dividend 
policy (Scholz 1992).  
Many researchers have studied the existence of the dividend clientele effect theory 
(Bajaj & Vijh 1990; Ang, Blackwell, & Megginson 1991; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1994). 
Pettit (1972) proves that elderly low-income investors rely more on their portfolios to 
finance their current consumption and avoid transaction costs. Consequently, they tend 
to invest in high-dividend stocks. Later, Scholz (1992) developed his model and verified 
that different tax treatments of dividends influence investors’ choice of dividend 
portfolios, which is consistent with the tax-clientele effect. Moreover, Armstrong & 
Hoffmeister (2012) studied the change in U.S. dividend taxation for qualified public 
utility stocks and found that this change affected some high dividend-yielding stocks.  
Dhaliwal, Erickson & Trezevant (1999) found that institutional shareholding changed 
following dividend initiations and Seida (2001) also provides evidence consistent with 
this result. Allen, Bernardo, & Welch (2000) found that firms pay dividends to attract 
more institutions, which pay less tax than individual investors. Relevant research on the 
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relationship between institutional shareholders and dividend policy has been conducted 
and the results are consistent with the clientele effect (Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; 
Desai & Jin 2011). Researchers continued to test and prove the dividend tax-clientele 
effect with different types of shareholders (Korkeamaki, Liljeblom, & Pasternack 2010; 
Dahlquist, Robertsson & Rydqvist 2014). For example, Korkeamaki, Liljeblom, & 
Pasternack (2010) proposed that firms altered their dividend policies based on changes 
in tax incentives for the largest shareholders in Finland. Elton and Gruber (1970) found 
that there was a positive relationship between stock dividends and the proportional size 
of ex-dividend price drops. Their explanation was that differential taxes induced a 
preference for capital gains relative to cash dividends. They also supported the notion 
that transaction costs are significant to specific investors (Elton, Gruber, & Rentzler 
1984).   
Furthermore, some researchers have found evidence that excess ex-dividend-day 
returns are positively correlated with transaction costs and that short-term trading 
increases for high-yield stocks around ex-dividend days (Karpoff & Walkling 1988, 
1990; Michaely & Vila 1996). The tests of ex-dividend-day behaviour have also been 
extended to different markets, with mixed results (Brown & Walter 1986; Lakonishok 
& Vermaelen 1983; Booth & Johnston 1984; Hietala, 1990; Kato & Loewenstein 1995; 
Bartholdy & Brown 1999; Graham & Kumar 2006; Dasilas 2009). More recently, 
researchers such as Becker, Ivković, & Weisbenner (2011) found that even the 
demographic and geographical variations of investors could affect dividend policy. 
However, other researchers have found less evidence to support the clientele effect 
(Lewellen et al. 1978; Kalay 1982; Richardson, Sefcik, & Thompson 1986; Brav et al. 
2005).  
  
2.2.5  Signalling Theory  
As the study of dividend payout policy developed, a variety of modern theories came 
about. The MM theory was argued to be inadequate because of the existence of 
asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. As a result, signalling theory 
was proposed, which posits that dividends can convey relevant firm information to 
investors. The information about a company’s current and prospects possessed by 
managers is actually not available to outsiders, and this informational gap may cause 
undervaluation of the company and its stock price by the market. Consequently, 
dividends become a useful tool to convey private information because investors see 
actual cash flows as a way of valuing a firm (Baskin, Baskin, & Miranti Jr. 1999). In 
addition, dividend announcements can be seen to convey implicit information about 
future earnings potential. Therefore, unanticipated announcements of dividend changes 
will influence a change in share prices in the same direction, which means that prices 
increase when dividends are initiated or increase, and decrease when dividends are not 
paid or decrease (Ang 1987; Koch & Shenoy 1999).   
Dividend-signalling models are used to provide a logical framework for a better 
understanding of the role of dividends in communicating relevant information to the 
market. There are two main basic features of all such models. First, managers possess 
private information about the future earnings prospects of firms and communicate this 
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information to the market by using dividend payments. Some information may be easy 
to deliver to investors either through announcements or audited financial statements, 
but other crucial information may be harder for investors to obtain. However, if too 
much detail is exposed by firms, this could undermine their competitive advantages. 
Second, firms have incentives to establish their true market value immediately. If 
managers withhold favourable information, this cannot be reflected in current market 
prices, and the wealth of existing shareholders will be transferred to new shareholders 
by any new share issues or share sales. The more favourable the private information 
that firms hold, the greater the incentive they have to communicate this information to 
the market, with the aim to eliminate the underpricing problem.   
There are several classical dividend-signalling models, such as those of 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), John and 
Nachman (1986), Kumar (1988), and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000). Bhattacharya 
(1979) proposes that managers should signal private information that concerns the 
prospects and expected profitability of firms’ investment projects, by committing 
exante to dividend policy. He assumes that outside investors lack information about the 
profitability of firms and those cash dividends are taxed more than capital gains, 
concluding that dividend payment is a signal of expected cash flow under these 
conditions.   
However, the Bhattacharya model has been criticized. First, it does not specify how 
management would commit to a specific dividend policy because dividends do not 
represent a contractual obligation, and when a cash flow shortfall occurs, firms are not 
obliged to resort to costly external financing to pay dividends. Therefore, market 
participants will not attach any importance to existing dividend payments if they 
recognize this lack of commitment, which means that the paying of dividends may not 
successfully play a signalling role. Second, besides dividend payments, share 
repurchases could also serve as a valid signalling mechanism, which generally has more 
favourable tax consequences for investors. Bhattacharya (1979) did not explain why 
firms choose to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares in order to signal 
information to the market at that moment. Some other research explains later that cash 
dividends are paid out of permanent cash flows while repurchasing shares is only the 
way firms utilize to take advantage of potential undervaluation and distribute excess 
capital temporarily (Jensen 1986; Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Dittmar 2000).   
Miller and Rock (1985) assume that dividend policy signals the qualities of firms. 
There exists asymmetrical information about firms between managers and outside 
investors. Highly regarded firms will try to signal positive information to attract 
investors by paying higher dividends. However, low-quality firms will be reluctant to 
forgo profitable investments in order to mimic the dividend payments of highlyregarded 
ones. As a result, firms could distinguish themselves by whether they decide to cut 
investments to pay high dividends. There is also an implication that firms may 
purposely reduce investments to pay higher dividends. Additionally, Miller and Rock 
(1985) predict about the announcement effect of dividend payment: there is a positive 
announcement effect for a high dividend payment and a negative effect for a low 
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payment. However, this model also does not give an explanation of why firms choose 
to signal by paying dividends but not by share repurchases.   
John and Williams (1985) overcame such criticism. They developed a model in 
which personal tax represents the cost signalling of a firm’s prospects to the market, 
which can explain why firms pay dividends even when share repurchases could be 
chosen as an alternative method. In the John and Williams model, shareholders sell 
shares to meet their liquidity needs. Managers hold information regarding the true value 
of firms that outside investors do not have and support the interests of existing 
shareholders. If firms are undervalued and existing shareholders have to sell their shares 
at a price that is below the fair value, high-quality firms decide to signal their true value 
by paying a taxable dividend. Although this is costly to shareholders, who must pay tax 
on the dividends if the outside investors interpret it as a positive signal, the share price 
will rise and shareholders will be able to sell fewer shares to meet their liquidity needs.  
In this case, paying dividends provides two benefits. First, shareholders sell their 
shares at a higher price. Second, they can benefit sufficiently from their fractional 
ownership only when their firms are sufficiently undervalued, even though they have 
to bear the tax cost. This is because a large fractional share of a firm’s equity is held by 
shareholders, and the gain on this part is quite valuable when the firm is undervalued. 
The shareholders of a low-quality firm will not obtain a profit because they will lose on 
the fractional share retained when any overvaluation is corrected. John and Williams 
(1985) model suggests that firms expect optimally high future operating cash flows to 
pay higher dividends, and these are higher when the tax cost relative to the capital gain 
is lower.   
As the study of signalling theory developed, researchers found that a firm will not 
change its dividend payment easily over a substantial period, even though its earnings 
may change dramatically during the same period. John and Nachman (1986) built their 
model by adding a dynamic version of the John and Williams (1985) model. In the John 
and Nachman (1986) model, the equilibrium of dividend payment is decided by two 
terms: first, the total extent of financing made at the firm and shareholder level; and 
second, the degree of optimism managers have in their private information. There are 
two specific situations: one when managers possess a high level of optimism about a 
firm’s future earnings and the firm’s securities are mispriced, so only the amount 
needed to finance profitable investments is expected; and one when the level of 
optimism about future earnings is relatively low, meaning managers prefer to acquire a 
large number of funds and hold a part of these in reserve to finance future investments. 
In both situations, the dividend payments are roughly the same, although the cash flows 
are quite different.   
Subsequently, Kumar (1988) developed a signalling theory in which dividend 
payments are smoothed relative to underlying cash flows. The Kumar (1988) model 
shows that with regard to types of firms ranging from low-quality to high-quality, the 
smoothing arising from dividends can be used to separate between them. Firm quality 
can be broken down into a finite number of discrete intervals, although firms in the 
same interval pay the same dividends, even though they have different earnings.   
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Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) developed a signalling model that potentially 
explains both dividend payments and smoothing based on tax clienteles. There are two 
types of investors in their model, untaxed institutional investors and taxed individual 
ones. In addition, they assume that institutional investors have greater incentives to 
invest and learn better about the quality of the firm because of their size. As a result, 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) further assume that paying dividends is one way to 
attract institutional investors. In their model, the market prices of the securities of the 
dividend-paying firms are more attractive for purchase by institutions than by 
individual investors because of the relative tax advantage. In addition, taxable dividends 
only exist in a high-quality firm because dividend payment will increase the chance that 
institutions which hold the firm’s stock detect the quality of the firm. Poor-quality firms 
know that their real quality will be revealed and they will lose if they mimic this 
dividend payment, while a high-quality firm does not fear losing investors and is willing 
to allow shareholders to incur tax costs in order to signal the quality of the firm.  
There is a long history of the research into signalling theory. Pettit (1972) is 
recognised as the first researcher to propose a dividend information market reaction. He 
found that share prices tend to rise or fall as announcements of dividends increase or 
decrease, and suggests that dividends can be used as an implicit device to transmit 
future information of expected earnings because of the limited public information 
disclosure. Moreover, for the first time, the variations in dividends are connected with 
additional information delivery, such as long-term cash flow; and the significance of 
the information depends on whether or not it is already known by the public. These 
findings were later supported by Aharony and Swary (1980) and Woolridge (1983).  
Ross (1977) introduced asymmetric information theory into the analysis of capital 
structure and stock dividend policy. Subsequently, Bhattacharya (1979) established the 
first theoretical model in the area of signalling hypothesis. Aharony and Swary (1980) 
found that even after controlling for contemporaneous earnings announcements, the 
relation between dividends and stock prices still holds, which suggests that dividends 
contain more incremental information about firm values compared to the relevant value 
information contained in earnings. Similar results were obtained by Asquith and 
Mullins’s (1983) research.  
Other researchers found evidence that dividends can transfer signals of different 
company aspects (Asquith & Mullins Jr. 1983). Some studies established that excess 
returns change following either the initiation or omission of dividends because of the 
signals they transfer (Asquith & Mullins Jr. 1983; Michaely, Thaler, & Womack 1995; 
Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Bali 2003). Miller and Rock (1985) found that 
dividends are the residual of earnings over investments and that a higher dividend than 
expected implies higher firm earnings, which will lead to a positive reaction to the stock 
price when the dividend announcement is made. Andres et al. (2013) reached the same 
conclusion, and also found that price reaction to dividends is related to a firm’s 
ownership structure. Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) proposed that the timing of 
dividend announcements could convey information to investors, while Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) proved that changes in dividends convey information about 
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the past and current earnings of firms. Furthermore, Hull (2015) suggests that a firm’s 
dividend reduction timing is relative to other dividend reductions in the same industry. 
When external financing is less available, high-value firms with greater investment 
opportunities will be amongst the first to make necessary dividend reductions for 
investment opportunities.  
Other research proposes that the signalling power of dividends differs from market 
to market. For instance, Dewenter and Warther (1998) compared dividend policies 
between Japan and the US and found the signalling effect in Japan was significantly 
lower than in the US. Conroy, Eades, and Harris (2000) also provide evidence 
consistent with this result. Overall, the mixed support for signalling theory indicates 
that firms communicate information about current and prospects by their dividend 
policy.  
  
2.2.6  Agency Theory  
A corporation’s operations involve a complex structure and rely on the contractual 
arrangements between different parties. Dividend payment plays an important role in 
balancing the complicated relationships between these parties. Different conflicts of 
interest occur between different types of capital suppliers, but the conflicts between 
stockholders and bondholders, and management and stockholders, dominate in the 
discussion of payout policy (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). In the conflicts of interest 
between bondholders and stockholders, management is assumed to be aligned with 
stockholders. Bondholders and stockholders share the market value of the firm and 
bondholders are paid before stockholders. Both the bondholders and the stockholders 
are willing to maximise their interests and therefore conflicts of interest between 
bondholders and stockholders occur, which will be discussed in separate research.   
Emphasis will be placed on another main conflict, that between stockholders and 
managers. Stockholders, who are defined here as the suppliers of capital in all forms, 
are the owners of the firms; however, in practice, professional managers are in control. 
The incentives of management and the stockholders are different. Both the social status 
and benefits of managers are associated with the controlled assets. First, managers 
always expect to hold more capital and retain as many earnings as they can to gain 
higher compensation, to prove how successfully they run the companies, and to avoid 
the risk of financial distress. Second, in many firms, executives are granted stock 
options, which means managers have incentives to reduce dividend payments to avoid 
a decline in the exercise prices of the options on ex-dividend days. Third, managers can 
manipulate investment decisions if they hold a large number of resources, as they prefer 
to invest more in securities that meet their personal interests better, which will lead to 
overinvestment.   
Therefore, in summary, managers have the incentive to pay a lower amount of 
dividends, which would maximise the wealth of stockholders and retain resources under 
their control as much as possible, resulting in overinvestment and undervaluation of the 
firm’s stock. Thus, managers’ behaviour would influence the interests of stockholders. 
Consequently, the board of directors is charged with representing the interests of 
stockholders and monitoring the performance of management. They want to ensure that 
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management makes decisions that are consistent with stockholders’ greatest wealth. 
However, this is not easy, because management is more privy than the members of the 
board to better information concerning the firm. As a result, a conflict of interest 
between the two groups exists, which will influence dividend decisions.  
Easterbrook’s (1984) and Jenson’s (1986) models are relatively important in 
agency theory. Easterbrook (1984) conjectured that dividend payments play an 
important role in solving agency relationships between stockholders and management. 
Entrepreneurs need a large number of external funds for financial investment as the 
optimal size of firms grows, which could result in a more diverse group of firm 
stockholders. However, smaller stockholders are unlikely to monitor the actions of 
managers because they will incur the full costs of monitoring, but receive only a small 
part of the benefits. However, if the stockholders can spread the monitoring costs 
proportionally, they can all gain when management makes an improved decision.   
Easterbrook argued that this is how dividend payments work. When a firm wants 
to raise external funds, it will pay more dividends to attract more investors. This 
behaviour will attract more professionals such as investment bankers, money managers, 
and public accountants, to scrutinise and evaluate the firm’s management. These 
professionals must be responsible because they could lose their reputation and 
customers for future security offerings if they misprice issues. As a result, the 
management of dividend-paying firms is scrutinised more frequently. Shareholders 
should have no problems with this because they can achieve better monitoring of 
management without paying monitoring costs. On one hand, paying dividends can 
attract funds; on the other hand, it can disperse and reduce the agency costs of firms, 
which is why stockholders insist on dividend payment, so they can spend less.   
Easterbrook (1984) proposed that managers have great incentives to pay less, while 
stockholders prefer to receive higher dividends because first, managers wish to hold 
more earnings to reduce the firms’ debt/equity ratio, so they can gain a higher reputation, 
and second, they will benefit more from future investments. From the summary above, 
Easterbrook found two important implications from his analysis. First, firms with more 
decentralised and smaller stockholders pay higher dividends and do so more frequently, 
as they have to rely on paying dividends to monitor management. Second, firms with 
lower debt/equity ratios, which also means they retain more earning for investments, 
pay fewer dividends. Easterbrook’s model shows a positive correlation between 
dividends and the debt/equity ratio.   
Conversely, Jensen’s (1986) model discovered a negative relationship between 
dividends and the debt/equity ratio. According to Jensen’s analysis, free cash flows, 
which are defined as cash flow in excess of that to support positive NPV investment 
projects, play an important role in separating managers’ interests from those of 
stockholders. Stockholders should insist that these free cash flows be paid in case 
managers use them to invest in their objectives. As a result, the lower the debt/equity 
ratio, the higher the level of dividends that should be paid.  
Agency theory has been studied over a long period. Many researchers have 
proposed that dividend policy is a way to relieve the agency problems between 
corporate insiders and outside shareholders (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Zwiebel 
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1996; Fluck 1998; Myers 1998; Gomes 2000). Rozeff (1982), one of the first 
researchers to model agency costs by the “cost minimization model”, points out that 
there should be a negative relationship between the insiders’ shareholding ratio and the 
payout ratio, with a positive relationship between the dispersion of ownership and 
payout ratio. He also suggests that the benefit of paying dividends in reducing agency 
costs is limited for firms with lower dispersive ownership, which supports the agency 
costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is examined and supported by many other researchers 
employing various methods in different markets, such as Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn 
(1992), Holder, Langrehr, and Hexter (1998), Saxena (1999), and Al-Malkawi (2005).   
A further study of the agency cost hypothesis, which in particular supports the free 
cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), was made by Lang and Litzenberger (1989). 
They distinguish between overinvesting firms and value-maximising ones using 
Tobin’s Q ratio and propose an overinvestment hypothesis that the potential for 
overinvestment problems may grow when dividend payments are reduced. However, 
their results were challenged by other empirical studies, which found little support for 
the agency theory of the free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation of dividend policy 
(Howe, He, & Kao 1992; Denis, Denis, & Sarin 1994; Yoon & Starks 1995; Lie 2000).   
La Porta et al. (2002) developed two competing hypotheses, the outcome, and the 
substitution hypotheses, to explain the relation between dividend policy and agency 
theory. The outcome hypothesis implies that dividends are a result of the legal 
protection of shareholders in a more effective legal protection system because 
shareholders have a greater right to force managers to release cash. On the other hand, 
the substitution hypothesis predicts that in a weak legal protection environment, 
managers use dividends to establish a good reputation when they need to raise external 
funds from the capital market. This is consistent with the outcome hypothesis, and also 
supports the fact that paying dividends can reduce the conflict between insiders and 
outsiders, or shareholders. In summary, the empirical results for the agency theory of 
dividend policy are mixed, but prove that dividends serve to reduce conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders, agency costs, and overinvestment problems.  
  
2.2.7  Lifecycle Theory  
The lifecycle theory of dividends contends that the optimal dividend policies of firms 
are dependent on the stages at which firms are in their life cycles. As firms grow to 
maturity, their investment opportunities and growth rates are reduced, but profitability 
and free cash flow rise. Therefore, firms begin to pay dividends in order to distribute 
earnings to shareholders. The theory also predicts that firms will continue to pay 
dividends, even if their growth opportunities and profitability are expected to decline 
over the short term, which is contradictory to signalling theory (Grullon, Michaely, & 
Swaminathan 2002; Bulan & Subramanian 2009).   
Extensive research has found evidence for the lifecycle theory. Mueller (1972) 
focuses on the agency problem between managers and shareholders in his seminal study 
and proposes that the agency problem is insignificant or even absent in a “young” firm; 
it will only become a real problem when the firm matures. This is further supported by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), who found strong evidence that a firm 
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increases dividend payments as the relative amount of earned equity in its capital 
structure rises. They controlled for several microeconomic factors, such as firm size, 
profitability, total equity and growth, and their regression shows that there is a high 
significant relation between payment decisions and the earned/contributed capital mix. 
Other researchers have also proven that the initiation of and changes to dividends are 
related to life cycle theory. For example, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) found 
that dividends decrease when the growth rate increases; Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan (2002) also propose that an increase or decline in firm profitability 
follows an increase or decrease in dividends. Bulan, Subramanian, and Tanlu (2007) 
also found that the initiation of dividends happens at the mature stage of a firm’s life 
cycle. They discovered that mature firms, which have grown larger, are more profitable 
and have greater cash flow but fewer growth opportunities, will initiate dividends. 
Denis and Osobov (2008) further extended the research to several countries and their 
results continue to support the dividend lifecycle theory.   
However, the theory is also controversial among some researchers. For instance, 
the research of Von Eije and Megginson (2008) indicates that an increase in retained 
earnings to equity has no likelihood of leading to dividend payout, whereas the age of 
the company has an influence. Overall, the empirical evidence favours the lifecycle 
theory of dividends in terms of dividend payment propensity and life cycle 
characteristics.  
  
2.2.8  Catering Theory  
Catering theory was first proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004). Generally speaking,  
the theory proposes that: “Managers cater to investors by paying dividends when 
investors put a stock price premium on payers, and by not paying when investors prefer 
nonpayers.” (Baker & Wurgler 2004: 1126). This means that managers will make a 
dividend decision according to investor demands for dividend payers. There are three 
basic premises for the catering theory. First, cash dividends are a source of the 
uninformed investor demand for firms; second, limits on arbitrage allow this demand 
to affect current share prices; and third, managers take advantage of the short-run 
benefits of catering to current mispricing against the long-run costs, and then make 
payout decisions. The empirical work to prove this theory tests the propensity to pay 
dividends depending on a dividend premium.  
Some research has attempted to prove the dividend catering theory. Baker and 
Wurgler (2004) found that there was a close correlation between the propensity of firms 
to pay dividends and the dividend premium, and proved that there was a link between 
catering incentives and the propensity of firms to pay dividends in another paper (Baker 
and Wurgler 2004). Li and Lie (2006) developed Baker and Wurgler’s (2004) model 
on catering theory and argued that the dividend catering model should not only estate 
whether firms pay dividends or not, but also explain the level of dividend change. They 
found that the dividend premium influences not only the decisions to increase or 
decrease dividend payments, but also the size of such changes. Ferris, Sen, and Yui 
(2006) further validated the catering theory, finding dividends had disappeared from 
the UK market after 1990 because of the very low dividend premium level. Neves and 
Torre (2006) developed and supported this theory in the European market, while Baker, 
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Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) suggested a catering theory of nominal share prices. 
They proved that managers would prefer to increase the supply of low-priced securities 
if they are valued higher and are more attractive than high-priced securities in order to 
cater for investors when they are willing to pay a premium for them, even though there 
is no increasing practical fundamental value. Albouy, Bah, and Bonnet (2010) explored 
the theory in another way. They conducted a survey of managers of French-listed 
companies and obtained a positive response from them, thus supporting the theory. 
More recent research has examined the theory in different markets, such as Indonesia, 
Jordan, and Taiwan, and also obtained evidence to support it (Yao, Baker & Powell 
2012; Kulchania 2013; Jiang et al. 2013; Ramadan 2015; Wang et al. 2016).   
However, some researchers have expressed doubts about the catering theory, for 
example, Denis and Osobov (2005), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009), Tsuji 
(2010), and Turner, Ye, and Zhan (2013). Denis and Osoboy (2005) and Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009) suggest that in countries with strict legal 
requirements, such as Germany, France, and Japan, companies will not pay dividends 
following investors’ preferences. Overall, research into the catering theory continues to 
merit further exploration.  
  
2.2.9  Tunnelling Theory  
The hypothesis of tunnelling also comes from information asymmetry, but contrary to 
signalling theory, it suggests that dividend payments are used to divert resources from 
companies to control shareholders’ own benefits, but not to deliver information to 
outsiders or attract investors (Chen, Jian, & Xu 2009; Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017). 
Tunnelling is defined as the siphoning of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit 
of their controlling shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002). 
Dividend tunnelling explored in the Chinese market suggests three key points. First, in 
markets with weak legal protection, firms pay dividends to tunnel incentives (Lin & Su 
2008; Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017). Second, the tunneling of dividends is dominant and has 
become a way to control shareholders and expropriate minority ones (Bae et al. 2002; 
Lee & Xiao 2004; Chang & Shin, 2007). Particularly for state-owned firms, cash 
dividend policy is predominantly used to extract resources for their own benefit (Lee & 
Xiao 2003; Chen, Jian, & Xu 2009). Usually, related-party transactions for tunnelling 
by group-firms or cash dividends are used as a medium for controlling shareholders to 
sell non-tradable shares to minority shareholders at a favorable price (Lee & Xiao 2004; 
Jian & Wong, 2004). For example, many Chinese-listed companies have increased 
dividend payments because of the differential pricing between tradable and nontradable 
shares during their initial public offering (IPO). Such companies might use high-
dividend payments to divert proceeds from an IPO or rights issue to controlling 
shareholders' pockets. Third, in the Chinese stock market, controlling shareholders 
enjoy a disproportionately higher return on dividends compared to outsiders, and take 
advantage of this feature (Johnson et al. 2000; Chen, Jian, & Xu 2009).  
  
2.3 Corporate Governance Theories  
Corporate governance can be defined as either “narrow” or “broad”. This narrow-broad 
dichotomy is based on a corporate governance regime that focuses on satisfying either 
the parochial interests of shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Sternberg 2004; West 
51 
 
2006) or the broader interests of diverse societal stakeholder groups, such as employees, 
management, and government (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride 2004; Gillan 2006). In the 
narrow sense, shareholders, the board of directors, and executive management are 
suggested as the key corporate governance structures in order to maximise the wealth 
of owners (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride 2004; West 2006). In contrast, a broad definition 
of corporate governance examines both the running of external and internal governance 
mechanisms to maximise firm value and satisfy the mutual benefit not only of existing 
shareholders but also other potential stakeholders (Freeman & Reed 1983; Cadbury 
1999; West 2006; Mallin 2008).   
Corporate governance practice does not consist of a standard mode and cannot 
operate in any standard form (Oman 2001). It is concerned with the socio-political and 
legal environments, business circumstances, and operation strategies, amongst other 
aspects (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). Various fundamental theories underlining 
corporate governance provide interpretations of the influencing factors and help to 
better understand the issues. An introduction to these theories, including agency, 
stewardship, stakeholder, resource dependency, transaction cost, social contract, 
legitimacy, political and ethics-related theory is given below.  
 
2.3.1  Agency Theory  
Much research into corporate governance derives from agency theory. In this theory, 
the agency problem relates to how to induce agents to act in the best interests of the 
principals (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Agents refer to managers, while the owners and 
the board of directors act as the principals. Corporate governance is regarded as a 
mechanism in which the board of directors is a vital monitoring tool that minimises any 
principal-agent problems caused by the decentralisation of ownership in modern 
companies (Mallin 2004). The theory assumes that the interests of the two focused 
participants in corporations, shareholders and managers, are clear and consistent and 
that they are not willing to make sacrifices for the interests of others (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella 2003). As a result, although the principals (shareholders) expect the agents 
(managers) to make decisions in their best interests, the agents may succumb to their 
self-interest and engage in opportunistic behaviour that may not achieve the aspirations 
of the principals.   
On one hand, the board of directors hired by shareholders plays an agency role to 
serve the shareholders by approving management decisions and supervising their 
implementation (Fama & Jensen 1983; Baysinger & Butler 1985; Lorsch & MacIver 
1989; Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Daily & Dalton 1994). Because the monitoring 
and governance functions of the board are important, much research has examined the 
composition of the board (Pearce & Zahra 1992; Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein 1994; 
Daily & Dalton 1994; Gales & Kesner 1994; Bhagat & Black, 1998; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). On the other hand, as managers may take actions that benefit themselves but not 
the shareholders by using their specific knowledge and expertise, a monitoring 
mechanism needs to be built, and a way to induce managers to act in the best interests 
of the shareholders needs to be provided (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Abdullah & 
Valentine 2009; Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). The problem between agents and principals 
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results in agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As a result, the study of governance 
mechanisms that could protect shareholder interests, minimise agency costs, and align 
the agents and principals is on-going.  
  
2.3.2  Stewardship Theory  
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory proposes that managers are good 
stewards and stand for the best interests of the owners (Donaldson & Davies, 1991). 
The theory is founded in social psychology, which states that the behaviour of stewards 
is organizational and collectivist, with a higher utility than individualistic self-service 
behaviour, and focuses on achieving the interests and goals of organisations (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson 1997). As a result, when shareholder wealth is maximised, 
the function of stewards is also maximised, as they have a clear mission and the success 
of organisations can satisfy most of the requirements of the owners (Smallman 2004). 
Smallman also proposes that the stewards will balance the tensions between different 
beneficiaries. Therefore, stewardship theory proposes an argument about corporate 
performance that satisfies the requirements of the interested parties and thus achieves 
the dynamic performance equilibrium for balanced governance. It stresses that there is 
a strong relationship between managers and firm success because the managers will 
protect and maximise shareholder wealth by improving firm performance (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson 1997; Daily, Dalton, & Canella 2003).   
   
2.3.3  Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory mainly centres on the issues concerning stakeholders in institutions, 
positing that an entity invariably seeks to balance and satisfy the interests of diverse 
stakeholders (Abrams, 1951). Stakeholders comprise not only shareholders but also 
other interest groups such as investors, employees, suppliers and customers, whom all 
participate in corporate business (Coleman et al. 2008). Consubstantial, contractual and 
contextual stakeholders are classified in order to distinguish between stakeholder types 
(Rodriguez, Ricart, & Sanchez 2002). First, consubstantial stakeholders are those who 
are essential for the existence of corporate business, such as shareholders, strategic 
partners, investors and employees. Second, contractual stakeholders are ones such as 
financial institutions, suppliers and customers, who have formal contracts with the 
company. Finally, contextual stakeholders are representatives of the social and natural 
systems of business operations and play a fundamental role in gaining credibility and 
carrying out company activities. Contextual stakeholders could be local communities, 
public administration or countries. Therefore, companies need to safeguard the interests 
of all these components, which contribute to creating their general value (Zingales 1998; 
Rajan & Zingales 1998; Rodriguez, Ricart, & Sanchez 2002).   
   
2.3.4  Resource Dependency Theory  
Resource dependency theory focuses on the role of the board of directors in acquiring 
resources for firms, whereas stakeholder theory concerns the interaction between an 
organization and its various groups of stakeholders. This theory contends that directors 
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secure essential resources for companies through their linkages to the external 
environment, and the appointment of independent directors is a means of gaining 
resources that are critical to the success of companies (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand 1996; 
Hillman, Canella, & Paetzold 2000). This kind of environmental linkage and 
interdependency may reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1989). For example, 
external directors who are able to acquire legal advice can communicate this in either 
board or private meetings and help to reduce costs.  
The requirements of resources lead to the development of network governance or 
exchange relationships between organisations. In addition, the uneven distribution of 
resources inside organisations results in interdependence in organisational relationships, 
which may be intensified by factors such as the importance, relative shortage or 
concentration of resources (Donaldson & Davis 1991). This resource dependency 
encourages directors to bring in external resources such as information, skills, key 
partners and legitimacy to firms in order to overcome uncertainty (Gales & Kesner 1994; 
Hillman, Cannella Jr., & Paetzols 2000).  
  
2.3.5  Transaction Cost Theory  
Transaction cost theory was first developed by Cyert and March (1963) and 
theoretically described and promulgated later by Williamson (1996), who attempted to 
show the interdisciplinary alliance of economics, law and organisations. According to 
this theory, firms are viewed as organisations comprising people with various views 
and objectives, who become so extensive that they can substitute for the market in 
determining resource allocation; in other words, price and production. As a result, 
managers, who are the decision-makers of corporate transactions, can be opportunists 
and arrange transactions in their own interests (Williamson 1996; Abdullah & Valentine 
2009).  
  
2.3.6  Social Contract Theory  
Social contract theory proposes that society is a series of social contracts between 
members and society itself, and social responsibility is thought of as a contractual 
obligation that a firm owes to society (Donaldson 1983; Gray, Owen, & Adams 1996). 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) developed the theory that managers make ethical 
decisions that refer to both a macrosocial contract, which includes the expectations of 
a business to support the local community and a microsocial contract, which is a 
specific form of involvement.   
  
2.3.7  Legitimacy Theory  
Legitimacy theory assumes that “the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate with some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). It is also based on the notion that a social contract 
exists between society and its members, similar to social contract theory. The society 
provides the authority of occupying and utilising natural resources and labour; as a 
result, a company can receive permission from society to operate and is ultimately 
accountable for its operations and actions to society (Deegan 2004). In legitimacy 
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theory, profit is viewed as a comprehensive measure of organisational legitimacy, 
which means a company must seriously consider the rights of the public, not just the 
rights of investors (Ramanathan 1976; Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Profit maximisation is 
not the primary pursuit of a company. Failing to comply with societal expectations 
could result in sanctions being imposed in the form of limited company resources, 
operations and products (Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Empirical research has used the 
legitimacy theory to explain the relationship between corporate disclosures and 
community expectations (Deegan 2004).  
  
2.3.8  Political Theory  
Political theory suggests that any political influence existing in companies could direct 
corporate governance; moreover, the participation of government in corporate decision 
making helps to gain much public interest when taking cultural challenges into 
consideration (Pound 1993). This theory highlights that the determination of the 
allocation of corporate power, profits and privileges is supported by the government. 
Hawley and Williams (1996) believe there is an immense political influence on 
governance development. They prove that over the past few decades, the government 
has had a strong political influence on enterprises and that politics has entered 
governance structures and corporate mechanisms.   
  
2.3.9  Ethics-Related Theory  
Ethics is defined as the study of morality and ethical theories and explains that the 
rational use of rules and principles can ascertain the rights or wrongs of a situation 
(Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Several ethics-related theories are associated with corporate 
governance, including business, feminist, discourse, virtue and postmodern ethics 
theories.   
Business ethics theory concerns the rights and wrongs of business activities, 
decisions and situations. The power and influence of business are becoming stronger 
than ever before, as the business is now a major provider, in terms of products, jobs and 
services, to society. Any business collapse also has a greater impact on society because 
the demands of stakeholders in companies are more complex and challenging than 
previously. Business ethics is important and helps to discover problems and benefits 
associated with ethical issues in firms. The rights and wrongs of business ethics is 
understood by injecting morality that is concerned with the norms, beliefs and values 
fixed in society and is helpful in terms of the rights and wrongs of an individual or 
community (Crane & Matten 2007).  
Feminist ethics theory places more emphasis on more healthy and empathetic 
social relationships, caring for and avoiding harm to each other. The social concern 
involves caring for one another, but is not a profit-centred motive in this theory; in 
addition, it is important to see ethics in the light of the exercised environment, as an 
organisation is a network of actions and impacts on cross-community levels and 
interactions (Casey 2006).  Discourse ethics theory seeks a peaceful settlement of 
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conflicts. It is also called argumentation ethics, in that argument that the establishment 
of ethical truth by way of investigating the presuppositions of discourse helps promote 
cultural rationality and cultivate openness (Haberman 1996; Meisenbach 2006).  
Virtue ethics theory advocates moral excellence, good character, goodness and 
chastity. It highlights the virtues of developing positive moral behaviour and is 
committed to bringing intangible virtuous assets into an organisation (Crane & Matten 
2007). This theory states that virtue acts in a given situation and involves two aspects, 
the affective and intellectual. The affective refers to doing the right things with positive 
feelings, while the intellectual means to behave virtuously for the right reasons (Annas 
2003).   
Finally, postmodern ethics theory goes beyond moral values and provides a more 
comprehensive approach, in which companies can make achieving goals a priority and 
forego or focus minimally on values (Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Firms that are so 
valuedriven that their ultimate goals become the pursuit of value may suffer a long-term 
detrimental effect (Balasubramaniam 1999).  
  
2.4 Models of Corporate Governance  
To achieve the aim of corporate governance, different models have been developed 
based on national and legal origins, including the Anglo-American model and the 
Continental Europe model. In Anglo-American countries, such as the US and UK, there 
is a one-tier system, which consists of a unitary board of directors and executive 
management. The core of this one-tier model is the doctrine of shareholder value and 
primacy (Schwartz 1983). The Continental Europe model, which is a two-tier system 
model, operates in Germany, France, China, Japan and other European or Asian 
countries, and includes both a board of directors and a supervisory board. The model 
focuses on maximising the wealth of existing or potential stakeholders, not only the 
shareholders on the board (Blair 1995). The remainder of this section will give an 
introduction to and description of the models of corporate governance.   
  
2.4.1  One-tier System  
The one-tier board, which is also known as the ‘Anglo-American’ model, consists only 
of the board of directors (BoD), which is responsible for both managerial and 
supervisory duties on behalf of shareholders. This system of corporate governance is 
practised in the US and UK markets. The members of the board of directors are elected 
by the shareholders and have the responsibility to advise and oversee management and 
its decisions. The board structure is a reflection of the neoliberal norms of shareholder 
primacy, as well as free market capitalism (Block & Gerstner 2016). The neo-liberal 
norm of shareholder primacy is a traditional unique Anglo-American model, which has 
been further entrenched by the Anglo-American norms of free-market capitalism and 
engrained in case law. Many researchers have summarized the notion of shareholder 
primacy by stating that corporations should develop their business activities with the 
aim of enhancing corporate and shareholder profit (Smith 1997; Ho 2010).  
Normally, the one-tier board is divided between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and executive directors, chairman or lead director, and independent directors. The role 
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of the CEO can be separate from or combined with that of the chairman. Commonly, 
the CEO or chief executive is the only executive representative on the board, with the 
remaining board members being independent directors. These have two main duties, 
which are to challenge proposed and executed strategies (Calkoen 2011). Board size is 
usually between eight and twelve members, including both academics and practitioners, 
and should be of an appropriate size that can accommodate the necessary skill sets and 
competences, as well as promoting flexibility, cohesion and effective participation 
(Lipton & Lorsch 1992). Generally, there are two main broad mandates: advising and 
monitoring. More specifically, six general responsibilities are outlined under these two 
board mandates, namely recruiting, supervising, retaining, evaluating and 
compensating managers; developing the direction of the company’s operations; 
establishing suitable policies based on the governance system; governing the company; 
upholding the fiduciary duty to protect company’s assets and members’ investments; 
and performing a monitoring and controlling function (Boland 2009). The members of 
the board of directors are required to act in good faith, have a reasonable knowledge of 
the company’s business, obtain credible information on each issue, and fully consider 
the consequences of decisions in order to serve the best interests of the company and to 
protect shareholder gains (Schaeffer 1985; Block, Barton, & Radin 1998; Baums & 
Scott 2005).   
There are several advantages to the one-tier system. First, it has a superior flow of 
information because of its structure and size. It involves a greater number of meetings 
and every member is required to be present. At the same time, the members are in 
constant contact with the executives, which can help to better understand and promote 
the supervisory function of the board in management decision making. Second, it is a 
structure that allows faster decision making. As the supervisory board and management 
are combined, no separate approval of decisions is needed. Finally, the board is allowed 
to better understand and be involved in the business of the company. Members with 
rich relevant business knowledge, combined with frequent formal board meetings, 
encourage the directors to challenge potential strategic problems (Jungmann 2006; 
Block and Gerstner 2016).   
On the other hand, the one-tier system also has disadvantages, the main one being 
less working efficiency. The board has to simultaneously make and monitor the same 
decisions. When it is small, close personal relationships between members can exist, 
making it difficult for them to be neutral (Block & Gerstner 2016).  
   
2.4.2  Two-tier System  
The two-tier system, also called the ‘Continental Europe model’, is a corporate structure 
system that comprises both the management and supervisory boards. The management 
board makes decisions on company objectives, while the supervisory board monitors 
their decisions and behaviour (Jungmann 2006; Bolck & Gerstner 2016). The 
supervisory members can represent any class of people who are relevant to the firms, 
apart from the directors and management (Jungmann 2006; Block & Gerstner 2016). 
This board system exists in some continental European countries, such as Germany, 
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Austria and the Netherlands. In 1993, China also introduced this board system for 
corporate governance.   
There are also advantages and disadvantages to the two-tier system. Generally 
speaking, it allows for better monitoring and its structure is more of a reflection of 
stakeholder primacy. Taking the German board system as an example, the managing 
institution is strictly separated from the controlling institution, which contributes to 
enhancing the boards’ functions. Moreover, the members of the boards are required to 
represent not only shareholders but also employees and other stakeholders, to protect 
both shareholders’ and the public’s interests (Jungmann 2006; Block & Gerstner 2016). 
However, the supervisory board in a two-tier system, being internal, always obtains 
information from company management, who may provide information together with 
their personal opinions, which may cause a problem of information asymmetry, in 
comparison to external supervisory institutions (Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 
2009; Block & Gerstner 2016). In addition, when a certain decision is made by 
management, waiting for ratification from the supervisory board may lead to costly 
delays and ineffective work (Douma 1997; Block & Gerstner 2016).  
  
2.4.3  One-tier vs. Two-tier Boards  
Comparing the one-tier and two-tier board systems, there are several differences, 
namely board size, compensation, and shareholder versus stakeholder interests. First, 
the members of the one-tier board comprise around ten people, while those of the 
twotier board could number over twenty. Previous research has argued that board size 
influences a firm’s performance and effectiveness. Some researchers have proposed 
that a larger board could damage firm performance because of the increased problems 
of communication and the decreased ability to control management. Moreover, a larger 
board is less flexible and responsible, which leads to less effective oversight of 
management (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells 1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). Second, 
the compensation of the directors is regulated differently and further reflects different 
governance norms. For instance, American board directors’ compensation is set by the 
board in consultation with compensation experts, while that of their German 
counterparts is decided by the supervisory board. In comparison, the compensation of 
the German management board has limited freedom. Third, the core aim of the one-tier 
board is to satisfy shareholder benefits, while the two-tier system is more likely to 
benefit stakeholders. This difference is reflected in laws and regulations as well as in 
board composition.   
  
2.4.4  Two-tier System in Germany                         
The explanation of the development of the German two-tier system can be derived from 
agency theory. Shareholders would like to maximise their profits and will avoid a sub-
optimal corporate governance system. However, management has executive control of 
the company and probably runs the risk of sacrificing shareholders’ returns.  As a result, 
the separation of interests produces agency costs. Besides, compared to focusing 
supervision in the hands of someone specialised, building a supervision organisation 
and staffing it by the shareholders themselves can save agency costs. Therefore, the 
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supervisory board is a rational choice as a specialised and separate board, untainted by 
conflicts of interest related to management (Li 1994; Block & Gerstner 2016).   
The resource dependence theory, which posits that externally available resources 
affect company behaviour, offers another explanation for the two-tier board system. 
German companies depend on external resources such as employees and outside capital 
from banks, so employee and bank representatives on the supervisory board are 
necessary and important. Companies can inform on their situation continuously and 
make refinancing decisions positively. As a result, instead of shareholders of both 
boards, stakeholders are able to gain outside resources more efficiently (Jahn 1993; 
Fearfull et al. 2010; Schüler-Zhou & Schüller 2013).  
 
2.4.5  Two-tier System in China  
China is another typical example of a two-tier board system. Since 1993, the Corporate 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Corporate Law”) requires listed firms to have 
both a board of directors (BoD) and board of supervisors (BoS). According to the 
provisions of the People’s Republic of China (“Corporate Law”), a limited liability 
company is required to set up a board of supervisors, which shall comprise at least three 
persons.1 A limited liability company which has relatively fewer shareholders or is 
relatively small in scale may have one or two supervisors and does not have to establish 
a board of supervisors. 2  The board of supervisors shall include representatives of 
 
1 Article 52, the Corporate Law.  
2 Article 52, the Corporate Law.  
shareholders and employees of the company at an appropriate ratio. The employee 
representatives, who serve as members of the board of supervisors, should be 
democratically elected by the employees of the company through meetings of the 
employee representatives or employees, or by any other means.3 No director or senior 
manager may concurrently work as a supervisor.4 There are several responsibilities of 
the supervisory board, including checking the financial affairs of the company; 
supervising the duty-related acts of the directors and senior managers; bringing forward 
proposals on the removal of any director or senior manager who violates any law, 
administrative regulation, article of association or any resolution of the shareholders’ 
meetings; demanding that any director or senior manager makes amendments if their 
act has injured the interests of the company; proposing the convening of temporary 
shareholder meetings and bringing forward proposals at such meetings, and initiating 
actions against directors or senior managers according to relevant articles of corporate 
law.5 The members of the supervisory board can attend the meetings of the board of 
directors as non-voting delegates and raise questions or suggestions on the matters to 
be decided by the board. They can make investigations or hire an accounting firm for 
help when necessary if they find the company is running abnormally.6   
In summary, the functions of the supervisory board are three-fold. First, it acts as 
a counsellor. For a small firm, which is owned and managed by only one entrepreneur, 
 
3 Article 52, the Corporate Law.  
4 Article 52, the Corporate Law.  
5 Article 54, the Corporate Law.  
6 Article 55, the Corporate Law.  
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the supervisory board performs the role of a trusted advisor to the entrepreneur and 
counsellor to the management. For a large company, the supervisory board is not only 
the witness to management strategies but also makes comments and criticism to 
improve the strategic vision. Second, the supervisory board ratifies important decisions 
made by management. It should play its role correctly in order to judge management’s 
important decisions about the firm’s development and to avoid destroying value. 
Finally, the most important function of a supervisory board is to monitor the 
performance and composition of the board of directors and management, in case of any 
illegal or unethical behaviour which might harm firm interests.  
Similar to the German two-tier system, the development of the Chinese two-tier 
system derives from agency theory (Rajagopalan & Zhang 2008; Conyon & He 2011). 
Additionally, some researchers suggest that the stewardship theory offers another 
explanation for the Chinese two-tier board system. This theory stresses that there is a 
strong relationship between managers and the success of a firm because the managers 
will protect and maximise shareholder wealth by improving firm performance (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson 1997; Daily, Dalton, & Canella 2003). The management of 
Chinese companies pays more attention to satisfying the interests of inside shareholders 
because of the concentrated and state-controlled ownership structure (Tian & Lau 2001; 
Chen, Ezzamel & Cai 2011; Conyon & He 2011).   
2.4.6  Comparing German vs. Chinese Two-tier Systems           
Although the Chinese supervisory board has been borrowed from Germany, there are 
two main differences between the two two-tier systems (Block & Gerstner 2016). First, 
the authority and status of the German supervisory board are much higher than the 
Chinese one. The members are elected by shareholders and they not only monitor 
management but also inspect the board of directors and their operations. The German 
supervisory board has important decision rights, such as selecting the members of the 
board of directors, deciding on their remuneration, and even the right to withdraw the 
appointments of directors. In contrast, the Chinese supervisory board is much more 
dependent and lacks power. It can only act as a counsellor and make comments on and 
criticise management decisions. It does not have any election or voting rights over the 
board of directors and its decisions. The Chinese board will report to the shareholders  
and wait for solutions if they find problems with a firm’s operation and decisions, which 
means it works inefficiently. Second, the German supervisory board must have an equal 
number of employee representatives and members who represent shareholders. The 
employee representatives must include at least one senior staff representative and 
representatives of the union. These employee representatives are supported by the union 
to ensure they are able to exercise power. Moreover, there is codetermination in German 
supervisory boards; as allowed by the law, employees can elect representatives to 
consult and participate in company decisions at the same level as management. 
Codetermination helps to protect the interests of the firm and its employees 
(Wiedemann 1980; Gorton & Schmid 2000; Renaud 2007). However, the employee 
representatives on the Chinese supervisory board lack support, because there is no 
relevant organisation such as a union that could offer them protection. As a result, the 




2.5 Ownership Structure  
Companies are owned by different types of investors, who are also responsible for 
accomplishing financial objectives. There is inside ownership, such as board members, 
executives and employees, and outside ownership, such as stockholders, agent owners, 
and private owners (Connelly et al. 2010). Previous research has provided evidence on 
corporate ownership with regarding to various topics, including dividend policy. 
Sections 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 2.5.3 describe how several main types of shareholders, 
including state-owned, institutional and managerial, influence dividend policy in 
different ways, as explained by different theories.   
  
2.5.1  State-owned Shareholders  
When a company’s shares are mainly held and controlled by the state, it is known as a 
state-owned holding company. Such a company is a special enterprise legal 
representative authorised by the state to specifically exercise the rights of assets, take 
major decisions, and elect managers and elect other funders of some state-owned assets. 
State-owned holding companies can be divided into two types: the pure-type holding 
company, which does not directly engage in production and business activities but 
controls other companies or enterprises by wholly or partly owning shares or equity in 
them; and the hybrid holding company, which mainly controls subsidiaries through 
shareholding, and directly performs some production and operation activities. The total 
capital invested by such holding both types in wholly-owned subsidiaries, holding 
subsidiaries and shareholding subsidiaries must exceed 50% of the registered capital, 
and the total capital used for direct production and operation must be less than 50% of 
the company's registered capital. In their relationship with subsidiaries, they exercise 
the rights of the funder, and indirect production and operation activities, they also enjoy 
the property rights of the legal person (Szamosszegi & Kyle 2011; Ho, Ho, & Young 
2013; Sheng & Zhao 2013).   
Research into government ownership refers to various topics, such as the 
correlation between government ownership and firm value, costs, investments and 
stock price variation (Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami 2009; Borisova & Megginson 
2011; Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Ben-Nasr & Cosset 2014). 
Besides these aspects, the correlation between government ownership and dividend 
payment has also been explored. Much research has studied how state-owned 
ownership impacts cash dividend payout and found a positive correlation between such 
ownership and dividend policy (Wang, Manry, & Wandler 2011; Lam, Sami, & Zhou 
2012; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013). Government ownership is a form of, or at least is 
similar to, institutional ownership, preferring a higher dividend payout to enhance 
managerial monitoring by external capital markets, especially when it is believed that 
direct monitoring efforts may be insufficient or too costly (Gul 1999). According to 
agency theory, state-owned shareholders prefer higher cash dividends to reduce 
conflicts with management (Wang et al. 2011). For example, Gugler (2003) examines 
the correlation between dividend payments and controlling ownership structure in 
Australian firms and suggests that state-owned firms are engaged in dividend 
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smoothing, while family-controlled ones are not. In addition, state-owned firms are 
more reluctant to cut dividends than family-owned ones. Nizar Al-Malkawi (2007) 
examines the determinants of dividend policy in the emerging market of Jordan and 
suggests that the shareholding ratio of insiders and state ownership significantly affects 
dividend payout policy, which strongly supports the agency hypothesis.   
Other theories are also used to explain the correlation between government 
ownership and dividend policy, such as clientele theory, tunnelling theory and the 
capital constraint hypothesis (Lee & Xiao 2004; Cheng, Fung, & Leung 2009 Wang, 
Manry & Wandler 2011; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013, Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017). For 
instance, some researchers suggest that the dividend payments of Chinese firms are a 
form of tunneling, particularly by state-owned firms, in order to divert proceeds from 
an IPO or rights issue to controlling shareholders' pockets (Lee & Xiao 2004; Chen et 
al. 2009). Researchers such as Bradford et al. (2013) also suggest that in China 
statecontrolled companies pay higher dividends than privately controlled ones because 
of the capital constraint hypothesis, which suggests that the former are less 
capitalconstrained when obtaining external equity and do not greatly depend on internal 
equity for financial growth.   
   
2.5.2  Institutional Shareholders  
Institutional shareholders refer to ownership which is held by large financial 
organisations, such as banks, insurance companies and investment firms. Institutional 
investors usually study entire industries and evaluate companies in depth before making 
investment decisions as they are usually large stock traders (Choi, Lee, & Williams 
2011). As a result, such shareholders may influence stock prices and dividend payments. 
Since the 1970s, there has been a trend of institutionalisation of securities investment 
in the securities markets of Western countries. Institutional investors' market share was 
30% in the 1970s and 70% in the early 1990s. Institutional investors have therefore 
become the main force in the securities market (Çelik & Isaksson 2014).  
As strong external investors, institutional investors have the ability and motivation 
to participate in corporate governance and play a supervisory role. It has been suggested 
that institutional shareholders alleviate agency problems because they are large 
investors who hold huge sums of money, and the continued increase in share ownership 
gives them a strong incentive to monitor company performance and management 
behaviour (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Ullah, Fida, & Khan 
2012). Cash dividends are an important company financial decision, which is 
significantly related to the interests of shareholders, no matter whether they are 
controlling or minority shareholders, or state-owned or institutional investors. 
Therefore, to balance the rights of major shareholders and alleviate the agency problems 
between shareholders and management, institutional investors will inevitably have a 
certain impact on cash dividend policy. To enhance managerial monitoring by external 
capital markets, especially when institutions question their own direct monitoring 
efforts as insufficient or too costly, they may prefer a higher dividend payout, which 
has a positive impact on dividend policy (Han, Lee, & Suk 1999; Short, Zhang, & 
Keasey 2002; Farinha 2003). At the same time, institutions may be better informed, and 
73 
 
this informational advantage could be manifest in different attitudes toward dividend 
payout policy (Amihud & Li 2006). The higher the shareholding ratio of institutional 
investors, the greater the initiative to collect important information about the company 
and supervise the behaviour of internal management. As a result, based on this 
information asymmetry, institutional shareholders help to alleviate agency problems by 
reducing internal friction and reducing conflictions of other investors (La Porta et al. 
2002).   
Other research has also proven that the correlation between institutional 
shareholders and dividend policy can be explained by the clientele effect. Institutional 
investors change their investments based on their own tax preferences and other 
demands. As a result, firms will also adjust their dividend policy according to clientele 
incentives and the correlation between institutional ownership and payout policy is 
comprehensive and mutual (Dhaliwal, Erickson, & Trezevant, 1999; Myers & Bacon 
2004; Grinstein & Michaely 2005; Desai & Jin 2011).   
  
2.5.3  Managerial Shareholders  
Management involves the administration of an organisation, including many senior to 
lower positions, such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 
Chairman, managers and supervisors. Similar to the other types of ownership, 
managerial shareholders also influence dividend policy significantly.   
Based on agency theory, most studies conclude that cash dividends are a 
mechanism for reducing the problem of overinvestment. Managers are more likely to 
spend firm capital on investments or increase consumption for their own benefit or 
compensation when there are excess cash flows (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen & Meckling 
1976; Rozeff 1982; Myers & Bacon, 2004). As a result, cash payouts can reduce the 
agency problems of free cash flow (Jensen 1986; Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn 1992). When 
managers hold a number of shares, they will stand by shareholders and conflicts of 
interest between them and outside shareholders could be reduced. Some research finds 
evidence to support the notion that managerial share ownership aligns the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders, as managers are less likely to engage in actions 
that are not in the interest of shareholders. A high level of managerial ownership could 
minimise agency problems, as managers would have to bear a portion of the losses 
arising from any divergent behaviour (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988). The association between managerial ownership and dividend policy has 
been extensively examined in various empirical studies (Rozeff 1982; Agrawal & 
Jayaraman 1994; Moh'd, Perry, & Rimbey 1995; White 1996; Fenn & Liang 2001; 
Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002).   
  
2.6 Corporate Ownership Concentration  
2.6.1  Introduction  
Discussion of the problem of concentrated corporate ownership began with the dividend 
agency cost theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Easterbrook (1984). Later, 
scholars and experts began to apply agency theory to further interpret and research the 
"mystery of dividends" based on their theoretical research. Distribution of stock among 
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shareholders has a significant impact on corporate actions that are dependent on 
shareholder voting. Majority control gives larger shareholders considerable power and 
discretion over key decisions, such as dividend decisions and payout ratios (Gugler 
2003). La Porta et al. (2002) argue that the central agency problem in large corporations 
around the world restricts the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders. If company insiders are controlling shareholders, while external 
shareholders hold comparatively much fewer shares, the controlling shareholders are 
more likely to expropriate the minority shareholders. This preference for dividends may 
be even stronger in emerging markets with weak investor protection (Mitton 2004). 
Besides the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders, there is also 
a conflict between internal and external investors. Firms that pay more dividends will 
have less wealth for controlling shareholders to extract private gains, and corporate 
insiders can divert profits and other resources to benefit themselves by reducing the 
expense of outside investors (Johnson et al. 2000, Su et al. 2014).  
In addition, when there is a large divergence between controlling and cash flow 
rights, the controlling shareholders will tend to control the resources of companies 
through active participation in board meetings and management appointments, and they 
have the ability to pursue their own benefits through related party transactions 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang 2000; La Porta et al. 2002). Controlling shareholders are 
less likely to be challenged by other shareholders when they expropriate minority 
shareholders (Zingales 1994, 1995; Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004). If large 
shareholders can benefit not only from cash dividends but also from price appreciation 
of shares, there will be no conflicts of interest between large and minority shareholders 
(Denis & McConnell 2003). However, if large shareholders fail to realise capital gains 
from free trading and their sole investment income source is cash dividends, they will  
have a strong incentive to ask for large cash dividends, which leads to a firm’s 
underinvestment and decrease in value.   
If control rights are consistent with cash flow rights, the major shareholders should 
be inclined to choose the lowest cost and most legally protected way to realise their 
own interests. As a result, the controlling shareholders may adversely impact the 
interests of the minority shareholders by also paying cash dividends. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggest that the more concentrated the equity and the higher the 
shareholding ratio of the major shareholders, the lower the cost of distribution and the 
more likely the major shareholder will be to distribute dividends in the normal way. 
However, the degree of infringement of major shareholders' resources will be different 
due to the difference in the claims of other small-cap stocks. When the major 
shareholder has greater control over the listed company and the control rights and cash 
flow rights also tend to be the same, the cost of achieving the self-interest of the major 
shareholder becomes lower.   
Therefore, when the largest shareholder infringes on the interests of the remaining 
shareholders, at the same time the other shareholders will also have the incentive to 
resist and monitor the largest shareholder (Edwards & Weichenrieder 1999; Faccio, 
Lang, & Young 2001). As the controlling shareholders are concerned with the trade-off 
between the agency problem of free cash flow and the risk of underinvestment, the 
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voting power of the remaining shareholders’ coalition can confront the power of the 
largest shareholder (Trojanowski & Renneboog 2005). This leads to a negative 
correlation between the concentrated controlling shareholding ratio and cash dividend 
payout (Trojanowski & Renneboog 2005, 2007).  
  
2.6.2  Empirical Evidence  
Previous research has explored the relationship between ownership concentration and 
dividend policy, obtaining different results. As is known, dividends are viewed as a 
substitute mechanism for large shareholder ownership in mitigating agency conflicts. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that when equity is more concentrated and the 
shareholding ratio of the major shareholders is higher, the cost of paying the dividend 
is lower and the major shareholders are likely to distribute dividends in the normal way, 
which supports the notion that highly concentrated ownership helps to alleviate agency 
conflict. Based on a sample drawn from 37 countries, Truong and Heaney (2007) also 
observed a positive association between the largest shareholder and dividend payouts. 
More recently, Ahmed and Javid (2008) suggested that ownership concentration is 
positively related to the dividend payout ratio in Pakistan.   
However, some research has found a negative correlation between ownership 
concentration and dividend payment, especially in some emerging markets with low 
protection (Maury & Pajuste 2002; Gugler & Yurtoglu 2003; Mancinelli & Ozkan 2006; 
Renneboog & Szilagyi 2006; Renneboog & Trojanowski 2007). Da Silva et al. (2004) 
even found a U-shaped relationship between paying dividends and the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder. They propose that dividends first increase and then decrease 
when the voting rights of the largest shareholder become stronger.  
Some research has also studied the effect of other large shareholders besides the 
largest one, based on agency hypothesis. Some companies have two or more large 
shareholders, which means that corporate policy is the result of interaction among 
several large shareholders (Bennedsen & Wolfenson 2000). The role of other major 
shareholders other than the largest includes incentives and the ability to balance and 
supervise the largest shareholder, so the cash dividend payout ratio is inversely related 
to its shareholding ratio (Bolton & Von Thadden 1998; Pagano & Roell 1998; Edwards 
& Weichenerrieder 1999; Faccio et al. 2001). On one hand, the monitoring role played 
by the other large shareholders could limit the expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
resources, while on the other, other large shareholders may collude with the controlling 
shareholder in expropriating corporate resources and sharing the private benefits 
(Pagano & Roell 1998; Faccio et al. 2001).   
Faccio, Lang, & Young (2001) found that in Europe, the presence of multiple large 
shareholders can minimise the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders 
towards minority shareholders, resulting in higher dividend payment. However, a lower 
dividend payment occurs in Asia, which suggests that controlling shareholders 
collaborate with other large shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders. 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007) also propose that there is a negative impact on the 
dividend payout ratio when the equity and voting rights are concentrated in the hands 
of a major shareholder alliance, but that this effect varies between types of shareholders. 
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Other studies have particularly explored the impact of the second-largest shareholder 
on dividend policy, with mixed results. For example, Maury and Pajuste (2002) found 
that dividend payouts were negatively related to the second-largest shareholder in 
Finland, while Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the second-largest shareholder and dividend payouts in Germany.  
  
2.7 Characteristics of Chinese Ownership  
2.7.1  Introduction  
Chinese ownership has two significant features: first, a relatively high number of listed 
firms are state-owned or a large number of shares are held by the government; and 
second, firms’ stock ownership is highly concentrated, no matter whether the 
shareholders are government or private ones (institutions and individuals) (Bradford, 
Chen, & Zhu 2013). As a result, any research into the ownership structure and dividend 
policy in China will always need to consider these two important characteristics. The 
following sections will discuss these in detail.   
  
2.7.2  Highly concentrated SOE  
Many studies find that state ownership is positively correlated with dividend policy 
(Wei, Zhang, & Xiao 2004; Lee & Xiao 2004; Wang, Manry, & Wandler 2011; Lam, 
Sami & Zhou 2012; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013). Some researchers explain this 
phenomenon by tunnelling theory, in that case, cash dividend policy is dominated by 
the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholders’ interests (Lee & Xiao 2003; Chen, 
Jian, & Xu 2009). State shares in China can only be transferred with special approval 
by the government, which has the same effect as the transfer of portions of non-tradable 
shares from the state to other shareholders. As a result, cash dividends could be a 
vehicle for tunnelling in companies with a state controlling shareholder instead of 
alleviating agency problems (Lee & Xiao 2004; Cheng, Fung, & Leung 2009, 2013). 
However, some research disagrees with this tunnelling theory. About half of the listed 
firms in China do not pay cash dividends and to encourage such payments, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) even requires listed firms to pay regular 
cash dividends if they want to make seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). As a result, the 
tunnelling motive may not be the key factor that affects dividend policy.   
The capital constraint hypothesis is considered to explain the phenomenon of state-
controlling ownership and dividend policy. It concludes that non-state-owned 
enterprises (NSOEs) pay fewer dividends than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) because 
they are more capital constrained. In China, the public corporate bond market is 
extremely small. Most business borrowing comes from banks, and over 98% of banking 
assets are owned and controlled by the state (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2006. Banks are 
known for their soft lending policy toward SOEs and a lending bias against NSOEs, 
which leads to the situation that it is more difficult for privately-controlled firms in 
China to raise long-term debt capital compared to SOEs (Brandt & Li 2003; Fan et al. 
2008). In addition, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) uses a merit-
based system to regulate listed firms’ share issuance; rights offering or undertaking of 
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an SEO is tightly restricted for NSOEs, but not for SOEs, because the CSRC is a sister 
agency, whose political ties are both formally and informally important, and its accepts 
SOEs that do not meet the requirement to be exceptions when they apply for SEOs if 
there is an acceptable explanation (Green 2003). As a result, the greater constraint on 
debt capital and external equity capital puts NSOEs under more pressure regarding 
internally generated funds, which means fewer dividends are paid by NSOEs than 
SOEs (Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013).  
Besides the feature of state control, high ownership concentration is the other 
significant feature. Related research has found the tendency to pay cash dividends 
because of the agency problems that large shareholders expropriating minority 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Lee & Xiao 2002; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; 
Wellalagea et al. 2014). A relatively large number of Chinese-listed companies are 
observed to have a single dominant controlling shareholder and the average 
shareholding ratio of this shareholder is nearly 50% (Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort 2002; 
Hu, Tam, & Tan 2010). The highly concentrated ownership leads to a high level of 
speculation, extensive insider dealing and frequent market manipulation in the Chinese 
market. Studies of China have discovered a high level of expropriation of the interests 
of minority shareholders by the majority shareholders (Claessens et al. 2002; Su, Xu & 
Phan 2008; Hu, Tam, & Tan 2010; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Wellalagea et al. 2014).  
In summary, the above arguments reveal that a highly concentrated ownership 
structure may affect the quality of corporate governance in different ways, implying 
that the relationship could be multi-directional.   
2.7.3  Corporate Pyramid Ownership  
Another factor that affects dividend policy in China is corporate pyramid ownership. 
The ultimate owners of the pyramid can control multiple resources through a chain of 
ownership in which they directly control a firm that owns a stake in one or more other 
firms, and these firms also control other firms in the same way. The corporate pyramid 
ownership structure is popular around the world because of the private benefits of 
control rights and is more prevalent in countries with weaker laws and undeveloped 
economic environments (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Attig, Gadhoum, & Lang, 2003). The pyramid structure is also 
common in China. In the case of both SOEs and NSOEs, such a structure can establish 
an efficient internal capital market that helps to reduce external financing constraints 
(Manos, Murinde, & Green 2012). The internal capital market within pyramids of firms 
becomes stronger in its allocation of funds across units as the pyramid size increases; 
in other words, a longer control chain enables greater utilisation of investable funds, 
but lower surplus funds and cash dividends (Stein 1997; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013).  
  
2.7.4  Related-party Transactions  
A controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to maximise private benefits rather 
than shareholder wealth by occupying firm resources, which is referred to as “tunnelling” 
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(Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001). Although tunnelling is rarely 
observed directly, many studies have examined specific channels where expropriation 
can be detected in different areas and countries, such as Hong Kong, Korea and Mexico  
(Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; La Porta et al. 2002; Baek, Kang, & Lee 2006; Cheung, Rau, 
& Stouraitis, 2006). Related-party transactions are an inverse proxy for quality of 
corporate governance and have a negative effect on cash dividends. The corporate 
governance of Chinese firms is quite weak and the controlling shareholders are more 
likely to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and external investors and 
siphon off firms’ resources (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng,  
Wei, & Yang 2011).   
  
2.7.5  Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy  
Semi-mandatory dividend policy was officially issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2008, in which listed companies must pay a certain 
level of dividends as a prerequisite for their refinancing qualifications before they can 
undertake seasoned equity offerings (SEO). This policy first came out in 2006 and 
stipulated minimum dividends as a requirement for securities issuance, which had to 
amount to at least 20% of net profit in 2006, a ratio which increased to 30% in 2008. 
This policy created the practice in China whereby dividends are connected to the right 
to issue seasoned equity. At the end of 2013, this required policy confirmed that all 
listed firms must pay cash dividends each year and that the amount must be at least 20% 
of firms’ earnings. Hence, a mandatory dividend institution was finally introduced in 
China. This semi-mandatory dividend policy was enacted by the CSRC because 
previously Chinese listed firms paid too little dividends and shared too little of their 
profits with shareholders. Many Chinese firms had seldom paid any dividends to their 
shareholders in more than 10 years since they were listed (Tao, Nan, & Li 2016).   
The Chinese semi-mandatory dividend setting is markedly different from the 
situation in the U.S., where firms determine the level of dividends to pay independently; 
it also differs from the mandatory dividend rules in other countries, such as Turkey, 
Brazil and Greece, where all firms are required to allocate a certain level of dividends 
(Adaoglu 2000; Dasilas & Leventis 2011; Martins & Novaes 2012). The Chinese 
semimandatory dividend rule suggests that paying dividends can convey two important 
types of information, namely a signal of strong free cash flow, and the high likelihood 
of the issuance of SEOs. As a result, stock prices will not react to dividend payments 
as strongly as in other markets such as the U.S., as the issuing of an SEO is conditional 
on these payments (Tao, Nan, & Li 2016).   
Some research has studied how semi-mandatory dividend are relevant to dividend 
policy. It has the policy effects of “positive incentive” and “negative incentive”. The 
companies that have “positive incentives” would like to pay cash dividends actively to 
meet the refinancing demands according to their cash flows and investments. However, 
the companies with weak performance but having refinancing needs will be impacted 
by the “negative incentive” effect of semi-mandatory dividend policy because they have 
to distribute dividends and reach the minimum stipulated dividend level (Hu & Ma 2017; 
Yu 2019). This “negative incentive” has a negative effect on the firm’s value and 
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increases the agency costs because the companies that are forced to pay dividend 
consume the internal funds that are already in short supply (Yu 2019). This regulatory 
pressure could also reduce the company’s propensity to pay dividends as well as the 
level of dividends (Hu & Ma 2017).  
  
2.7.6  Shareholders Right  
In developing markets, the main agency problem, a high level of expropriation, occurs 
between the majority and minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 
2002), which lead to a low minority shareholder right (Mardani & Indrawati 2018). The 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy could be different 
because of the degree of shareholder right protection. Some research suggests that there 
is a positive relationship between better corporate governance and dividend payment 
when shareholder rights are low while other research proposes that weaker corporate 
governance influences dividend payment positively udder low shareholders rights 
(Renneboog & Szilagyi 2006; Kowalewski, Stetsyuk, & Talavera 2008; Change et al. 
2018; Mardani & Indrawati 2018). As is well known, the Chinese stock market is not 
well developed, and corporate governance is weak (Anderson, Ch, & Liao 2019). Some 
limited research has shown that low minority shareholders rights can influence Chinese 
dividend policy (Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Wellalagea et al. 2014; Tran 2020).  
However, this aspect of research is not considered as shareholder right protection 
in China is poor due to weak legal environment and there is a serious agency problem 
between majority and minority shareholders (Mardani & Indrawati 2018; Anderson, Ch, 
& Liao 2019). Partly as a result, the main focus is on examining the influence of 
corporate board structure, investor sentiment and stock liquidity.  
  
2.8 Investor Sentiment and Dividend Policy  
2.8.1  Introduction to Investor Sentiment  
Investor sentiment refers to the overall attitude of investors towards the stock market, 
who may be optimist or pessimist about stocks in general. (Baker & Wurgler 2007). 
Research on investor sentiment has been conducted for a relatively long time. At first, 
it was considered to be a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that was 
not justified by present facts, and two assumptions were made. First, Delong et al. (1990) 
assumed that investors were subject to sentiment, while Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
proposed the second assumption, that betting against sentimental investors was costly 
and risky. As a result, rational investors, who are also called arbitrageurs, are not as 
aggressive in forcing prices as has been suggested; consequently, whether and how 
investor sentiment affects the stock market has been proposed.   
Later, the question of how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects 
arose. One approach to doing this was to use biases in individual investor psychology, 
such as representativeness, overconfidence and conservatism, to explain individual 
investors’ underreaction or overreaction to past returns or fundamentals. For example, 
a related set of models, as discussed by Hong and Stein (2003) and Shefrin (2008), 
generates misvaluation if it relies on differences of opinion across investors, combined 
with short sales constraints. These aggregated models can predict the patterns of 
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investor sentiment, stock prices and volume marketwide. However, this approach may 
have problems; for example, the models cannot be definitely true, and real markets and 
investors are too complicated to be summarised neatly by just a few selected biases and 
trading frictions.  
Another approach developed by Baker and Wulgler (2006), based on two broader 
and more irrefutable assumptions of behaviour finance, namely sentiment and limits to 
arbitrage, is macroeconomic in nature and focuses on the measurement of reduced-form 
aggregate sentiment and its effects on individual stocks and market returns. The 
advantage of this approach is that it encompasses abnormal market performances such 
as bubbles and crashes, as well as everyday patterns in stock prices in a simple, intuitive 
and comprehensive way. It is not straightforward to measure investor sentiment in this 
approach. A number of proxies are suggested to relate to sentiment and can be used as 
conditioning variables and combined to describe investor sentiment, such as investor 
surveys, investor mood, retail investor trades, mutual fund flows, option implied 
volatility, insider trading, closed-end fund discount (CEFD), share turnover, the number 
of IPOs, average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the 
dividend premium. (Fama & French 2001; Baker & Stein 2004; Baker & Wurgler 2007).  
These variables are briefly introduced below.  
1. Investor surveys  
Investor surveys refer to the process of asking investors how optimistic they are in order 
to gain insight into marginal irrational investors. Relevant surveys have been conducted 
to find the correlation between investors’ attitude and confidence in stock market 
returns and security prices (Shiller & Pound 1989; Brown & Cliff 2005; Qiu & Welch 
2006; Lemmon & Portniaguina 2006).   
2. Investor mood  
Some studies have attempted to explore the correlation between investor mood and 
stock prices. For example, Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003) suggest that through 
autumn and winter, market returns are on average lower because of seasonal affective 
disorder, a depressive disorder associated with declining hours of daylight.   
3. Retail investor trades  
Different retail investors have different patterns of trading on the stock market. 
Compared to professionals, inexperienced retail or individual investors are more likely 
to be subject to sentiment. Research which has studied retail investor trades has found 
that investors at different ages preferred different amounts of stocks during the Internet 
bubble (Greenwood & Nagel 2009), while other research has found that retail investors 
buy and sell stocks in concert in micro-level trading data, which is consistent with the 
systematic sentiment (Kumar & Lee 2006; Barber, Odean, & Zhu 2009).   
4. Mutual fund flows  
Mutual fund flows, a variable that is related to investor sentiment and is easily available, 
has been used as a proxy for the sentiment. Overall market sentiment can be measured 
based on the trading movement of fund investors (Brown et al. 2003). Frazzini and 
Lamont (2005) found evidence that if a particular stock holding by a fund experiences 
strong inflow, its subsequent performance is relatively poor.   
5. Insider trading  
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The patterns of insider trading may contain a systematic sentiment component and are 
able to predict stock returns (Seyhun 2000). Insider trading refers to the use of corporate 
insiders of private information to trade their own stocks strategically for personal gain. 
This has been proven to influence stock prices and returns. Some research has found 
that insider sales before the offering of new stock generally elicits negative stock price 
reactions (Lamba & Khan 1999; Seyhun 2000). Other research suggests that positive 
returns follow insider purchases, while negative returns follow sales (Seyhun 2000; 
Iqbal & Shetty 2002; Chiang, Chung & Louis 2017).  
6. Closed-end fund discount  
Closed-end fund discount (CEFD) is the average difference between the net asset values 
(NAV) and market prices of closed-end stock fund shares and is inversely related to 
sentiment (Zweig 1973; Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler 1991; Neal & Wheatley 1998). 
Closedend funds are the fixed number of shares issued by investment companies and 
traded on stock exchanges. When closed-end funds are disproportionately held by retail 
investors, the average discount on closed-end equity funds could be a sentiment index, 
and the discount will increase when retail investors are bearish.  
7. Share Turnover  
Share trading volume, which is also market liquidity, can also be viewed as an investor 
sentiment index. Previous research on trading volume has revealed underlying 
differences in investors’ opinions (Scheinkman & Xiong 2003; Baker & Stein 2004).   
8. IPO market  
IPO volume, the underlying demand for initial public offerings (IPO), and IPO firstday 
returns, the average first-day returns of initial public offerings, are both suggested to be 
extremely sensitive to investor sentiment (Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh 2006; Baker & 
Wurgler 2006).   
9. Equity share issues  
Equity share issues are the share of equity issues over total new issues, which is the sum 
of equity and debt issues. It is a broad measure of equity financing activity. Previous 
researchers, such as Baker and Wurgler (2000), have proven that high values of equity 
share issues portend low stock market returns. Firms that shift between equity and debt 
successfully can reduce the overall cost of capital.   
10. Dividend premium  
The dividend premium is the difference between the average market-to-book value 
ratios of dividend payers and nonpayers. Many studies have found that firms’ 
propensity to pay dividends increases when dividends are at a premium, and vice versa. 
As a result, dividend premium can reflect firms’ catering to prevailing sentiment when 
deciding to pay dividends or not (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006).   
  
2.8.2  Evidence on Investor Sentiment and Dividend Policy  
The demand for dividends by investors varies over time and can be reflected by 
“sentiment” (Long 1978). For example, investors may prefer safe dividend-paying 
stocks in low-sentiment periods such as recessions, while in good times such as booms, 
they may prefer risky stock (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Gemmill 2005). When investors 
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look forward to a cash dividend payment and a dividend premium, firms would like to 
cater to their demands, which is known as the catering theory (Baker & Wurgler 2004; 
Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006). Many studies have examined and agree with 
the positive relationship between investor sentiment and dividend payment. The studies 
suggest that high sentiment means that investors are optimistic about the stock market 
and they may overprice stocks. Firms prefer to pay cash dividends to attract cash flow 
and resources from outside. Conversely, if there is low sentiment, the attitude by 
investors towards the stock market is pessimistic, which leads to an undervaluation of 
stock prices. In this situation, firms prefer a more efficient internal capital market that 
helps to reduce external financing constraints and reduce cash dividend payments 
(Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Yao et al. 2012; Baker, Weigand & Kapoor 2015; 
Baker & Weigand 2015; Caliskan & Doukas 2015). As a result, high sentiment could 
influence dividend policy positively.    
However, some research contradicts the catering hypothesis. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
& Skinner (2009) suggest that the disappearance of dividends due to a more 
concentration of large dividend payers. The number of dividend payers declined as a 
result of small dividend payers stopping payments. However, large dividend payers 
increased their current dividend payments. Similar findings were presented by Denis 
and Osobov (2008) for firms in several countries, including the U.K., Canada, Germany, 
France and Japan, while other researchers, such as Von Eije and Megginson (2007), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner (2009) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) were unable 
to find evidence to support the catering theory. As a result, the relationship between 
dividend policy and investor semtiment still needs to be developed.  
  
2.9 Stock Liquidity and Dividend Policy  
2.9.1  Introduction to Stock Liquidity  
The ability to trade large volumes of stocks with the least price impact, cost, and 
postponement is termed “liquidity” (Kumar & Misra 2015). Liquidity has 
multidimensional characteristics, such as tightness, immediacy and depth, which cannot 
be captured in a single measure (O’Hara 2004). It has important implications for stock 
markets and impacts corporate finance decisions on, for example, dividends, stock 
splits, firm valuation and capital structure (Kumar & Misra 2015). The development of 
stock markets is influenced by the level of liquidity. In an illiquid market, investors 
make higher gains, along with large uncertain transactions, which may cause significant 
price volatility, resulting in higher losses in comparison to liquid markets. As a result, 
high illiquidity lowers capital inflows and impedes the development of the stock market. 
At the same time, higher stock liquidity can help to reduce firms’ capital costs. A better 
understanding of liquidity dynamics helps managers to improve their trading strategies 
(Domowitz & Wang Beardsley 2002; Coughenour & Saad 2004).  
Previous research has extensively studied the measurements and determinants of 
liquidity and its implications for corporate finance and asset pricing. Different proxies 
have been developed to describe liquidity in terms of various characteristics. For 
example, bid-ask spreads, the sum of buying premiums and selling concessions, is one 
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of the measures of liquidity. Assets that are traded at once without a loss are more liquid. 
Investors may choose to trade immediately at the current bid or ask price or wait until 
there is a favourable price for them. The ask price can reflect the premium for 
immediate buying, while the bid price similarly reflects the concession requirement of 
an immediate sale. As a result, the spread between the bid and ask prices shows the 
degree of liquidity (Keynes, 1930). The Hui-Heubel (1984) liquidity ratio attempts to 
capture market breadth with related price impacts of the trading volume. The Amivest 
measure, introduced by Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985), measures liquidity by daily 
volume. The limitation of this measure is that it cannot incorporate days without trading 
or ones with no returns. Saar and Lybek (2002) classified the measures of liquidity into 
four categories, namely transaction cost, volume-based, equilibrium price-based and 
market-impact measures, based on their ability to capture a particular characteristic. 
Amihud (2002) proposed a measure called illiquidity (ILLIQ) to capture the lack of 
liquidity by dividing daily returns by daily volume in dollars, which can show how 
prices fluctuate triggered by a unit of dollar volume. Some researchers, such as 
Goyenko, Holden and Trizinka (2009), conclude that Amihud’s (2002) measure is 
better at capturing liquidity compared to the other measures.   
As liquidity has multidimensional features, measures of it vary and they can 
produce different results, which point to different conclusions (Kyle 1985; Benić & 
Franić 2008). Some studies conclude that there is actually no theoretically correct or 
universally accepted definition and measure for liquidity because of the specific factors 
and peculiarities of the market (Baker 1996; Sarr & Lybek 2002).  
  
2.9.2  Evidence on Liquidity and Dividend Policy   
As liquidity depends on firms’ abilities to convert assets into cash to meet debts or other 
obligations, this could affect the attractiveness of stocks to investors and the level of 
dividend payments (Griffin 2010; Ahmed 2015). Specifically, it is considered to 
influence dividend policy for several reasons, as explained by different theories. First, 
according to the clientele transaction cost view, there is a negative relationship between 
stock liquidity and dividend payment because investors can create homemade dividends 
without cost by selling their holdings in a financial market with trading friction. As a 
result, firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to pay cash dividends (Banerjee, 
Gatchev, & Spindt 2007). Second, the informational effect view argues that higher 
liquidity helps to reduce information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders and 
restrains the incentives of the former to expropriate from the latter for personal interests, 
which means stock liquidity influences dividend policy positively (Kyle 1985; Stiglitz 
2000; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki 2003; Laporta et al. 2002). Third, stock liquidity is 
related to a firm’s maturity, including size, profitability and growth opportunities, 
which demonstrate the ability of a firm to pay a dividend (Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 
2007). For example, the higher the liquidity, the more companies are able to invest in 
positive net present value projects, meaning the amount of dividend payments is 
reduced (Becker-Blease & Paul 2006; Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 2007; Griffin 2010).  
Kania and Bacon (2005) studied how the characteristics of a company, including 
liquidity, risk, and profitability, could influence dividend policy and confirmed that the 
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dividend payout ratio is significantly affected by these factors. Aivazian, Gatchev, and 
Spindt (2007) made a cross-section analysis based on NYSE and AMEX firm databases 
and suggest that firms with less liquidity are more likely to pay cash dividends. Banerjee, 
Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) also found a negative relationship between dividends and 
stock market liquidity, interpreting this as a sign that dividends and liquidity are viewed 
as substitutes by investors. AI-Kuwari (2009) investigated the dividend policy of listed 
firms in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries and found a strong negative 
impact of the leverage ratio on dividend payment. Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala (2010) 
studied firms in the American services industry and confirmed that the debt-to-equity 
ratio is one of the important determinants of dividend payment. This conclusion is 
further confirmed by Sim’s (2011) research of Malaysian listed companies in the food 
industry. Igan, de Paula, and Pinheiro (2010) also found evidence that the link between 
liquidity and dividend payment will be stronger when firms’ shareholders are more 
powerful. Finally, Ahmed (2015) proved that there is a significant positive correlation 
between liquidity and the dividend payout ratio in his study of the banking sector in the 
UAE. In summary, dividend policy and market liquidity have been extensively studied, 
butthe results vary and involve different hypotheses. The relationship between dividend 
policy and market liquidity still needs to be developed.  
   
2.10  Conclusion   
This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the theories and knowledge 
relevant to the scope of this research in conducting an empirical analysis of factors 
influencing dividend policy while taking account of corporate governance, ownership 
structure and investor sentiment in Chinese stock markets. The issues covered include 
theories of dividend policy and corporate governance followed by a comparison of 
various models of corporate governance with reference to the institutional background 
in China. In this regard, attention is paid to different types of ownership structures 
influencing dividend policy and the institutional background of Chinese companies 
operating in an environment where issues of investor sentiment and stock market 
liquidity are important. The relevant theories and evidence pertinent to these issues 
discussed in this chapter are intended to serve as a background to support the empirical 
research carried out in later chapters. Specifically, previous research examines the 
association between supervisory board and dividend policy from different aspects 
combining the relevant features of stock markets and national policies (Jungmann 2006; 
Roth 2013; Block & Gerstner 2016), issues that have not been extensively investigated 
in the context of Chinese stock market. This research extends the literature by 
examining how the two-tier supervisory board structure influences dividend policy of 
listed firms in China that have concentrated ownership structures. Additionally, 
previous research mainly investigates how investor sentiment and stock liquidity 
influence dividend policy by testing relevant theories without taking account of the 
influence of specific market structure prevalent to the local environment. By 
considering the specific nature of corporate structures in the Chinese stock market, this 
research aims to fill the gap related to how investor sentiment and stock liquidity affect 
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dividend policy, while allowing for the effects of controlling shareholders and 































CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the methodology employed in the empirical analysis. After a 
brief overview of the research philosophy, this chapter is concerned with presenting the 
empirical models used in testing a number of hypotheses to be formulated. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 revealed that a good deal of research has been carried out 
on dividend policy but there is still scope for conducting further research specifically 
with regard to factors related to corporate governance, ownership structure, investor 
sentiment, and stock market liquidity explaining the likelihood of dividend payouts in 
China.   
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methods by which this gap in 
knowledge could be addressed by the study in hand. In section 3.2, the research 
philosophy which underpins the study is examined, explaining how this philosophy (i.e. 
positivism) influences the choice of a quantitative approach, thus providing a rationale 
for the research design. Then, in section 3.3, the data collection procedure is described 
including the criteria for data selection of Chinese listed firms. Section 3.4 covers the 
empirical models including the variables used to test the postulated hypotheses, and the 
appropriate estimation methods. This section is split into three parts, covering the three 




3.2 Research Philosophy  
Researchers adopt methodologies based on their individual assumptions about how they 
view the world. This has implications for the selection of specific methodologies to 
answer a given study’s research objectives. The current research relies on a positivist 
paradigm which is closely linked to a natural sciences perspective. This framework 
asserts that credible data can only be obtained from real world phenomena which can 
be empirically observed. Any research strategy linked to this philosophy, therefore, 
involves the use of existing theory to develop hypotheses which can then be confirmed 
or disputed based on analysis of the collected data (Saunders et al., 2015).  
Research undertaken within the positivist paradigm is intended to remain 
independent of individual value judgements and instead exhibit a high level of 
objectivity when compared to other approaches (e.g. interpretivism) which involve a 
more subjective type of data collection. It is therefore argued that positivist data 
collection methods effectively prevent any bias on the part of the researcher from being 
transferred onto the data to be analysed (Saunders et al., 2015). These methods are 
usually rigorously structured with the intention of enabling replication (Gill & Johnson, 
2010). The type of data used in this study is secondary (i.e. collected by a third party) 
and quantitative (primarily generated and analysed through statistical means). 
Specifically, the data comprise various metrics lifted from the financial records of the 
sampled firms.   
The literature review in Chapter 2 suggests that various factors linking with 
dividend theory underpin the scope of the current research. But to ascertain the 
empirical evidence, data collection is required, and the analysis techniques are generally 
classified as either quantitative or qualitative. Data collected through qualitative 
methods are usually non-numeric in nature and are intended to reflect the beliefs, 
opinions, relationships, behaviours, social environments, and events that individuals 
experience (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). Quantitative data, on the other hand, are 
numeric in nature, and the methods of analysis are typically mathematical or statistical 
(Muijs, 2010).  
The two approaches confer certain advantages and disadvantages over each other. 
Saunders et al. (2015) confirm that the techniques and procedures selected by a 
researcher can have an impact on the results of a study. Sometimes researchers mix 
methods in an attempt to cancel out the ‘method effect’ and thus increase the reliability 
of the study’s conclusions. In this study, the researcher attempts to determine the nature 
of the relationships between various dependent and independent variables. For this 
reason, a quantitative approach is considered most appropriate and, by way of extension, 
a quantitative method of data collection will be employed. Furthermore, the hypotheses 
developed will only be testable via quantitative means. Finally, the suitability of the 
quantitative approach for the present study is confirmed by the literature review 
presented in Chapters 2; most of the reviewed studies obtained valid and reliable results 






3.3 Data Collection  
As explained in Chapter 1, the study aims to analyse the potential impact of various 
factors explaining dividend policy in Chinese listed firms. Therefore, a panel dataset 
comprising all listed firms that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges in the Chinese open market covered by the China Stock Markets and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database is created covering the period from 1st 
January 2008 to 31st December 2016. The dataset is annual and used in the empirical 
study to examine how the supervisory board, investor sentiment and market liquidity 
impact the dividend policy of highly concentrated state-controlled listed firms. The data 
on the security issues obtained from CSMAR are matched using stock codes (Stkcd) 
for the listed firms. In line with most research, financial firms are excluded from the 
sample because of the volatility of their data variables, their different capital structure 
to non-financial firms, and the regulatory factors that affect them (e.g. Baker & Wurgler 
2004; DeAngelo, De Angelo, & Stulz 2006; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner 2009; 
Tao, Nan, & Li 2016). Firms without any relevant code or corresponding accounting 
data are excluded. There were originally 21,824 firm-year observations, but 400 of 
these from financial companies, banks and insurance firms were excluded because their 
financial statements are different from those of other industries (He & Yu 2009; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner 2009). In addition, 3,012 of the observations have 
missing information, such as IPOs, net cash flow, operating revenue, etc., so were 
excluded automatically when running regressions (with STATA). The final sample 
comprised 18,412 firm-year observations.   
Table 3.1 presents the basic annual firm observations in the sample period from 
2008 to 2016, with corresponding trends presented in Figure 3.1. Panel A presents the 
yearly firm observations listed on the main board, small and medium enterprise (SME) 
board and growth enterprises market (GEM). Panel B presents the firms paying annual 
cash dividends (payers) and those that did not dividends (nonpayers). The yearly firm 
observations show an upward trend, no matter whether they relate to the main board, 
SME or GEM. The number of listed firms on the SME and GEM grew faster than those 
on the main board. In addition, as the number of listed firms increased every year, firms 
paying cash dividends increased correspondingly, while the number of nonpayers 
changed little.  
Table 3.1 Number of Yearly-Firm Observation 1   
Panel A     
Year  Main Board  SME  GEM  
2008  1,184  208  0  
2009  1,222  256  0  
2010  1,209  349  56  
2011  1,256  541  184  
2012  1,311  646  292  
2013  1,337  680  339  
2014  1,289  679  354  
2015  1,312  679  394  
2016  1,427  751  478  
Panel B     
Year  Total  Payer  Nonpayer  
2008  1,392  726  666  
2009  1,478  791  687  
2010  1,614  936  678  
2011  1,981  1,291  690  
2012  2,249  1,594  655  
2013  2,356  1,728  628  
2014  2,322  1,649  673  
2015  2,385  1,622  763  
2016  2,656  1,950  706  
This table presents the annual observations of the sample firms. The sample period covered 2008 to 2016 and the 
sample comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges.Panel A presents 
the yearly firm observations listed on the main board, small and medium enterprise (SME) board and growth 
enterprises market (GEM). Panel B presents the firms paying cash dividends (payers) annually and those that did 




Figure 3.1 Yearly Observation Trends 1   
3.4 Variable Definitions, Hypotheses and Model Specifications   
This section describes the variables and the research design used in the study. Variables 
used are defined including how they are measured when the models are specified. 
Subsection 3.4.1 gives definitions of the dependent, explanatory and control variables 
employed to explore the relationship between supervisory boards and dividend 
payments, and discusses the models used to test the hypotheses related to them. 
Subsection 3.4.2 defines the dependent, explanatory and control variables employed to 
examine how investor sentiment impacts dividend payment in concentrated and state-
controlled listed firms. The models used for the analysis are also explained. Subsection 
3.4.3 explains the variables and models used to test how market liquidity influences 
dividend payment for concentrated and state-controlled listed firms.    
  
3.4.1  Supervisory Board and Dividend Policy   
A distinction is drawn between the dependent, explanatory and control variables that 
examine the relationship between the supervisory board and dividend payment, the 
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specified for the hypothesis testing, including logit and OLS regressions. In addition, 
probit and tobit models are used as alternative models for robustness checking.   
  
3.4.1.1 Dependent Variables  
As our research focuses on cash dividend payments, whether firms pay these and at 
what level are the main questions posed. As a result, the variables which are used to 
measure the decisions on and changes to cash dividend payment are described below. 
i. Dividend Decision: 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
 Payerit  is a dummy variable used to measure whether a firm decided to pay cash 
dividends. Thus Payerit equals 1 when the firm did decide to pay these at year t, while 
payerit equals 0 when firms are nonpayers (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006).  
ii. Dividend Level: 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
Dividendit is defined as the level of cash dividend payment, measured as the number 
of cash dividends divided by the book value of assets at year t (Li & Lie 2006, Ab 








𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the amount of cash dividend of firm i at year t 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the book value of the total asset of firm i at year t 
iii. Changes in Dividend: ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 
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∆Dit is defined as changes in dividends, either increasing or decreasing amounts. This 
variable is measured by dividend change (DCit). DCit is calculated by the change in 
cash dividend payments from year t-1 to year t, divided by the net income of year t 
(DeAngelo, De Angelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007). It is 







𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the amount of cash dividend of firm i at year t 
𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 is the amount of cash dividend of firm i at year t-1 
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the net income of firm i at year t 
 
3.1.1.1  Explanatory Variables 
In chapter 4, the study aims to examine how the supervisory board affects a firm’s cash 
dividend payments in the Chinese two-tier system. The related board factors 
(independent variables) are described below. 
i. The Size of the Supervisory Board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡)  
Supsizeit  is the number of supervisors. It is proposed that this influences dividend 
payments. Previous research has found evidence that board size influences the 
effectiveness of governance and determines dividend payments decisions; a larger 
board size influences dividend payments negatively because of the lower monitoring 
and responsibility, and the question of information asymmetry (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; 
Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Wu 2004; 
Guest 2009; Lublin 2014).  
ii. The Ratio of Emolument received by the Supervisory Board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡)  
Supaidit  is measured by the percentage of supervisors who are given emoluments. 
Previous research has discovered that management emolument influences dividend 
policy and corporate decisions in a positive way (Lambert, Lanen, & Larcker 1989; 
Mehran 1992; White 1996; Berger, Ofek, & Yermack 1997; Fenn and Liang 2001; 
Kang, Kumar, & Lee 2006). Since the emolument-receiving management can positively 
affect dividend payment, a supervisory board receiving higher emoluments could also 
influence cash dividend policy positively. 
iii. The Ratio of Employee Representation on the Supervisory Board (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Employeepit is measured as the percentage of supervisors who are also employees. In 
a two-tier system, the supervisory board is required to include employee representatives 
for better monitoring and to represent stakeholders’ benefits. Some previous research 
has proposed that employee representation on the supervisory board could influence a 
company’s governance and payout policy positively (Benelli, Loderer, & Lys 1987; La 
Porta et al. 2002; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001; Gorton and Schmid 2004; Fauver and 
Fuerst 2006).  
iv. The Total Shareholding Ratio of Supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Supsharepit is measured as the number of shares held by supervisors divided by the 
total number of shares. Previous research has found that shareholders affect payout 
policy for personal benefit (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Lambert, Lanen, & Larcker 1989; 
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Jolls 1998; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Weisbenner 2000; Fenn & Liang 2001; 
Kahle 2002; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Raedy, & Shackelford 2004; Brown, 
Liang, & Weisbenner 2007). Therefore, supervisory board shareholders could 







𝑆𝐵𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares held by supervisors of firm i at year t 
𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of shares 
v. The Dependent Director Representative Ratio of the Supervisory Board (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Directorpit is measured by the percentage of supervisors who have a close working 
relationship with the board of directors, such as the chairman, secretary and the 
chairman’s assistant. The independence of boards has been proven to influence 
enhanced governance and shareholder benefits. Many researchers have found that 
independent or dependent board members reduce shareholder interests, board functions 
and dividend policy (Adams & Feirrera 2007; Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; Adams & 
Ferreira 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang 2008; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao 2009; Adams, 
Hermalin, & Weishach 2010; Armstrong, Guay, & Weber 2010; Duchin, Matsusaka, & 
Ozbas 2010). 
 
3.1.1.2 Control Variables 
In addition to the main explanatory variables representing the supervisory board that 
affects dividend payment, the study incorporates a number of additional variables that 
could have a partial effect on cash dividend payment, such as the board of directors 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014); management (Fenn & 
Liang 2001; Kahle 2002; Brown, Liang, & Weisbenner 2007); firm characteristics 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Ahmed & 
Javid 2008; Iturriaga & Crisóstomo 2010); ownership type and structure (Gugler 2003; 
Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017); and relevant policy (Tao, Nan, & 
Li 2016). As a result, we control for the following variables:  
i. Size of the Board of Directors (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡)  
Bsizeit  is measured as the number of members of the board of directors in the 
management board. This has been proved to influence corporate performance (Yermack 
1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 1998; Mak & Li 2001; Belkhir 2009); dividend 
policy (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014); and corporate 
governance (Hermalin & Weisbach 1988; Dalton et al. 1999; Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; 
Fich 2005). Smaller board size has been found to better monitor and control 
management because of agency problems (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 1998; Guest 
2009; Lublin 2014). On the other hand, some studies posit that a larger board impacts 
firms’ decisions and dividend payments positively because it contains more outsider 
representation, who have more experience, knowledge and ability to provide better 
advice, which works better for a large complex company (Hermalin & Weisbach 1988; 
Dalton et al. 1999; Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; Fich 2005). 
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ii. The Shareholding Ratio of the Board of Directors (𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Bshareopit is calculated by the number of shares held by the board of directors divided 
by the total number of shares. Extensive research has proven that insider shareholders 
influence dividend policy positively for personal wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, 
Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Raedy, & Shackelford 
2004; Hu & Kumar 2004; Truong & Heaney 2007; Brown, Liang, & Weisbenner 2007). 







𝐵𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares held by the board of directors of firm i at year t 
𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of shares 
iii. Independent Director Percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Indepit is measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board. This type 
of director has been suggested to influence board decisions and shareholder benefits 
(Burns 2004; Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; Luchetti & Lublin 2004; Adams & Feirrera 
2007). Consequently, independent directors can influence dividend policy. Previous 
research suggests that the independent members on the board of directors influence 
dividend payment positively. More independent directors on the board help to better 
oversee management and represent for stockholder interests (Brudney, 1982; Adams & 
Ferreira 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang 2008; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao 2009; Alias et al. 
2012). 
iv. The Executive Shareholding Ratio (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Exeshareopit is calculated by the number of shares held by executives divided by the 
total number of shares. Previous research has confirmed that executives or managers 
who hold a large number of shares impact dividend policy because of personal financial 
incentives and benefits (Lambert, Lanen, & Larcker 1989; Jolls 1998; Weisbenner 2000; 








𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares held by the management of firm i at year t 
𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of shares 
v. SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡)  
TopSOE𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable to measure whether the listed firms is state-owned or 
not. It equals 1 when the company is controlled by the state; otherwise, 0. Many 
researchers have studied the correlation between state-owned shareholders and firm 
performance and dividend policy, especially in the Chinese market (Dewenter & 
Malatesta 2001; Gugler 2003; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017). It is 
known that different types of ownership have different impacts on dividend policy 
because of the agency problem and personal interest. State-owned shareholders are 
willing to keep stable dividend payments and are reluctant to cut dividends (Gugler 
2003; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010). 
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vi. The Degree of Concentration of the Largest Shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Top1opit is calculated by the number of shares held by the largest shareholder divided 
by the total number of shares. The largest shareholder has been proven to significantly 
impact or even control corporate performance and dividend policy for personal wealth 
(Asquith & Mullins Jr. 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Jun 2006; Truong & Heaney 







𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares held by the largest shareholder of firm i at year t 
𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of shares 
vii. Indicator of Lifecycle: Firm Size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡)  
InAit is measured as the natural log of book value of total assets, which is the sum of 
all asset items (Rajan and Zingale 1995; Dong, Hirshleifer, & Teoh 2012). The reason 
for scaling with the natural logarithm is to avoid the bias associated with outliers and 
errors. Residuals become bigger when the value of the dependent variable is bigger, 
which is anomalous and inevitable. The natural logarithm of a variable helps to 
neutralize the residuals to obtain a larger value for it. In addition, using logarithm values 
to control the difference in size between small and large firms can eliminate the 
potential skewness associated with large values to neutralize firm size. This factor is 
one of the basic measures of company maturity. When it has been verified that it affects 
dividend payment, the conclusion will be that a mature firm which is larger, more 
profitable and has fewer growth opportunities prefers to pay dividends (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006). This conclusion also supports the dividend lifecycle theory 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & 
Osobov 2008). The indicator is described as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 
where: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the book value of total assets 
viii. Indicator of Lifecycle: Firm Profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡)  
ROAit is measured as a firm’s return on assets. This return refers the operating profits 
and total assets are the sum of all asset items. Firm profitability is another factor that 
measures company maturity. Profitable firms have high levels of internal funds to pay 
cash dividends, in addition to future investment, which is suggested by lifecycle theory 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & 






𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a firm’s return measured as operating profits 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the book value of the total assets of firm i at year t  
ix. Indicator of Lifecycle: Growth of The Firm (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡)  
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∆REVit is measured as a firm’s change in operating revenue from year t-1 to t divided 
by revenue in year t-1. Operating revenue is defined as revenue recognised by the 
company, apart from interest income, net earned premiums, commissions and fees. As 
the lifecycle theory suggests, a mature firm that is larger, more profitable and has fewer 
growth opportunities prefers to pay dividends (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; 
Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & Osobov 2008). The growth of a firm can 
measure company maturity. A lower growth indicator means that the company has a 
high degree of maturity, fewer growth opportunities and spends more free cash flow on 








𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is the operating revenue measured as revenue minus interest income, net 
earned premiums and commissions, and fee income of firm i at year t-1 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the operating revenue measured as revenue minus interest income, net 
earned premiums and commissions, and fee income of firm i at year t 
x. Indicator of Lifecycle: R&D Investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡)  
R&Dit is measured as the amount of research and development investment divided by 
operating revenue. As part of a firm’s future investment, higher R&D investment means 
that the company has good growth prospects, which could influence the cash dividend 
negatively (Fama & French 2001; Gugler 2003). For small young firms that lack 
internal funds, the cost of R&D investment reduces the internal cash flows used for 








𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the amount of research and development investment of firm i 
𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the operating revenue measured as revenue minus interest income, net 
earned premiums, and commission and fee income 
xi. Indicator of Catering and Investor Sentiment: Dividend Premium (𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷)  
Pit−1
D−ND , the equal-weighted market dividend premium, as proposed and defined by 
Baker and Wurgler (2004), is the difference between the natural logs of the dividend 
payers’ and nonpayer’s average market-to-book ratio each year, and is also called the 
log of the ratio of average market-to-book. “Market-to-book” is defined following 
Fama and French (2001). The market-to-book ratio is book assets minus book equity 
plus market equity, all divided by book assets. It is used to measure the propensity to 
pay dividends and has been verified as having a positive impact on the propensity to 
pay dividends as well as changes in paying dividends. This conclusion also supports 
the dividend catering theory (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Jayaraman, 
& Sabherwal 2009). 
xii. Indicator of Investor Sentiment: Trading Volume (𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1)  
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STurnit−1 is measured as the detrended log of turnover ratio and calculated as the ratio 
of annual reported share volume to shares listed by CSMAR (Baker & Wurgler 2006; 
Ding et al. 2017). Previous research has used this variable as a sentiment index based 
on the NYSE database and found that high share turnover means high market liquidity 
and low market returns, which is a symptom of investors’ optimism or overvaluation 








𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 is the annual reported share volume at year t-1 
𝑆𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 is the number of shares listed by CSMAR at year t-1 
xiii. Leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡)  
D/Eit  is measured as a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, which indicates the relative 
proportion of equity and debt of financing a firm’s assets, and which is calculated by 
total liabilities divided by total shareholder equity. Total liabilities are defined as the 
sum of all liability items, and total shareholder equity is the sum of all shareholders’ 
equity items. This variable is also known as risk, which has been proved to influence 
dividend policy. Previous research has indicated that there is a significantly negative 
relationship between leverage and dividend payment, which means that firms with 
higher leverage and level of risk pay lower dividends (Collins, Saxena, & Wansley 1996; 
D’souza & Saxena 1999; Baker, Veit, & Powell 2001; Mahadwartha 2003; Jiraporn & 








𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡 is the total liabilities of firm i 
𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the total shareholder equity of firm i 
xiv. Net Cash Flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡)  
CFit  is measured as a ratio calculated by the difference between cash inflow from 
operating activities and cash outflow from operating activities, divided by total assets. 
Net cash flow influences corporate investment and dividend payment (Lang & 
Litzenberger 1989; Vogt 1994). It is an important determinant of the dividend payout 
ratio and reflects the ability of a firm to pay dividends (Alli, Khan, & Ramirez 1993; 
Amidu & Abor 2006; Gill, Bigger, & Tibrewala 2010). Much previous research 
includes this factor as a control variable in the study of dividend policy and has 
demonstrated a positive relationship between cash flow and dividend payment (Faccio, 
Lang, & Young 2001; Fenn & Liang 2001; Carpenter & Sanders 2002; Gugler & 
Yurtoglu 2003; Amidu & Abor 2006; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, 









𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the net cash flow from operating activities, measured as the difference between 
cash inflow and cash outflow  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the book value of total assets 
xv. Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡)  
SEOit  is a measure which is a dummy variable, equal to 1 when semi-mandatory 
dividend policy is applied, and 0 otherwise. This variable is measured by whether a 
firm conducts seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in a particular year (Tao, Nan, & Li 
2016). According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), listed 
companies must continually pay a certain level of dividend as a prerequisite for their 
refinancing qualifications for at least three years before they can undertake SEOs. This 
indicates the SEO firms must adhere to the semi-mandatory dividend policy. As a result, 
we assume that when firms make SEOs, SEOit equals 1 in the same year t and the 
previous two continuous years t-1 and t-2, and equals 0 for the remaining years of the 
SEO firms and all years of the non-SEO firms. 
 
3.1.1.3 Hypotheses, Model Specification and Estimation  
Given the number of explanatory representing the supervisory board, several 
hypotheses can be postulated, and an appropriate econometric model can be used to test 
the relationship between the supervisory board and dividend policy. Drawing upon 
previous studies in the literature, the first set of hypotheses relate supervisory board 
characteristics to the propensity to pay cash dividends, which leads to the postulation 
of the following five testable sub-hypotheses: 
H4.1a: Supervisory board size affects the propensity to pay dividends 
H4.2a: Emolument-receiving members on supervisory boards affect the propensity to 
pay dividends 
H4.3a: Employee representatives on a supervisory board do not significantly affect the 
propensity to pay dividends 
H4.4a: Higher supervisory board shareholding positively affects the propensity to pay 
dividends 
H4.5a: The dependent director representatives of the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on the propensity to pay dividends. 
These hypotheses, the rationale for which is discussed in Chapter 4, indicate that 
the probability or likelihood of firms paying cash dividends is influenced by a set of 
factors characterizing the supervisory board alongside other relevant firm 
characteristics. Hence, a logit model is appropriate to test the hypotheses. Logit models 
are widely used as a type of generalized linear model to estimate the functional 
relationship between dependent and independent variables when the dependent variable 
is binary, characterizing the decision to pay or not. For a binary dependent variable, the 
logistic regression model is appropriate and its parameters can be estimated efficiently 
under maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), while the logistic model can restrict the 
predicted probability within the range of 1 and 0. MLE is a method to estimate the 
parameters of a probability distribution by maximizing the likelihood function, which 
aims to make inferences about the population that is most likely to generate the sample, 
especially when the joint probability distribution of random variables is not necessarily 
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independent and identically distributed (Myung 2003). A logistic model also corrects 
for heteroscedasticity that invalidates the statistical tests of significance. 
Heteroscedasticity exists because the subpopulations of a collection of random 
variables have different variabilities (Cox 1970; Tennant 1977; Silvapulle 1981; Scott 
& Wild 1991). Many researchers, such as Baker and Wurgler (2004), Li and Lie (2006), 
and Denis and Osobov (2008) have applied logit models in their studies of explanatory 
factors linking to the propensity to pay dividends. Therefore, an appropriate logit model 
to empirically test the above hypotheses is specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4.1) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1  is the set of the main explanatory variables representing supervisory 
board namely: the size of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡;  the emolument payment 
ratio of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡); the ratio of employee representation on the 
supervisory board ( 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); the total shareholding ratio of supervisors 
(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); and supervisory board independence (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡);  
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); dummy SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡); the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth 
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 ); stock 
market turnover ( 𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ); dividend premium ( 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ); and semi-mandatory 
dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
As an alternative to the logit model, a probit model could be used to check the 
consistency of the test results relating to hypotheses H4.1a, H4.2a, H4.3a, H4.4a, and 
H4.5a. The difference between these two models is theoretical; the logistic regression 
model uses a logit link function, which assumes that the dependent variables have only 
two categories, 0 or 1, and uses the natural log of the odds that dependent variables 
equal one of the categories, while probit regression uses an inverse normal link function 
(Liao 1994). However, both probit and logit models are types of generalized linear 
models that estimate the functional relationship between dependent and independent 
variables, which is appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable and corrects for 
heteroscedastic errors (Silvapulle 1981; Scott & Wild 1991). As a result, probit models 
can be used in exactly the same situations as logit models.  
Apart from influencing the decision to pay dividends, the literature also indicates 
that supervisory board characteristics may affect the amount of dividend.  Accordingly, 
the second set of hypotheses tests the relationship between the level of dividend 
payment and the supervisory board characteristics. Similar to the previous set, the 
testable hypotheses are given below: 
H4.1b: Supervisory board size affects the level of cash dividends 




H4.3b: Employee representatives on a supervisory board do not significantly affect the 
level of cash dividends 
H4.4b: Higher supervisory board shareholding positively affects the level of cash 
dividends 
H4.5b: The dependent director representatives of the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on the level of cash dividends 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation can be used to test the above hypotheses. 
OLS is widely used as a type of linear least squares method to estimate the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model by minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
where the residual for each observation is the difference between the actual and fitted 
value. Geometrically, the smaller the sum of the squared residuals, parallel to the axis 
of the dependent variable, and between each data point in the set and the corresponding 
point on the regression surface, the better the model fits the data (Pavelescu 2004). 
Previous research has extensively applied the OLS model linking dividend pay to a 
range of explanatory factors (Baker and Wurgler 2004; Li and Lie 2006). To empirically 
test the above hypotheses using OLS estimation, the model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (4.2) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1  is a set of main explanatory variables representing supervisory board 
characteristics, namely: the size of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the emolument 
payment ratio of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 ); the ratio of employee 
representation on the supervisory board (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); the total shareholding ratio 
of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); supervisory board independence (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡). 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); dummy SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡); the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth 
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 ); stock 
market turnover ( 𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ); dividend premium ( 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ); and semi-mandatory 
dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
An alternative to OLS estimation of the above model is a tobit model. Also called 
a censored regression model, the tobit model estimates the linear relationship between 
variables when the dependent variable is censored in some way (Tobin 1958; Amemiya 
1984). Compared to the tobit model, the use of OLS regression has a limitation in that 
it provides inconsistent estimates of the parameters when the dependent variable is 
censored, which means the coefficient estimates of the model do not necessarily 
approach the true population of parameters when the sample size increases 
asymptotically (Long 1997). Since dividend payments are positive (hence truncated at 
zero), tobit estimation is used to check for the consistency of results in the empirical 
analysis. 
Finally, it is of interest to test whether supervisory board characteristics influence 
the change in dividend payments. Thus, as a third set of hypotheses, the following 
testable hypotheses are proposed: 
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H4.1c: Supervisory board size is associated with changes on dividend payments 
H4.2c: Emolument-receiving members on supervisory boards are associated with 
changes on dividend payments 
H4.3c: Employee representatives on a supervisory board are not associated with 
changes on dividend payments 
H4.4c: Higher supervisory board shareholding is associated with increases in dividend 
payments 
H4.5c: The dependent director representatives of the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on changes of dividend payments. 
 Many researchers have applied OLS estimation in their studies to link explanatory 
factors to changes to dividend payments (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, 
Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007). Thus, OLS estimation is used to empirically test the 
above hypotheses in the specification of the model as follows: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (4.3) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1  is the set of main supervisory board variables: the size of the supervisory 
board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡); 
the ratio of employee representation on the supervisory board (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); the total 




𝑘=6  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); dummy SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡); the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth 
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 ); stock 
market turnover ( 𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ); dividend premium ( 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ); and semi-mandatory 
dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
Alternatively, tobit estimation is used as a consistency check assuming that 
increases in dividends are always positive in the sample period.  
 
3.1.2 Investor Sentiment, Ownership and Dividend Policy 
The next set of hypotheses proposes the relationship between investor sentiment, 
ownership (highly concentrated state ownership) and dividend payment. In this section, 
the dependent variables dividend decision (Payerit) and Changes in Dividend (∆Dit) 
are as same as those in Chapter 4. Most of the control variables are the same as those 
controlled for in testing the relationship between the supervisory board and dividend 
policy in Chapter 4, which are: the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); the shareholding ratio of 
the board of directors (Bshareopit); independent director percentage (Indepit); firm 
size (InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net 
cash flow (CFit ); R&D investment (R&Dit ); and semi-mandatory dividend policy 
(SEOit). Two additional control variables which are relevant to the supervisory board, 
the size of the supervisory board ( Supsizeit ) and the total shareholding ratio of 
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supervisors ( Supsharepit ), are added and described in section 3.4.1. Only the 
explanatory variables are described below. 
 
3.1.2.1 Explanatory Variables 
As the study aims to examine the association between investor sentiment, ownership 
(highly concentrated state ownership) and dividend policy, the proxies used to measure 
the index of investor sentiment are discussed, together with the variables representing 
the characteristics of the largest shareholders, as described below. 
i. Investor Sentiment Index (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡)  
Investor sentiment is defined broadly as a general mood among investors regarding a 
particular market or asset. Previous research has confirmed how investor sentiment 
influences dividend policy. Some studies suggest a positive relationship between 
investor sentiment and dividend payment consisting with the reference of the catering 
theory, while others propose that there is a negative relationship, as confirmed by 
signalling theory (Frankfurter & Wood 2002; Baker & Wurgler 2004; Ferris, Sen, & 
Yui 2006).  
There are many proxies related to sentiment and used to describe investor sentiment, 
such as investor mood, closed-end fund discount, share turnover, and first-day returns 
on IPOs (Baker & Stein 2004; Baker & Wurgler 2007). In Baker & Wurgler’s (2007) 
study, variables such as the closed-end fund discount, trading volume, the number and 
first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and dividend premium are 
contained to form the investor sentiment index. We follow the method proposed by 
Baker & Wurgler (2006) to develop an index of investor sentiment applicable to the 
context of the Chinese stock market. To do this, we only use five of the six proxies: 
trading volume, the number and first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, 
and dividend premium; as data on closed-end fund discounts are unavailable. In 
addition, we adjust the measurements of the proxies in line with other studies (e.g. Ning 
2009; Zhu & Niu 2016; Ding et al. 2017), which develop the sentiment index 
construction method based on the Chinese stock market data to reflect China’s stock 
market investor sentiment more accurately. To do so, it is sensible to describe each of 
the proxies individually as below. 
Trading Volume. Trading volume, also the market turnover (STurnit−1), is measured 
as the detrended log of turnover ratio and calculated as the ratio of annual reported share 
volume to shares listed by CSMAR (Baker & Wurgler 2006; Ding et al. 2017). Previous 
research has used this variable as a sentiment index based on the NYSE database and 
found that high share turnover means high market liquidity and low market returns, 
which is a symptom of investors’ optimism or overvaluation (Jones 2001; Baker & 
Stein 2004; Baker & Wurgler 2006).  
IPO Market: IPO Volume. IPO volume is presented by IPO number (IPONit ), the 
natural log of annual IPO volume. The reason for scaling with the natural logarithm is 
to avoid the bias associated with outliers and errors, as the value of this variable is large. 
The underlying demand for IPOs is considered to be extremely sensitive to investor 
sentiment. IPOs’ capriciously open and close could explain the fluctuations of IPO 
volume, implying the sentiment of investors (Baker & Wurgler 2006; Ding et al 2017).  
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IPO Market: First-day Returns On IPOs. The first-day returns on IPOs (IPORit−1), 
representing the IPO market, are investigated and viewed as an index of investor 
sentiment. They are calculated as the detrended log of average annual first-day returns 
on IPOs. High first-day returns on IPOs are cited as a measure of investor enthusiasm, 
while a low idiosyncratic return is interpreted as a symptom of market timing 
(Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh 2006; Baker & Wurgler 2006).  
Equity Share in New Issues. The equity share in the new issues (ESit) is also a measure 
of financing activity and can capture the sentiment. It is the ratio of equity issuance to 
the total of equity and long-term debt issuances (Baker & Wurger 2000, 2006). Previous 
research has proven that high values of equity portend low stock market returns (Baker 
& Wurgler 2000; Yu & Yuan 2011). 
Dividend Premium. Dividend premium (Pit−1
D−ND), the equal-weighted market dividend 
premium, as proposed and defined by Baker and Wurgler (2004), is the difference 
between the natural logs of the dividend payers’ and nonpayer’s average market-to-
book ratio each year, and is also called the log of the ratio of average market-to-book. 
“Market-to-book” is defined following Fama and French (2001). The market-to-book 
ratio is book assets minus book equity plus market equity, all divided by book assets. It 
is used to measure the propensity to pay dividends and has been verified as having a 
positive impact on the propensity to pay dividends as well as changes in paying 
dividends. This conclusion also supports the dividend catering theory (Baker & 
Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Jayaraman, & Sabherwal 2009). 
Using these five proxies, a composite index is derived to capture their common 
components, with each proxy first standardised (Baker & Wurgler 2007; Zhu & Niu 
2016; Ding et al. 2017). We used principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the 
investor sentiment index and define it as the first principal component of the correlation 
matrix of the five variables. The first principal component explains 53% of the sample 
variance, which indicates that each factor captures much of the common variation. 
Finally, investor sentiment presents as below: 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 0.5784𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 0.3845𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 0.5372𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
+ 0.3029𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 0.3706𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷  
𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 is the market turnover; 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 is IPO number; 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 is the first-day 
return on IPOs; 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the equity issue over total new issues and 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷  is dividend 
premium. 
In addition, as each proxy can represent investor sentiment, the above variables, 
share turnover (STurnit−1 ), IPO number ( IPONit ), the first-day returns on IPOs 
(IPORit−1), the equity share ratio (ESit) and dividend premium (Pit−1
D−ND), can be used 
separately by conducting a robustness test to verify how they exactly affect dividend 
payment (Neal & Wheatley 1998; Baker & Wurgler 2000; Baker & Stein 2004; 
Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh 2006).  
ii. SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡)  
TopSOE𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable to measure whether the listed firms is state-owned or 
not. It equals 1 when the company is controlled by the state; otherwise, 0. Many 
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researchers have studied the correlation between state-owned shareholders and firm 
performance and dividend policy, especially in the Chinese market (Dewenter & 
Malatesta 2001; Gugler 2003; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Lin, Chen, & Tsai 2017). It is 
known that different types of ownership have different impacts on dividend policy 
because of the agency problem and personal interest. State-owned shareholders are 
willing to keep stable dividend payments and are reluctant to cut dividends (Gugler 
2003; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010). 
iii. The Degree of Concentration of The Largest Shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡)  
Top1opit is calculated by the number of shares held by the largest shareholder divided 
by the total number of shares. The largest shareholder has been proven to significantly 
impact or even control corporate performance and dividend policy for personal wealth 
(Asquith & Mullins Jr. 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Jun 2006; Truong & Heaney 







𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares held by the largest shareholder of firm i at year t 
𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of shares 
Using the above explanatory variables, the hypotheses that corporate ownership 
and investor sentiment affect dividend policy can be tested using interaction terms of 
the ownership and investor sentiment measures, as explained further below.  
 
3.1.2.2 Hypotheses, Model Specification and Estimation  
This section describes an econometric model used to test the relationship between 
investor sentiment, ownership (highly concentrated and state ownership) and dividend 
policy. The testable hypotheses proposed are as follows: 
H5.1a: The propensity of SOEs to pay cash dividends is affected by investor sentiment  
H5.2a: The propensity of firms with large shareholder concentration to pay cash divi-
dend is affected by investor sentiment 
The rationale for these and other hypotheses proposed in this section is discussed 
in Chapter 5. Following Baker and Wurgler (2004), Li and Lie (2006), Denis and 
Osobov (2008) and others, a logit model can be used to test the above hypotheses which 
involve a binary dependent variable. An appropriate logit regression model for the 
above hypotheses is as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5.1) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the index variable of investor sentiment (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is the variable of ownership: state ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or the shareholding ratio 
of the largest shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡  is the interaction term between the index variable of investor sentiment 
( 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ) and the variable of ownership ( 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) or ( 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ): 





𝑘=4  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage ( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); the size of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); the total 
shareholding ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth ( ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage ( 𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow ( 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ); R&D 
investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); and semi-mandatory dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡).  
Note that, given the number of explanatory variables to represent investor 
sentiment and ownership, the possible interaction variables in the above specification 
would include SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 , SE_Top1opit , STurn_TopSOEit , STurn_Top1it , 
IPON_TopSOEit , IPON_Top1it , IPOR_SOEit , IPOR_Top1it , ES_SOEit , ES_Top1it , 
Pit−1
D−ND_SOEit and Pit−1
D−ND_TOP1it . All the variables apart from SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡  and 
SE_Top1opit are used in the robustness test. Also, a probit model could be used to 
replace the logit model to check the consistency of the estimated results. 
In addition to the above pair of hypotheses, the second set of hypotheses can be 
formulated to test the relationship between investor sentiment, ownership (highly 
concentrated and state ownership) and the change in dividend payment, as follows: 
H5.1b: Investor sentiment affects SOEs on changes of cash dividends 
H5.2b: Investor sentiment affects firms with large shareholder concentration on 
changes of cash dividends. 
Researchers such as DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006); Bulan, Subramanian 
and Tanlu (2007) have applied OLS models in their studies link changes to the dividend 
payment. Therefore, to test the above hypotheses, OLS estimation is applied to the 
following model: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (5.2) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the index variable of investor sentiment (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is the variable of ownership: state ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡  is the interaction term between the index variable of investor sentiment 
( 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ) and the variable of ownership ( 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) or ( 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ): 
𝑆𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 or 𝑆𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); size of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the total shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm 
growth (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); 
and semi-mandatory dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
A tobit model could also be used as an alternative model for the robustness 
checking of hypotheses H5.1b and H5.2b.  
 
3.1.3 Market Liquidity, Ownership and Dividend Policy 
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This section discusses the dependent, explanatory and control variables that examine 
the relationship between market liquidity, ownership (highly concentrated state 
ownership) and dividend payment, the empirical analysis for which is conducted in 
Chapter 6. Here, the dependent variables, dividend decision (Payerit) and Changes in 
Dividend (∆Dit) are as same as those in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The control variables 
are also the same as in Chapter 5 and describled earier in section 3.4.1. The main 
explanatory variables are described in section 3.4.3.1. 
 
3.1.3.1 Explanatory Variables 
To examine the association between market liquidity, ownership structure (highly 
concentrated state ownership) and dividend policy, the main explanatory variables for 
representing market liquidity are described below. 
i. Indicator of Stock Liquidity: Illiquidity (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡)  
Illiqit  is the indicator of stock liquidity, which is presented by the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio. Following Amihud (2002) and Jiang et al. (2017), and based on the 
database collected from CSMAR, illiquidity in this research is computed as the average 
ratio of the daily absolute return to the trading volume in Chinese yuan. This variable 
is widely used to measure liquidity (Amihud 2002; Goyenko, Holden, & Trzcinka 2009; 
Jiang et al. 2017). We multiply the daily stock return by 100 and measure the trading 
volume in million RMB to obtain a larger value of variable illiquidity. A higher value 












𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the daily stock return multiplied by 100 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the trading volume in million RMB of firm i on day d 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the number of trading days for firm i in year t 
ii. Indicator of Market Liquidity: BAS (BASit)  
BASit is the spread between the bid price (the highest stock buying price) and the ask 
price (the lowest stock selling price), which has been shown to reflect the underlying 
liquidity for a particular stock and is considered to be a measure of the supply and 
demand for this stock (Roll 1984; Amihud 2002; Plerou, Gopikrishnan, & Stanley 
2005). We use the simplest type of bid-ask spread, the quoted spread, as an alternative 













𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the lowest asking price of firm stock i on day d 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the highest bid price of firm stock i on day d 
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the average between the lowest ask and highest bid 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the number of trading days for firm i in year t 
iii. Indicator of Stock Liquidity: Turnover Ratio (TurnOverit),  
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TurnOverit is the annual firm turnover ratio and calculated as the accumulative value 
of daily trading volume in shares of stocks to the number of outstanding shares of the 
stock. A higher turnover ratio means more frequent trading and higher liquidity, which 
is found to influence dividend payment negatively in previous research (Hu 1997; 
Amihud 2002; Oladipupo & Okafor 2013). This variable is later used as an alternative 







𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the annual reported share volume of firm i at year t 
𝑆𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the average number of shares outstanding of firm i at year t 
 
3.1.3.2 Hypotheses, Model Specification and Estimation Technique 
To first the relationship between market liquidity, ownership (highly concentrated and 
state ownership) and the propensity for dividend payment, the first pair of testable 
hypotheses proposed are: 
H6.1a: The propensity of SOEs to pay cash dividends is affected by stock liquidity 
H6.2a: The propensity of firms with large shareholder concentration to pay cash divi-
dend is affected by stock liquidity 
To empirically test the above hypotheses related to a binary dependent variable, 
following Baker and Wurgler (2004), Li and Lie (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), the 
logit regression is estimated as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6.1) 
where:  
𝛼0   is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡   is the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋′𝑖𝑡   is the variable of ownership: state ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or shareholding ratio 
of the largest shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is the interaction term between the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) and the 
variable of ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡): 𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  or 𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage ( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); the size of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); the total 
shareholding ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) firm growth (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment 
(𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); dividend premium (𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷); and semi-mandatory dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
A probit model could be used to replace the logit model to test hypotheses H6.1a 
and H6.2a and to check for the consistency of the results with the logit model. 
The second set of hypotheses aims to test the relationship between market liquidity, 
ownership (highly concentrated and state ownership) and the change in dividend 
payment, proposed as follows: 
H6.1b: Stock liquidity affects SOEs on changes of cash dividends 




Following DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006); Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu 
(2007), to test the above hypotheses, OLS estimation can be applied to the model: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (6.2) 
where:  
𝛼0   is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋′𝑖𝑡  is the variable of ownership: state ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or shareholding ratio of 




 is the interaction term between the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) and the 
variable of ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡): 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑖𝑡 or 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡  
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4   is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage ( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); the size of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); the total 
shareholding ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth ( ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage ( 𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow ( 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ); R&D 
investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); dividend premium (𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷); and semi-mandatory dividend policy 
(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
The hypotheses that market liquidity and corporate ownership affect dividend 
policy in the above model are tested using interaction effects of various proxies 
representing ownership and market liquidity, namely Illiq_TopSOEit, Illiq_Top1opit, 
BAS_TopSOEit , BAS_Top1opit , Turn_TopSOEit  and Turn_Top1opit . Of these, 
BAS_TopSOEit , BAS_Top1opit, Turn_TopSOEit and Turn_Top1opit are used in the 
robustness check. Also, as before, a tobit estimation could alternatively be applied as a 
robustness check of hypotheses H6.1b and H6.2b. 
 
3.2 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodology to be employed in the empirical analysis. 
After a brief overview of the research philosophy, the data collection procedure was 
described, the variables were defined and the models were specified in accordance with 

















SUPERVISORY BOARD AND DIVIDEND POLICY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis of the effects of the supervisory board on 
dividend policy decisions, including the propensity for, level of and changes to cash 
dividend payments, based on a sample of Chinese listed firms. The structure of 
supervisory boards across different economies has evolved as either one-tier or two-tier 
type based on national and legal origins. In the US or UK, there are one-tier systems, 
which consist of a unitary board of directors and executive management (Maassen 1999; 
Krivogorsky 2006), and researchers have conducted an empirical analysis of how the 
board of directors influences dividend policy in the US or UK markets with mixed 
results (e.g., Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Mancinelli & Ozkan 2006; Ntim & Osei 2011; 
Elmagrhi et al. 2017). On the other hand, in Germany, China and some other European 
and Asian countries, a two-tier system comprising both the board of directors and the 
supervisory board operates (Wang 2008). The association between the supervisory 
board and dividend policy has also been explored in European and Asian countries, 
such as Germany, France, Finland, Japan and China; and the empirical analysis has 
similarly produced mixed results. (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; Gorton & Schmid 
2004; Fich 2005; Fauver & Fuerst 2006; Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 2009; 
Block & Gerstner 2016). 
The Chinese supervisory board is a typical example of a board operating on 
national and legal origins; it was based on, but is different from, the German supervisory 
board model (Dahya, Karbhari, & Xiao 2002; Ding et al. 2009; Zhao 2009). First, the 
authority and status of the Chinese and German supervisory boards are different. The 
German version has much higher authority, which can not only monitor management 
but also has important decision rights. By contrast, the Chinese board is less 
independent and to some extent powerless, as they can only act as counsellor and make 
comments on or criticise management decisions. Second, the members of the German 
supervisory board are supported and protected by relevant organisations, but this is not 
the case with members of the Chinese board. The codetermination in German 
supervisory boards also helps to protect the interests of the firm and its employees 
(Wiedemann 1980; Gorton & Schmid 2000; Renaud 2007). However, the employee 
representatives on the Chinese supervisory boards lack support because there is no 
relevant organization such as a union that could offer them protection. Finally, the 
business operations in Chinese companies are more complex and the specificities of 
Chinese ownership, such as the SOEs, could influence the function of the supervisory 
board. As a result, the simple replication of the two-tier system must be enhanced 
according to the specificities of the Chinese stock market and the basic principles of the 
law also need to be refined (Lee 2019). The reasons behind why the German 
supervisory board works successfully but seems to fail in China need to be investigated 
further in this research, in order to provide further insight into their weaknesses.  
The association between Chinese supervisory boards and dividend policy has been 
examined from different aspects, such as size and employee representatives, with 
varying results. Some research suggests that smaller supervisory boards influence 
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dividend policy more strongly because they are more flexible and effective, while other 
studies argue that larger ones will impact dividend payments because they are more 
academic (Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; Fich 2005; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). Some other 
studies investigating the relationship between employee representatives and dividend 
payment support the notion that employee representatives prefer to pay dividends to 
dampen insider expropriation (Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001; La Porta et al. 2002). 
However, the ways in which the Chinese supervisory board influences dividend payout 
policy, including features that have already been studied and ones that have been little 
explored, such as receipt of emoluments and independence, still need further analysis.  
This chapter examines the relationship between the Chinese supervisory board and 
decisions on dividend payments. Using the methodology and data outline in chapter 3, 
we investigate how the features of the Chinese supervisory board, including size, receipt 
of emoluments, employee representatives, shareholding ratio and dependent director 
representatives, can influence cash dividend payments. The empirical analysis in this 
chapter focusses on how the Chinese supervisory board structure impacts dividend 
policy.  
While briefly repeating what might be already covered in earlier chapters, section 
4.2 reviews the related literature in order to develop the hypotheses that were simply 
stated in chapter 3. Section 4.3 outlines the models for the regressions, while Section 
4.4 presents the descriptive statistics including univariate analysis. Section 4.5 
discusses the empirical findings including robustness analysis. Section 4.6 draws the 
conclusions. 
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 The Size of the Supervisory Board 
Dividend policy has been argued to mitigate conflicts between management, who may 
be reluctant to satisfy the best interests of shareholders, who expect greater returns from 
their investments (Grossman & Hart 1980; Easterbrook 1984; Jenson 1986). In addition, 
paying dividends makes firms exposed more frequently, which allows for better 
monitoring (Easterbrook 1984). In turn, dividend policy is influenced by agency costs 
and the strength of shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). The board of 
directors is appointed by the shareholders and represents their interests; and the 
members of the board have the responsibility to monitor management and its decisions 
(Block & Gerstner 2016). As a result, the board can influence dividend payment on the 
basis of the board size and board independence. Previous research has found evidence 
that board size influences the effectiveness of governance and determines dividend 
payment decisions. Studies such as those of Guest (2009) and Lublin (2014) argue that 
a larger board could increase problems of communication and reduce the ability to 
control management. At the same time, a larger board is less flexible and responsible 
than a smaller one, which leads to less effective oversight of management (Lipton & 
Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells 1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 
2014). Besides these issues, pressure from institutions and regulations has resulted in a 
decrease in average board size (Wu 2004). These studies indicate that a larger board 
cannot help to strengthen shareholders’ rights and increases agency costs, which will 
have a negative impact on dividend policy. In a two-tier system, the supervisory board 
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is structured separately to monitor management and its decisions (Jungmann 2006; 
Block & Gerstner 2016). As it grows in size, it may face the same problems as the board 
of directors with regard to communication, monitoring and being less responsible, 
which will have a negative influence on dividend payments. 
On the other hand, some studies posit that a larger board impacts firms’ decisions 
and dividend payments positively because it contains more outsider representation, with 
more experience and knowledge and ability to provide better advice, which works better 
for a large complex company (Hermalin & Weisbach 1988; Dalton et al. 1999; Agrawal 
& Knoeber 2001; Fich 2005). However, the members of the supervisory board comprise 
people who are related to the firms, apart from the directors and the management, which 
means it is an inside board and will always obtain information from management. 
Management could provide information in line with their personal opinions, which may 
cause a problem of information asymmetry (Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 2009; 
Bolck & Gerstner, 2016). As a result, a larger supervisory board may work ineffectively, 
with less independent judgement, which may result in it being unable to monitor and 
control management, as well as having a negative effect on dividend policy. As a result, 
the above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4.1a: Supervisory board size affects the propensity to pay dividends  
H4.1b: Supervisory board size affects the level of cash dividends 
H4.1c: Supervisory board size is associated with changes on dividend payments.  
 
4.2.2 Emolument received by the Supervisory Board  
Compensation helps to resolve agency problems between shareholders and 
management. Previous research has examined the link between management 
compensation and agency problems and found that the receipt of compensation by 
management can influence corporate governance and dividend policy, as executive 
compensation provides managers with effective incentives to maximise shareholder 
benefits (Murphy 1999; Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003). Some 
studies show that equity-based executive compensation influences dividend payout and 
capital structure decisions in a different way. An investment opportunity hypothesis has 
been proposed, that if management has more stock incentives, this will reduce cash 
dividend payments (Lambert, Lanen, & Larcker 1989; Mehran 1992; White 1996; 
Berger, Ofek, & Yermack 1997; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kang, Kumar, & Lee 2006). 
However, some research proposes that the concentrated ownership or the large 
shareholders in China have substantial influence on the compensation of board of 
directors. Therefore, director compensation may not be able to resolve the agency 
conflict and have adjusted influence on dividend payment (Chen et al 2017; Chen et al. 
2019). 
Similarly, paying the members of the supervisory board could also reduce the 
agency problem and encourage it to better stand for stakeholders’ benefits and to 
monitor management and its decisions. Moreover, paying compensation could be a way 
to give the supervisory board members an incentive to do a better job. Compared to 
working without an emolument, the members in receipt of such fees may be more 
responsible. As a result, if more members of the supervisory board receive emoluments, 
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this may have a positive impact on the cash dividend payment. However, if the payment 
of members does not inspire them as expected or manipulated by the state-controlled 
or majority shareholders (Chen et al 2017; Chen et al. 2019), this will only increase 
agency costs. These considerations lead to the following testable hypotheses: 
H4.2a: Emolument-receiving members on supervisory boards affect the propensity to 
pay dividends  
H4.2b: Emolument-receiving members on supervisory boards affect the level of cash 
dividends 
H4.2c: Emolument-receiving members on supervisory boards are associated with 
changes on dividend payments. 
 
4.2.3 Employee representation on the Supervisory Board 
In a two-tier system, the supervisory board is required to include employee 
representatives for better monitoring and to represent stakeholder benefits. Some 
previous research has proposed that employee representation on the supervisory board 
could influence company governance and payout policy. Gorton and Schmid’s (2004) 
research on the 250 largest German stock corporations found that a higher level of 
employee representation can weaken the firm’s objective to satisfy shareholders’ 
benefits. Moreover, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) found that employee representation on 
the supervisory board is quite important and useful, as it provides a powerful means of 
monitoring, reduces agency costs and improves governance effectiveness. They also 
found that firms with employee representatives are more likely to pay dividends in order 
to dampen insider expropriation (Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001; La Porta et al. 2002). 
Other researchers, such as Benelli, Loderer, & Lys (1987), also support the notion that 
employee representation on the board can influence business policy decisions. 
Both the Chinese and the German supervisory boards are required to have a certain 
number of employee representatives. However, unlike those on German boards, who 
are supported by the union to ensure they can exercise power, representatives on 
Chinese supervisory boards lack support because there are no relevant organisations 
such as unions that could offer them protection. As a result, in practice, the function of 
employee representatives seems to be ineffective. Based on the discussion above, we 
propose the hypotheses as follows: 
H4.3a: Employee representatives on a supervisory board do not significantly affect the 
propensity to pay dividends 
H4.3b: Employee representatives on a supervisory board do not significantly affect the 
level of cash dividends 
H4.3c: Employee representatives on a supervisory board are not associated with 
changes in dividend payments. 
 
4.2.4 Total Shareholding of Supervisors 
Shareholders prefer different dividend policies depending on their personal benefits, 
and previous research has explored how stock owners affect payout policy. It has been 
proven that considering the high taxes, executives or managers who held large amounts 
of shares in options preferred low dividend payments for personal financial incentives 
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before the dividend tax cut in the US in 2003 (Lambert, Lanen, & Larcker 1989; Jolls 
1998; Weisbenner 2000; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kahle 2002). However, Brown, Liang, & 
Weisbenner (2007) found that after the 2003 tax cut, executives had the incentive to 
raise dividends when their shareholdings were high for personal benefit, which is 
consistent with tax effect or tax-induced clientele effect theory. Many researchers have 
also reported a positive relationship between insider ownership and increased dividends 
when considering their own personal wealth and tax advantages, which can be 
explained by the “bird in the hand”, agency and tax effect theories (Shleifer & Vishny 
1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, 
& Shackelford 2004). When the members of the supervisory board hold shares, they 
also expect personal benefits from dividend payments; moreover, as shareholders, they 
can inhibit management’s jobbery by encouraging such payment. They stand for 
shareholders’ benefits and monitor the managers in case they hold a large amount of 
cash for personal interests or investments (Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, 
Zhang, & Keasey 2002). Therefore, supervisory board shareholders can positively 
affect cash dividend payment. Based on the discussion above, testing hypotheses are 
formulated as follows: 
H4.4a: Higher supervisory board shareholding positively affects the propensity to pay 
dividends 
H4.4b: Higher supervisory board shareholding positively affects the level of cash 
dividends 
H4.4c: Higher supervisory board shareholding is associated with increases in dividend 
payments. 
 
4.2.5 Dependent Director Representative in Supervisory Board 
Corporate boards, such as boards of directors and supervisory boards, are required to 
include both independent and dependent members in many countries, such as the UK, 
US, Germany and Japan (Harris & Raviv 2006; Block & Gerstner 2016). Some previous 
research has studied the correlation between the independence of the board of directors 
and board decisions and suggests that the independence of boards influences their 
decisions and shareholder benefits. For example, some researchers propose that 
independent external directors provide information to help make decisions on 
maximising firm profits, while dependent insiders not only give private information but 
also consider their own personal benefits (Grinstein & Tolkowsky 2004; Adams & 
Feirrera 2007). Some researchers propose that independent directors can control and 
reduce the interests of shareholders, a process that is driven by agency problems (Burns 
2004; Luchetti & Lublin 2004, Adams & Ferreira 2007). Other researchers have also 
studied the correlation between outside directors and board functions, finding that 
outside directors make a contribution to better monitoring because of their 
independence, and insiders give better advice and more firm-specific knowledge 
(Adams & Ferreira 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang 2008; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao 2009; 
Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach 2010; Armstrong, Guay, & Weber 2010; Duchin, 
Matsusaka, & Ozbas 2010). In conclusion, in comparison to independent directors, 
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although dependent ones can provide more inside firm-specific information, they are 
weak at monitoring management and influenced by personal benefits when they make 
decisions. 
In China, some members of supervisory boards have a close working relationship 
with the board of directors, such as the chairman’s secretary and chairman’s assistant, 
who may be easily influenced by the board of directors because of the board’s private 
information or close personal relationships, which can lead to a lack of independence 
of the supervisory board (Bansal, Lopez-Perez, & Rodriguez-Ariza 2018; Farag & 
Mallin 2019). As the board of directors represents the interests of shareholders and has 
a positive attitude towards paying dividends, as a result, dependent members who are 
also the secretaries or assistants to the chairman, could have a positive effect on cash 
dividend payments. The above discussion leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
H4.5a: The dependent representatives of the director on the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on the propensity to pay dividends 
H4.5b: The dependent representatives of the director on the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on the level of cash dividends 
H4.5c: The dependent representatives of the director on the supervisory board have a 
significant effect on changes on dividend payments. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
The data selection procedure for testing the above hypotheses is described in section 
3.2 and the model specifications are outlined in section 3.4 of chapter 3. Here, for ease 
of analysis, it suffices to simply state the specifications for each set of hypotheses: 
For testing hypotheses 4.1a – 4.5a: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (4.1)        
For testing hypotheses 4.1b – 4.5b: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (4.2) 
For testing hypotheses 4.1c – 4.5c: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         (4.3) 
where:  
𝛼0 is the constant term 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑛
𝑚=5
𝑛=1  is a set of main explanatory variables representing supervisory board 
characteristics, namely: the size of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the emolument 
payment ratio of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 ); the ratio of employee 
representation on the supervisory board (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); the total shareholding ratio 
of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); supervisory board independence (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡). 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=6  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); dummy SOE (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡); the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth 
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 ); stock 
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market turnover ( 𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ); dividend premium ( 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ); and semi-mandatory 
dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
In the above specifications (4.1)-(4.3), the dependent variables are different owing 
to the nature of the hypotheses being tested, but since the hypotheses are otherwise 
similar, the explanatory and control variables are common. The precise definitions of 
the dependent, explanatory and control variables employed are detailed in section 3.4 
of chapter 3. 
   
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for dividend policy (Panel A), supervisory 
boards (Panel B) and other control variables which could affect dividend policy (Panel 
C). The mean value of Payerit  is 0.656, showing that more than half of the firms 
decided to pay cash dividends (Payerit) every year. The mean value of cash dividend 
payments is 0.012, which is higher than the median value (0.006), which also confirms 
that the sample distribution of the payout is skewed to the right. The median value of 
∆Dit is 0.000, which indicates that most of the firms would like to maintain stable cash 
dividend payments every year.  
With regard to the explanatory variables, the size of the Chinese supervisory board 
(Supsizeit) is between 1 to 14 members, with an average size of around 4 members. 
The minimum ratio of employee representatives (Employeepit) is 0, and the maximum 
is 80%; on average, around 35% of the members of the Chinese supervisory boards are 
employee representatives. The shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit) ranges 
from zero to 0.043, with an average value is 0.002. Director representatives 
(Directorpit), who have a close working relationship with the board of directors, such 
as the chairman’s secretary and assistant, comprise at most 20% of the members. The 
average board size (Bsizeit) is 9, which is higher than the average supervisory board 
size. The average shareholding levels of directors ( Bshareopit ), executives 
(Exeshareopit) and the largest shareholders (Top1opit) are quite high, which means 
they hold a considerable number of shares and the degree of shareholding concentration 
is high. This indicates, first, that both the large shareholders and the members of the 
board of directors would prefer higher dividend payments to satisfy their own desires 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 
2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 2004). Second, the largest shareholders can 
manipulate dividend payments at will because they in fact hold considerable power over 
dividend decisions (Zingales 1994, 1995; Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004). Third, 
the executives could either choose to pay more cash dividends or hold cash for further 
investments according to the way in which they are rewarded. When they prefer cash 
dividends, they will stand by the shareholders when they choose to reduce cash dividend 
payments when there is equity-based executive compensation (Berger, Ofek, & 










Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for Chapter 42  
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payerit 18,412 0.656 1.000 0.475 0.000  1.000  
Divlevelit 18,412 0.012  0.006  0.018  0.000  0.300  
∆Dit 18,412 -0.004  0.000  0.287  -1.136  0.712  
Panel B: Supervisory Board Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Supsizeit 18,412 3.707 3.000 1.185 1.000 14.000 
Supaidit 18,412 0.709 0.667 0.276 0.200 1.000 
Employeepit 18,412 0.346 0.333 0.198 0.000 0.800 
Supsharepit 18,412 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.043 
Directorpit 18,412 0.006 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.200 
Panel C: Control Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bsizeit 18,412 8.833 9.000 1.787 0.000 18.000 
Bshareopit 18,412 0.096 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.625 
Exeshareopit 18,412 0.051  0.000  0.119 0.000 0.524 
Indepit 18,412 0.370 0.333 0.048 0.333 0.500 
Top1opit 18,412 0.446  0.000  0.497 0.000 1.000 
TopSOEit 18,412 0.227  0.200  0.180 0.003 0.632 
InAit 18,412 21.955 21.795 1.250 19.639 25.202 
ROAit 18,412 0.037 0.034 0.052 -0.135 0.165 
∆REVit 18,412 0.215 0.107 0.631 -0.619 4.740 
D/Eit 18,412 1.220 0.805 1.246 0.048 5.912 
CFit 18,412 0.042 0.042 0.077 -0.203 0.257 
STurnit−1 18,412 8.239 8.169 0.392 7.710 8.987 
R&Dit 18,412 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.087 
SEOit 18,412 0.360 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000 
Pit−1
D−ND 18,412 -0.099  -0.102 0.031 -0.147 -0.032 
This table presents summary statistics of all the variables used for the regressions. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016 and the sample 
comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges. All the variables except for the dummy ones 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values to eliminate outliers. The dependent variable Payerit equals 1 when firms decide to 
pay cash dividends and 0 otherwise; Divlevelit is defined as the level of cash dividend payment; ∆Dit represents changes in dividends. 
The independent variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory board 
( Supaidit ); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board ( Employeepit ); the shareholding ratio of supervisors 
(Supsharepit); supervisory board independence (Directorpit); and other control variables which are the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors (Bshareopit); the shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent director 
percentage (Indepit); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit); firm 
size (InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net cash flow (CFit); share turnover (STurnit−1); R&D 
investment (R&Dit); semi-mandatory dividend policy (SEOit); and dividend premium (Pit−1
D−ND). 
4.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.2 presents the univariate analysis of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
of the relationship between the supervisory board and dividend payment. For this 
analysis, the variables are classified according to whether the firms paid dividends or 
not, i.e. into payer and nonpayer groups. All the variables are tested for mean 
differences using a simple t-test. The mean differences of the supervisory board factors, 
namely Supsizeit , Supaidit , Employeepit , Supsharepit  and Directorpit  between 
nonpayers and payers are 0.063, -0.038, -0.025, -0.002 and 0.001 respectively, which 
are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. The values of the mean differences 
first indicate that compared to a large supervisory board, a smaller one gives more 
support to paying cash dividends, which is consistent with the research claims that 
smaller supervisory boards work more effectively, with independent judgement, and 
are able to monitor and control management, as well as having a positive effect on 
dividend policy (Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). Second, supervisory boards with more 
emolument-receiving members, employee representatives and holding a larger number 
of shares have more incentive to pay cash dividends. As previous research suggests, 
both compensation and employee representation could encourage supervisory boards 
to better represent stakeholders’ benefits and monitor management and its decisions, 
and may have a positive impact on dividend policy (Fenn & Liang 2001; Faccio, Lang, 
& Young 2001; Kang, Kumar, & Lee 2006; Fauver & Fuerst 2006). Finally, the 
dependence of the supervisory board probably affects a firm’s payout decisions because 
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the dependent members hold private information and have private interests (Grinstein 
& Tolkowsky 2004; Adams & Feirrera 2007). 
Most of the mean differences of the control variables are statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The results first indicate that the mean differences of Bshareopit , 
Exeshareopit  and Top1opit  between nonpayers and payers are negative and 
statistically significant, implying that shareholders who hold more shares prefer to 
receive more cash dividends (Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & 
Shackelford 2004). Second, the mean difference of TopSOEit between nonpayers and 
payers is positively significant, which supports the notion that companies which are 
state-controlled are unwilling to pay cash dividends (Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001; 
Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013). Third, the significant mean differences of InAit, ROAit 
and ∆REVit between nonpayers and payers are consist with life-cycle theory (DeAngelo 
et al. 2006; Denis & Osobov 2008), and finally, the mean differences of STurnit−1 and 
Pit−1
D−ND  between nonpayers and payers are both positively significant, which could 
indicate that investors have higher sentiment towards firms that do not pay cash 







Table 4.2 Univariate Analysis of Dividend Payers and Nonpayers for Chapter 43  
 Payers Nonpayers Nonpayers - Payers 
VARIABLE N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Diff. t-stat 
Supsizeit 
12,267 3.686  3.000  6,145 3.749  3.000  18,412 0.063*** 3.406 
Supaidit 
12,267 0.722  0.667  6,145 0.685  0.667  18,412 -0.038*** -8.714 
Employeepit 
12,267 0.354  0.333  6,145 0.330  0.333  18,412 -0.025*** -8.045 
Supsharepit 
12,267 0.003  0.000  6,145 0.001  0.000  18,412 -0.002*** -16.863 
Directorpit 
12,267 0.006  0.000  6,145 0.007  0.000  18,412 0.001** 2.256 
Bsizeit 
12,267 8.903  9.000  6,145 8.693  9.000  18,412 -0.210*** -7.533 
Bshareopit 
12,267 0.119  0.001  6,145 0.049  0.000  18,412 -0.070*** -25.872 
Exeshareopit 
12,267 0.065  0.000  6,145 0.024  0.000  18,412 -0.040*** -22.034 
Indepit 
12,267 0.370  0.333  6,145 0.371  0.333  18,412 0.001 1.498 
TopSOEit 
12,267 0.425  0.000  6,145 0.488  0.000  18,412 0.063*** 8.166 
Top1opit 
12,267 0.235  0.208  6,145 0.211  0.183  18,412 -0.024*** -8.414 
InAit 
12,267 22.133  21.955  6,145 21.597  21.494  18,412 -0.536*** -22.034 
ROAit 
12,267 0.053  0.045  6,145 0.004  0.010  18,412 -0.049*** -28.015 
∆REVit 
12,267 0.209  0.129  6,145 0.226  0.048  18,412 0.017*** -66.565 
D/Eit 
12,267 1.014  0.696  6,145 1.631  1.109  18,412 0.617* 1.765 
CFit 
12,267 0.052  0.050  6,145 0.023  0.022  18,412 -0.029 32.585 
STurnit−1 
12,267 8.214  8.169  6,145 8.290  8.285  18,412 0.076*** 36.653 
R&Dit 
12,267 0.004  0.000  6,145 0.003  0.000  18,412 -0.001*** 12.397 
SEOit 
12,267 0.374  0.000  6,145 0.332  0.000  18,412 -0.042*** -5.564 
Pit−1
D−ND 12,267 -0.101  -0.104  6,145 -0.095  -0.102  18,412 0.006*** -5.043 
This table presents univariate analysis of payers and nonpayers. Payers are defined as firms which pay cash 
dividends, while nonpayers are those which do not pay cash dividends. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016. 
The sample comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges. All the 
variables apart from dummy ones are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables comprise the size of the supervisory board 
(Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory board (Supaidit), the employee representative ratio 
on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); supervisory board 
independence (Directorpit), and other control variables which are the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); the shareholding 
ratio of the board of directors (Bshareopit); the shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent 
director percentage (Indepit); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (Top1opit); firm size (InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net 
cash flow (CFit); share turnover (STurnit−1); R&D investment (R&Dit); semi-mandatory dividend policy (SEOit); 









4.4.3 Correlation Test 
Table 4.3 provides the Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the independent variables 
for the entire sample. A correlation coefficient close to or equal to +1 or -1 suggests 
high collinearity or perfect multicollinearity among the variables. Most of the 
correlations are close to or below 0.35, which implies low multicollinearity among the 















Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 4 
 
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐭 𝐄𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐞𝐞𝐩𝐭𝐢 𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐭𝐢 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐩𝐢 𝐁𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 𝐁𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐢 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐓𝐨𝐩𝐒𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭 𝐓𝐨𝐩𝟏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐀𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 ∆𝐑𝐄𝐕𝑖𝑡 𝐃/𝐄𝐢𝐭 𝐂𝐅𝐢𝐭 𝐏𝐢𝐭−𝟏
𝐃−𝐍𝐃 𝐒𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐭−𝟏 𝐑&𝐃𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐄𝐎𝐢𝐭 
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 1 
        
           
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐭 -0.182*** 1 
       
           
𝐄𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐞𝐞𝐩𝐭𝐢 0.023*** 0.071*** 1 
      
           
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.088*** 0.165*** 0.048*** 1 
     
           
𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐩𝐢𝐭 0.022*** -0.009 0.127*** 0.005 1 
    
           
𝐁𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 0.356*** -0.138*** -0.062*** -0.050*** 0.022*** 1 
   
           
𝐁𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.254*** 0.368*** 0.096*** 0.404*** -0.032*** -0.193*** 1 
  
           
𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐢 -0.204*** 0.293*** 0.081*** 0.326*** -0.013* -0.157*** 0.788*** 1 
 
           
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.104*** 0.097*** 0.063*** -0.019*** -0.008 -0.417*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 1            
𝐓𝐨𝐩𝐒𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭 0.218*** -0.209*** -0.212*** -0.110*** -0.021*** 0.176*** -0.229*** -0.177*** -0.052*** 1           
𝐓𝐨𝐩𝟏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 0.089*** -0.129*** 0.227*** -0.171*** 0.057*** 0.042*** -0.268*** -0.218*** 0.028*** -0.306*** 1          
𝐈𝐧𝐀𝐢𝐭 0.257*** -0.139*** 0.141*** -0.143*** 0.039*** 0.274*** -0.239*** -0.204*** 0.014** 0.127*** 0.334*** 1         
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 -0.043*** 0.057*** -0.020*** 0.105*** -0.034*** 0.006 0.157*** 0.137*** -0.019*** 0.001*** -0.026*** 0.030*** 1        
∆𝐑𝐄𝐕𝐢𝐭 0.100*** -0.053*** 0.028*** -0.051*** 0.015** 0.111*** -0.077*** -0.064*** 0.039*** 0.134 0.073*** 0.435*** 0.130*** 1       
𝐃/𝐄𝐢𝐭 0.154*** -0.124*** -0.016** -0.152*** 0.020*** 0.129*** -0.253*** -0.211*** -0.016** 0.084*** 0.128*** 0.368*** -0.334*** 0.198*** 1      
𝐂𝐅𝐢𝐭 0.172*** -0.098*** 0.044*** -0.070*** 0.016** 0.190*** -0.135*** -0.110*** 0.024*** 0.108*** 0.203*** 0.544*** 0.136*** 0.407*** 0.102*** 1     
𝐏𝐢𝐭−𝟏
𝐃−𝐍𝐃 0.029*** -0.038*** -0.191*** -0.063*** -0.001 0.011 -0.087*** -0.074*** -0.011 0.186*** -0.126*** -0.000 -0.015** 0.021** 0.010 0.006 1    
𝐒𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐭−𝟏 0.041*** 0.145*** -0.029*** -0.056*** -0.007 0.032*** -0.105*** -0.085*** -0.031*** 0.064*** -0.052*** -0.022*** -0.005 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.036*** 0.361*** 1   
𝐑&𝐃𝐢𝐭 -0.040*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.002 -0.055*** 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.052*** -0.090*** -0.065*** -0.059*** 0.028*** -0.004 -0.145*** -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.037*** 1  
𝐒𝐄𝐎𝐢𝐭 0.267*** 0.050*** 0.089*** -0.151*** 0.006 -0.019*** 0.073*** -0.217*** 0.021*** -0.085*** -0.028*** 0.087*** 0.031*** 0.159*** 0.055*** -0.030*** -0.050*** -0.060*** 0.053*** 1 
This table presents the correlation between all the independent variables apart from the interaction terms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the 
emolument payment ratio of the supervisory board (Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); supervisory board independence (Directorpit), and other control variables 
which are the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); shareholding ratio of the board of directors (Bshareopit); shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent director percentage (Indepit); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); the shareholding ratio of 





4.5 Empirical Analysis  
To investigate the above hypotheses we expect to determine how the supervisory board 
structure (size, emolument payments, employee representation, the total shareholding 
ratio of supervisors and supervisory board dependence) influence dividend policy in 
China, including the propensity for, the level of and changes to the payment of cash 
dividends. In addition, the factors that are controlled for, containing measures of the 
features of Chinese ownership using Top1OPit and TopSOEit; the board of directors 
comprising Bsizeit, Bshareopit and Indepit; and firm characteristics, as indicated by 
InAit , ROAit , ∆REVit , D/Eit , CFit  and R&Dit . InAit , ROAit  and ∆REVit , are also the 
measures of the maturity of firms to proxy the life-cycle theory (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
& Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & Osobov 2008). Stock 
market turnover and dividend premium are indicated by STurnit−1 and Pit−1
D−ND , which 
are the proxies of investor sentiment, as well as capturing catering theory (Baker & 
Stein 2004; Baker & Wurgler 2006; Li & Lie 2006). Chinese semi-mandatory dividend 
policy is controlled and indicated by SEOit, a dummy variable. 
 
4.5.1 Supervisory Boards and Propensity for Dividend Payments  
This section tests the connection between size (Supsizeit), the emolument payment 
ratio ( Supaidit ), the ratio of employee representation ( Employeepit ), the total 
shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit) and supervisory board dependence 
( Directorpit ) and the propensity for cash dividend payment. According to the 
hypotheses, a smaller (larger) supervisory board has a positive (negative) effect on the 
initiation of cash dividends because of the weakened supervision function and 
information asymmetry (Böckli 2009; Hommelhoff & Hopt 2009; Guest 2009; Lublin 
2014). Emolument payment could affect the initiation of cash dividends positively as a 
way of resolving the agency problem, working in a similar way to management 
compensation (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003). Employee 
representatives on the supervisory board may not have an influence on the initiation of 
cash dividend payment because of their lack of support and protection. Higher 
supervisory board shareholding could positively affect the initiation of cash dividend, 
considering either personal interests or agency problems (Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 
2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 2004). The 
dependence of supervisory boards, which is measured by the dependent director 
representatives on the board, could lead to a positive effect on the initiation of cash 
dividend payment according to agent theory (Burns 2004; Luchetti & Lublin 2004, 
Adams & Ferreira 2007).  
Table 4.4 shows the results of the logit model estimating the relationship between 
the supervisory board and the propensity of firms to pay cash dividends. The 
explanatory variables representing hypotheses H4.1a - H4.5a are included individually 
in columns (1)-(5) as well as jointly in column (5). The coefficient of Supsizeit  is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a 
significant negative relationship between the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit) 
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and the decision to pay cash dividends, which is consistent with H4.1a. This result 
supports the argument that a smaller supervisory board has fewer communication 
problems, is more flexible and more responsible than a larger one. In other words, a 
smaller supervisory board can monitor management and better advance the interest of 
stakeholders (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 
1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). The coefficient of Supaidit is positive (0.048) but not 
significant, which indicates that there is no significant relationship between the 
emolument-receipt of supervisory boards ( Supaidit ) and decisions to pay cash 
dividends. Hence, this finding is inconsistent with H4.2a. Paying compensation can be 
a partial remedy to solve the agency problem and to protect shareholder benefits 
(Murphy 1999). Therefore, emoluments should encourage the members of the 
supervisory board to work more effectively and influence the payment of cash 
dividends positively. However, the test results indicate that paying supervisory board 








Table 4.4 Logit Model: Supervisory Boards and Propensity for Cash Dividends5  
Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Supsizeit -0.067***     -0.068*** 
 (-3.584)     (-3.646) 
Supaidit  0.048    0.036 
  (0.626)    (0.469) 
Employeepit   -0.209*   -0.168 
   (-1.879)   (-1.491) 
Supsharepit    23.828***  24.487*** 
    (6.063)  (6.204) 
Directorpit     -0.814 -0.784 
     (-1.496) (-1.424) 
Bsizeit 0.051*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 
 (3.674) (2.961) (2.902) (2.785) (2.987) (3.499) 
Bsharepit 2.354*** 2.364*** 2.391*** 2.093*** 2.373*** 2.044*** 
 (11.061) (11.035) (11.225) (9.810) (11.158) (9.480) 
Indepit -0.958** -1.012** -0.992** -0.893* -0.997** -0.858* 
 (-2.080) (-2.199) (-2.157) (-1.941) (-2.170) (-1.852) 
Exesharepit 1.040*** 1.041*** 1.049*** 0.977*** 1.050*** 0.981*** 
 (3.334) (3.342) (3.360) (3.150) (3.367) (3.157) 
TopSOEit 0.074 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.089* 
 (1.600) (1.069) (0.934) (1.143) (0.933) (1.852) 
Top1opit 0.830*** 0.841*** 0.862*** 0.884*** 0.845*** 0.900*** 
 (6.740) (6.843) (6.978) (7.191) (6.870) (7.255) 
InAit 0.744*** 0.737*** 0.741*** 0.740*** 0.737*** 0.751*** 
 (32.905) (32.800) (32.724) (32.963) (32.814) (33.044) 
ROAit 24.247*** 24.256*** 24.198*** 24.124*** 24.234*** 24.073*** 
 (33.616) (33.594) (33.496) (33.504) (33.566) (33.457) 
∆REVit -0.380*** -0.378*** -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.377*** -0.373*** 
 (-10.267) (-10.195) (-10.137) (-10.134) (-10.177) (-10.110) 
D/Eit -0.486*** -0.488*** -0.490*** -0.485*** -0.488*** -0.485*** 
 (-23.282) (-23.342) (-23.379) (-23.225) (-23.336) (-23.213) 
CFit 1.153*** 1.133*** 1.120*** 1.148*** 1.130*** 1.157*** 
 (3.835) (3.772) (3.725) (3.823) (3.763) (3.852) 
STurnit−1 -0.406*** -0.407*** -0.423*** -0.403*** -0.408*** -0.414*** 
 (-7.758) (-7.778) (-8.005) (-7.689) (-7.800) (-7.825) 
SEOit -0.033 -0.029 -0.026 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 
 (-0.809) (-0.718) (-0.635) (-0.669) (-0.704) (-0.712) 
R&Dit 0.996 1.024 1.082 1.172 1.056 1.183 
 (0.628) (0.646) (0.683) (0.737) (0.666) (0.743) 
Pit−1
D−ND -1.465** -1.495** -2.006*** -1.447** -1.523** -1.841** 
 (-2.130) (-2.176) (-2.736) (-2.103) (-2.217) (-2.505) 
Constant -13.195*** -13.192*** -13.102*** -13.300*** -13.165*** -13.328*** 
 (-19.578) (-19.522) (-19.468) (-19.756) (-19.571) (-19.685) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.299 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.299 0.297 
This table presents the results of logit regression explaining the propensity of firms to pay dividends. The 
dependent variable, payerit, takes a value of 1 for dividend payers and 0 for non-payers. The sample period is 
from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables, apart from dummy variables, were winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in 
parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant relationships at the 10 percent, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. The variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio 
of the supervisory board (Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); 
the shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); supervisory board independence (Directorpit), and other 
control variables which are the size of the BoD (Bsizeit ); the shareholding ratio of the board of directors 
(Bshareopit); the shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent director percentage (Indepit); the 
largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit); firm size 
(InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net cash flow (CFit); share turnover 





The coefficient of Employeepit is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level when included individually, which indicates that employee representatives 
( Employeepit ) do influence the decision to pay cash dividends. Employee 
representatives on the supervisory board should play an important role in monitoring, 
improving governance effectiveness and promoting dividend payments to dampen 
insider expropriation (La Porta et al. 2002; Faccio, Lang, & Yong 2001; Fauver & 
Fuerst 2006). However, the result is not significant in column 6, which indicates that 
employee representatives on Chinese supervisory boards may not have an impact on 
decisions to cash dividend payments, consistent with H4.3a. The coefficient of 
Supsharepit is positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a 
significant positive relationship between supervisory board shareholding (Supsharepit) 
and the decision to pay cash dividends, giving strong support for H4.4a. We argue that 
similar to other insider ownership, members of the supervisory board who hold many 
shares intend to increase their personal wealth through paying cash dividends (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, 
Ready, & Shackelford 2004). The coefficient of Directorpit  is negative but not 
significant, which indicates that there is no significant relationship between the 
dependent director representatives on the supervisory board (Directorpit) and decisions 
to pay cash dividends, a finding which does not support H4.5a. This result is actually a 
good indication that although these members work closely with the board of directors, 
they will not be influenced by them and can make decisions independently. 
Among the other explanatory and control variables, the coefficients of Bsharepit, 
Exesharepit and Top1opit are positive and significant at the 1% level. These results 
indicate that the shareholdings of directors (Bsharepit), executives (Exesharepit) and 
the largest shareholder (Top1opit) have a significant positive impact on the propensity 
to pay cash dividends, which supports the notion that insider ownership supports 
payment, in consideration of their personal wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, 
Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 
2004) and is consistent with the agency, bird in the hand and clientele effect theory. 
The coefficients of InAit and ROAit are also positive and significant at the 1% level; 
and that of ∆REVit is negative and significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that 
firm size (InAit) and profitability (ROAit) have a significant positive relationship with 
the propensity to payment of cash dividends, while growth opportunity (∆REVit) has a 
significant negative relationship with the same, which means that larger firms with high 
profitability and lower growth opportunity prefer to pay cash dividends. This can be 
explained by lifecycle theory (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, 
Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & Osobov 2008). The coefficient of Pit−1
D−ND  is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the dividend premium 
(Pit−1
D−ND) has a significant negative relationship with the payment of cash dividends. 
This result is inconsistent with the catering theory, suggesting that there is a positive 
relationship between dividend premium and dividend policy because of the catering 
mentality (Baker & Wurgler 2006; Li & Lie 2006). However, signalling theory provides 
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a reasonable explanation for this from another perspective. A negative dividend 
premium indicates that investors’ sentiment is low and that they have less confidence 
in and expectations of the stock market. As a result, paying cash dividends becomes an 
effective option to deliver good information and attract investors (Frankfurter & Wood 
2002). 
In summary, the test results show, first, that there is a significant negative 
correlation between supervisory board size and payment of cash dividends, which is 
consistent with H4.1a, the hypothesis that smaller supervisory boards positively affect 
the decision to pay dividends. Second, there is a significant positive correlation between 
supervisory board shareholding and decisions on paying cash dividends, which means 
that H4.4a, the hypothesis that higher supervisory board shareholding positively affects 
the decision to pay dividends, is accepted. Third, the results of the remaining 
supervisory board aspects, including emolument payment, employee representation and 
dependence of Chinese supervisory boards, are insignificant, which indicates that they 
are irrelevant to decisions to pay cash dividends and consequently the hypotheses H4.2a 
and H4.5a are rejected, although support for H4.3a is mixed. Finally, the test results of 
the control variables show that besides the supervisory board, other factors such as firm 
characteristics and investor demands also influence dividend decisions. 
 
4.5.2 Supervisory Boards and level of Dividend Payment 
According to hypotheses H4.1b – H4.5b, the Chinese supervisory board is expected to 
impact the amount of cash dividends in the same way as it does the propensity for 
paying cash dividend. In this section, therefore, we focus on the association between 
size ( Supsizeit ), the emolument payment ratio ( Supaidit ), the ratio of employee 
representation (Employeepit), the total shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit) 
and supervisory board dependence ( Directorpit ) and the level of cash dividend 
payment.  
Table 4.5 shows the results assessing the impact of the supervisory board and the 
level of paying cash dividends. As with Table 4.4, we include the supervisory board 
variables individually as well as jointly, but the results of control variables, which are 
broadly similar, are not shown in Table 4.5. The coefficient of Supsizeit is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. In theory, a smaller supervisory board has fewer 
communication problems, and is more flexible and responsible than a larger one, which 
means a smaller board can monitor management and represent stakeholders’ benefits 
better (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells 1998; 
Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). However, although this result supports H4.1b, the coefficient 
is 0.000, which means that this factor actually has a negligible effect on the level of 
paying cash dividends in practice. The coefficient of Supaidit is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a positive relationship between the receipt 
of emoluments by the supervisory board (Supaidit) and the level of cash dividends. 
Theoretically, when a firm decides to pay a cash dividend, a supervisory board which 
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receives compensation will stand for shareholders’ wealth and influence the level of 
cash dividend payment positively. However, although the result supports H4.2b, the 









Table 4.5 OLS Model: Supervisory Boards and Level of Cash Dividend Payment6  
OLS Regression Model 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supsizeit -0.000**     -0.000** 
 (-2.333)     (-2.293) 
Supaidit  0.001**    0.001** 
  (2.160)    (2.096) 
Employeepit   -0.001   -0.000 
   (-0.944)   (-0.732) 
Supsharepit    0.064***  0.066*** 
    (3.557)  (3.633) 
Directorpit     -0.004* -0.004* 
     (-1.727) (-1.706) 
Constant -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007** 
 (-1.828) (-1.952) (-1.743) (-1.959) (-1.812) (-2.074) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
R-squared 0.354 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.354 0.354 
Adj. R-squared 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.353 
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions of the level at which firms pay dividends. The dependent 
variable Dividendit is measured as the amount of cash dividends divided by the book value of assets. The sample 
period is from 2007 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in 
parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent 
variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory 
board (Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); and supervisory board independence (Directorpit). The variable control 
contains all the same control variables as in the regressions. 
The coefficient of Employeepit is statistically insignificant, consistent with H4.3b. 
The coefficient of Supsharepit is positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates 
that there is a significant positive relationship between supervisory board shareholding 
(Supsharepit) and the level of paying cash dividends, which is consistent with H4.4b. 
This means that similar to insider ownership, members of the supervisory board who 
holding a considerable number of shares will attempt to increase their personal wealth 
by paying cash dividends (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; 
Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 2004). The coefficient of 
Directorpit is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, and the marginal 
impact on the level of cash dividend payment is small. 
Overall, although the impact of supervisory board size, emolument payment on the 
level of dividend payment is small, their statistical significance indicates that 
hypotheses H4.1b and H4.2b are supported. H4.3b, the hypothesis that employee 
representatives on a supervisory board do not significantly affect the level of cash 
dividends, is also supported because the coefficient of employee representatives is 
insignificant. Similarly, there is support for H4.4b, the hypothesis that higher 
supervisory board shareholding positively affects the level of cash dividends, is strong 
and the marginal impact of this variable is significantly positive. However, support for 
H4.5b is mixed. 
 
4.5.3 Supervisory Boards and Changes in Dividend Payment 
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According to hypotheses H4.1c - H4.5c, the Chinese supervisory board is expected to 
also influence changes in cash dividend payments in the same way as it does on the 
propensity for and level of such payments. In this section, we focus on the association 
between size ( Supsizeit ), the emolument payment ratio ( Supaidit ), the ratio of 
employee representation (Employeepit ), the total shareholding ratio of supervisors 
(Supsharepit) and supervisory board dependence (Directorpit), and the changes in 
cash dividend payment.  
Table 4.6 shows the results assessing the impact of supervisory board variables on 
changes in cash dividend payments. The effects of Supsizeit, Supaidit, Supsharepit, 
and Directorpit  are all insignificant. Only the coefficient of Supsharepit , being 
positive (0.026) and significant at the 5% level, has an impact on the change in dividend 
payments. The results indicate that the supervisory board is irrelevant to cash dividend 
changes apart from the shareholding ratio of supervisors, which is consistent with 
clientele effect theory (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, 
Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 2004). Thus, only H4.4c, the 
hypothesis that higher supervisory board shareholding is associated with increases in 
dividend payments, is supported (apart from H4.3c which states an insignificant impact). 
There are several reasons why the supervisory board does not determine changes to the 
dividend payment. First, Chinese supervisory boards lack power and work inefficiently 
because of their weak protection and imperfect regulations. In addition, companies 
would like to maintain a stable dividend policy to show their profitability and attract 
outside investors (Lintner 1962; Fama 1974; Baker & Powell 2000; Omet 2004). 
Moreover, firms change their dividend payments as a result of other factors, such as 









Table 4.6 OLS Model: Supervisory Boards and Changes in Cash Dividend Payment7  
OLS Regression Model 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supsizeit 0.000     -0.000 
 (0.145)     (-0.076) 
Supaidit  -0.009    -0.009 
  (-1.008)    (-1.063) 
Employeepit   -0.139   -0.151 
   (-0.406)   (-0.443) 
Supsharepit    0.026**  0.026** 
    (2.115)  (2.107) 
Directorpit     0.029 0.015 
     (0.472) (0.246) 
Constant -0.131* -0.125* -0.139** -0.130* -0.131* -0.132* 
 (-1.884) (-1.805) (-1.998) (-1.869) (-1.883) (-1.897) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Adj. R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of the change in firms’ cash dividends. The dependent variable 
∆Dit represents the change in dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016, 
consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding 
financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. 
t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the size of 
the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of supervisory board (Supaidit), the employee 
representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit), the shareholding ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit), 
the supervisory board independence (Directorpit). The variable control contains all the same control variables as 
in the regressions. 
171 
 
4.5.4 Robustness Check 
This section presents two robustness tests to assess the consistency of the results of the 
association between cash dividend payment and Chinese supervisory boards.  
In the first robustness test, we first replaced the logit and OLS models with probit 
and tobit models, respectively. In other words, to estimate the propensity to pay 
dividend payments, the use of probit replaces logit estimation as the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. To estimate the effects on the level and changes in dividend payments, 
the use of tobit replaces OLS estimation. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, to be compared with the results of Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, 
respectively. The results are consistent since the outcomes of the main hypothesis 
remain the same as the earlier results. For instance, the effects of supervisory broad size 
and total supervisory shareholding are significant, confirming support for hypotheses 
H4.1a and H4.4a, as before, while the effects of emolument payment and dependence 
of Chinese supervisory boards are insignificant, confirming rejection of H4.2a and 
H4.5a, while there is mixed support for H4.3a. Similarly, the tobit results confirm the 







Table 4.8 Tobit Model: Supervisory Boards and Cash Dividend Level9  
Tobit Model 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supsizeit -0.000**     -0.000** 
 (-2.135)     (-2.106) 
Supaidit  0.001**    0.001** 
  (2.094)    (2.029) 
Employeepit   -0.001   -0.000 
   (-0.979)   (-0.763) 
Supsharepit    0.064***  0.066*** 
    (4.102)  (4.194) 
Directorpit     -0.004 -0.004 
     (-1.374) (-1.363) 
Constant -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007** 
 (-1.828) (-1.952) (-1.743) (-1.959) (-1.812) (-2.074) 
Variables Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
This table presents the results of the Tobit regressions of the level at which firms pay dividends. The dependent 
variable Dividendit is measured as the amount of cash dividends divided by the book value of assets. The sample 
period is from 2007 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shared on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in 
parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent 
variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory 
board (Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); and supervisory board independence (Directorpit). The variable control 
contains the same control variables as in the regressions. 
Table 4.7 Probit Model: Supervisory Boards and Propensity for Cash Dividend8  
Probit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Supsizeit -0.042***     -0.043*** 
 (-3.843)     (-3.908) 
Supaidit  0.024    0.014 
  (0.532)    (0.319) 
Employeepit   -0.118*   -0.092 
   (-1.829)   (-1.408) 
Supsharepit    13.538***  13.895*** 
    (6.473)  (6.612) 
Directorpit     -0.470 -0.452 
     (-1.475) (-1.403) 
Constant -7.639*** -7.631*** -7.579*** -7.710*** -7.620*** -7.720*** 
 (-19.810) (-19.727) (-19.661) (-20.006) (-19.781) (-19.949) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.295 0.293 0.292 0.293 0.295 0.295 
This table presents the results of the probit regression of the propensity of firms to pay dividends. The dependent 
variable payerit takes a value of 1 for dividend payers and 0 for non-payers. The sample period is from 2008 to 
2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding 
financial firms. All the variables apart from the dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and *, **, 
and *** indicate statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The independent 
variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory 
board (Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); and supervisory board independence (Directorpit). The variable control 





In the second robustness test, we replaced the main variables representing aspects 
of the supervisory boards. For example, the emolument payment ratio (Supaidit) was 
replaced by a dummy variable of emolument payment (Dum_Supaidit), equal to 1 when 
one or more members of the supervisory board were paid, otherwise 0. Similarly, the 
ratio of employee representation ( Employeepit ), the total shareholding ratio of 
supervisors ( Supsharepit ) and supervisory board dependence ( Directorpit ) were 
replaced by dummy variables of employee representation ( Dum_Employeepit ), 
shareholders on the supervisory board (Dum_Supsharepit) and dependent members of 
the supervisory board (Dum_Directorpit). The same logit and OLS regressions were 
Table 4.9 Tobit Model: Supervisory Boards and Changes in Cash Dividend Payments10  
Tobit Model 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supsizeit 0.000     -0.000 
 (0.143)     (-0.074) 
Supaidit  -0.009    -0.009 
  (-1.002)    (-1.058) 
Employeepit   0.026**   0.026** 
   (2.138)   (2.132) 
Supsharepit    -0.139  -0.151 
    (-0.447)  (-0.487) 
Directorpit     0.029 0.015 
     (0.473) (0.247) 
Constant -0.131* -0.125* -0.139** -0.130* -0.131* -0.132* 
 (-1.884) (-1.805) (-1.998) (-1.869) (-1.883) (-1.897) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050 
This table presents the results of the Tobit regression of the change in firms’ cash dividends. The dependent 
variable ∆Dit represents the changes in dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2007 
to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shared on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, 
excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses, 
and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables 
comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the emolument payment ratio of the supervisory board 
(Supaidit); the employee representative ratio on the supervisory board (Employeepit); the shareholding ratio of 
supervisors (Supsharepit); and  supervisory board independence (Directorpit). The variable control contains the 
same control variables as in the regressions. 
run with the replaced variables to further verify whether these factors had a connection 
with dividend policy decisions. 
The results of this exercise are shown in Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, and the findings 
are consistent with the previous results pointing to the same conclusions. For example, 
the effects of emolument payment and employee representatives are insignificant, so 
these factors of the Chinese supervisory boards do not influence dividend policy, while 
other factors such as supervisory board size and members who are also shareholders 




Table 4.10 Robustness: Supervisory Boards and Propensity for Cash Dividends11  
Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Supsizeit -0.068***     -0.073*** 
 (-3.686)     (-3.944) 
Dum_Supaidit  0.046    0.017 
  (0.607)    (0.216) 
Dum_Employeepit   0.081   0.098 
   (1.264)   (1.519) 
Dum_Supsharepit    0.135***  0.146*** 
    (3.278)  (3.523) 
Dum_Directorpit     -0.149 -0.147 
     (-1.383) (-1.355) 
Constant -17.012*** -17.008*** -16.941*** -16.895*** -16.998*** -16.894*** 
 (-32.418) (-32.301) (-32.273) (-32.145) (-32.407) (-31.936) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.296 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity of firms to pay dividends. The dependent 
variable payerit takes a value of 1 for dividend payers and 0 for non-payers. The sample period is from 2008 to 
2016, consisting of all listed companies that issues A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding 
financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. 
t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and *, **, and 
*** indicate statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The independent 
variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); supervisory board emolument payment dummy 
(Dum_Supaidit); employee representation on the supervisory board dummy (Dum_Employeepit); shareholding 
of supervisors dummy (Dum_Supsharepit), and dependent member dummy (Dum_Directorpit). The variable 




Table 4.11 Robustness: Supervisory Boards and Cash Dividend Level12  
OLS Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Supsizeit -0.000**     -0.000** 
 (-2.414)     (-2.400) 
Dum_Supaidit  0.001**    0.001** 
  (2.434)    (2.208) 
Dum_Employeepit   -0.001*   -0.001* 
   (-1.886)   (-1.760) 
Dum_Supsharepit    0.001***  0.001*** 
    (2.826)  (2.803) 
Dum_Directorpit     -0.001 -0.001 
     (-1.516) (-1.363) 
Constant -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007*** 
 (-2.542) (-2.723) (-2.686) (-2.357) (-2.553) (-2.716) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Adj. R-squared 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.356 
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions of the level at which firms pay dividends. The dependent 
variable Dividendit is measured as the amount of cash dividends divided by the book value of assets. The sample 
period is from 2007 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables wre winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in 
parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent 
variables comprise the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit) supervisory board emolument payment dummy 
(Dum_Supaidit); employee representation on the supervisory board dummy (Dum_Employeepit); shareholding 
of supervisors dummy (Dum_Supsharepit); and dependent member dummy (Dum_Directorpit). The variable 
control contains the same control variables as in the regressions. 
Table 4.12 Robustness: Supervisory Boards and Changes in Cash Dividend Payments13  
OLS Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Supsizeit 0.000     -0.000 
 (0.156)     (-0.045) 
Dum_Supaidit  -0.009    -0.009 
  (-1.039)    (-1.110) 
Dum_Employeepit   0.018**   0.018** 
   (2.453)   (2.454) 
Dum_Supsharepit    0.003  0.003 
    (0.582)  (0.655) 
Dum_Directorpit     0.005 0.004 
     (0.438) (0.340) 
Constant 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.023 
 (0.146) (0.242) (0.323) (0.179) (0.154) (0.472) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Adj. R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of changes in firms’ cash dividends. The dependent variable 
∆Dit represents the changes in dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016, 
consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding 
financial firms. All the variables apart from the dummy variables wre winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise 
the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); supervisory board emolument payment dummy (Dum_Supaidit); 
employee representation on the supervisory board dummy (Dum_Employeepit); shareholding of supervisors 
dummy (Dum_Supsharepit); and dependent member dummy (Dum_Directorpit). The variables control contains 
the same control variables as in regressions. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the impact of the supervisory board structure on the 
dividend payment decisions of Chinese listed firms. Some of the two-tier Chinese 
supervisory board factors have been proven to impact decisions on and the level of cash 
dividend policy in various ways. The size of the supervisory board has a negative 
impact on the decision to pay cash dividends, which is consistent with the previous 
view that a smaller supervisory board helps more to monitor management’s behaviour 
and to stand up for shareholders’ benefits (Wu 2004; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014), while 
the emolument-receiving ratio influences the level of cash dividend positively because 
of the incentives the members received to stand up for shareholders’ benefits (Bertrand 
& Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003). The shareholding ratio of the 
supervisory board has a significant positive impact on the decision to pay cash 
dividends.  
The research has also found that Chinese supervisory boards have problems and 
implications with their functions. First, employee representatives show no association 
with dividend policy and are unable to represent stakeholders’ benefits and monitor 
management decisions. Second, members who are also shareholders may influence div-
idend policy based on their own benefits (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & 
Welch 2000). To improve the function and effectiveness of the Chinese supervisory 
board, first, the size of the supervisory board should be small because a larger board 
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could experience increased communication problems and a reduced ability to control 
management (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 
1998; Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). Second, employee representatives should be protected 
and supported by laws and professional organizations such as unions so they can work 
more efficiently. Finally, the independence and power of the Chinese supervisory board 
should be improved. So far, the “two-tier system” in China is effectively a one-tier sys-
tem in nature. Chinese supervisory boards are very dependent and lack power because 
they can only act as counsellors and give comments on and criticise management deci-
sions. They do not have any election or voting rights concerning the board of directors 
and its decisions. The Chinese supervisory board can only report to shareholders and 
wait for solutions when they find problems with a firm’s operation and decisions, which 
is the reason why it works less efficiently. Overall, the finding of this chapter indicate 
what the Chinese “two-tier system” needs to do is not only to copy the board structure 
from other experienced countries, but also to improve and protect its functions by en-
hancing its own rights and power, and the integrity of relevant regulations. 
As a limitation, this study did not seek to address the problem of potential endoge-
neity or reverse causality. However, in defense, it could be argued that this problem 
does not seriously arise here. In principle, dividend policy is influenced by the inde-
pendent variables, such as the features of the supervisory board, but dividend policy 
may not influence the structure or existence of the supervisory board simultaneously. 
The supervisory board exists by law and generally evolves independently of dividend 
policy decisions. Furthermore, in our empirical analysis, we control for unobservable 
industry-level effects, which to some extent alleviates the potential endogeneity or re-




















INVESTOR SENTIMENT, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND DIV-
IDEND POLICY 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a relevant empirical analysis of the relationship between investor 
sentiment, corporate ownership and dividend policy, including decisions on and 
changes to the cash dividend, based on the sample of Chinese listed firms. Investor 
sentiment is defined broadly as the general attitude of investors towards the financial 
market or particular security. There are many proxies related to sentiment and used to 
describe investor sentiment, such as investor mood, closed-end fund discount, share 
turnover and first-day returns on IPOs (Baker & Stein 2004; Baker & Wurgler 2007). 
Previous research has confirmed how investor sentiment influences dividend policy. 
Some studies suggest a positive relationship between investor sentiment and dividend 
payment consisting with the reference of the catering theory, while others propose that 
there is a negative relationship, as confirmed by signalling theory (Frankfurter & Wood 
2002; Baker & Wurgler 2004; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006). 
Corporate ownership and dividend policy have been extensively explored. For 
example, some research has focused on how different types of ownership, such as state, 
institution or managerial, affect dividend payment (e.g., Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; 
Farinha 2003; Lee & Xiao 2004; Amihud & Li 2006; Kumar 2006; Wang, Manry, & 
Wandler 2011; Lam, Sami, & Zhou 2012; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013). Some studies 
have examined the relationship between the degree of ownership concentration and 
dividend payout policy. The distribution of stock among shareholders could cause 
agency problems between majority and minority shareholders, which significantly 
influences dividend payment (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004; Truong 
& Heaney 2007; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Wellalagea, Fauzi, & Wang 2014; Su et al. 
2014). 
Although the relationship between either investor sentiment and dividend policy or 
corporate ownership and dividend policy has been widely studied, the relationship 
between the three factors has not been explored. According to agency theory, the 
controlling inside shareholders could expropriate not only minority shareholders but 
also outside ones by manipulating dividend policy (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, 
Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011). However, they still need to be concerned 
with investors’ requirements and firm value (Truong & Heaney 2007). In addition, 
investor sentiment reflects investors’ demands, as well as influencing dividend payment. 
As a result, it is questioned whether investor sentiment influences the largest 
shareholders’ decisions on cash dividend payment and this study aims to research this 
topic. Moreover, we develop the research among Chinese-listed firms with highly 
concentrated state-controlled ownership, meaning that many Chinese listed firms’ share 
distributions are not only highly concentrated but also state-owned. Hence, we also test 
whether investor sentiment influences SOEs’ decisions on cash dividends. 
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The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to examine the relationship between investor 
sentiment, ownership and decisions on dividend policy. We estimate logit/probit and 
OLS/tobit models to investigate how the concentrated and state ownership impact the 
decisions on and changes to cash dividend payments under the influence of investor 
sentiment. The results and conclusions will be developed in the following sections. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 5.3 briefly describes the models and 
variables for the regressions, while Section 5.4 introduces the sample selection and 
discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 5.5 discusses the empirical findings and 
robustness analyses and section 5.6 draws the conclusions. 
 
5.2  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The demand for dividends by investors varies over time and market sentiment tends to 
influence their payment (Long 1978). For example, investors may prefer safe dividend-
paying stocks in low-sentiment periods such as recessions, while in good times such as 
booms, investors may prefer risky stocks (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Gemmill 2005). 
Acording to the catering theory, when investors look forward to a cash dividend pay-
ment and a dividend premium, firms would like to cater to their demands (Baker & 
Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006). The high sentiment means that 
investors are optimistic about the stock market and they may overprice stocks. Firms 
prefer to pay cash dividends to attract cash flow and resources from outside. Conversely, 
if there is low sentiment, the attitude by investors towards the stock market is pessimis-
tic, which leads to an undervaluation of stock prices. In this situation, firms prefer a 
more efficient internal capital market that helps to reduce external financing constraints 
and reduce cash dividend payments. As a result, high sentiment could influence divi-
dend policy positively.  
However, there may be a negative correlation between investor sentiment and div-
idend policy. According to signalling theory, a dividend payment can convey relevant 
information, such as firms’ true value and profitability and firms can thus obtain cash 
flow from investors (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & Rock 1985; Frankfurter & Wood 
2002). When sentiment is low, investors have no confidence in or expectations of the 
stock market, and the cash dividend becomes the primary source of income. Companies 
will tend to pay a cash dividend to deliver good signalling and attract investors. As a 
result, investor sentiment could have either a positive or negative impact on dividend 
policy. 
With regard to ownership, theoretically, there is a positive relationship between 
state ownership and dividend policy. Some researchers have explained this phenome-
non by tunnelling theory, arguing that cash dividend policy is dominated by the tunnel-
ling incentive of controlling shareholders’ interests (Lee & Xiao 2004; Chen, Jian, & 
Xu 2009). State shares in China can only be transferred with special approval by the 
government, which has the same effect as the transfer of a portion of non-tradable 
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shares from the state to other shareholders. As a result, cash dividends could be a vehi-
cle for tunnelling in companies with state-controlling shareholders instead of alleviating 
agency problems (Lee & Xiao 2004; Cheng, Fung, & Leung 2009). Other research ex-
plains the positive phenomenon of state-controlling ownership and dividend policy by 
the capital constraint hypothesis. It concludes that non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) 
pay fewer dividends than state-owned ones (SOEs) because NSOEs are more capital 
constrained. In China, banks are known for their soft lending policy toward SOEs and 
lending bias against NSOEs. Therefore, privately controlled firms in China find it more 
difficult to raise long-term debt capital compared to SOEs (Brandt & Li 2003; Fan et 
al. 2008). At the same time, rights offerings or undertaking of SEOs is tightly restricted 
for NSOEs but not SOEs, because the CSRC is a sister agency to the Chinese banks 
whose political ties are both formally and informally significant, and it accepts SOEs 
that do not meet the requirement for an exception on the application if there is an ac-
ceptable explanation (Green 2003). As a result, a greater constraint on debt capital and 
external equity capital puts NSOEs under more pressure regarding internally generated 
funds, which leads to fewer dividends being paid by NSOEs than SOEs (Bradford, Chen, 
& Zhu 2013). 
However, in practice, as the state is usually also the largest shareholder in Chinese 
firms, this could have a negative influence on dividend policy. First, according to 
agency theory, majority control gives the larger shareholders considerable power and 
discretion over dividend decisions and payout ratios, which means when the controlling 
shareholder expropriates minority shareholders, other shareholders will not challenge 
this (Zingales 1994, 1995; Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004). Additionally, a con-
trolling shareholder has a strong incentive to maximise private benefits rather than 
shareholder wealth by occupying firm resources, which is referred to as tunnelling 
(Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001). As a result, under the weak legal 
protection and corporate governance of Chinese firms, the controlling shareholders are 
more likely to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and outside investors and 
siphon off firms’ resources by related-party transactions, which has a negative effect on 
cash dividends (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & 
Yang 2011). Second, corporate pyramid ownership in China also affects dividend pol-
icy. This ownership structure is popular around the world because of the private benefits 
of control rights and is more prevalent in countries with weaker laws and undeveloped 
economic environments (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Attig, Gadhoum, & Lang 2003). A pyramid structure can es-
tablish an efficient internal capital market that helps to reduce external financing con-
straints (Manos, Murinde, & Green, 2012). The internal capital market within the pyr-
amids of firms becomes stronger in its allocation of funds across units as the pyramid 
size increases; in other words, a longer control chain enables higher utilisation of in-
vestable funds, but lower surplus funds and cash dividends (Stein 1997; Bradford, Chen, 
& Zhu 2013). Finally, as the capital constraint is already restricted to NSOEs but loses 
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to the SOEs, SOEs could pay fewer cash dividends than NSOEs because the latter has 
to attract more outside investors to raise fund resources.  
Previous literature has also explored the important relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividend policy. Majority control gives larger shareholders consid-
erable power and discretion over dividend decisions and payout ratios (Gugler 2003). 
One agency problem is that the controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate 
minority shareholders and to be less likely to be challenged by other shareholders (Zin-
gales 1994, 1995; Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004). When there is a large diver-
gence between control rights and cash flow rights, if large shareholders fail to realise 
capital gains from free trading and their sole investment income source is cash divi-
dends, they will have a strong incentive to ask for large cash dividends, which leads to 
firm’s underinvestment and lower value. In cases where the control rights are consistent 
with the cash flow rights, the major shareholder should be inclined to choose the lowest 
cost and most legally protected way to realise its interests. As a result, the controlling 
shareholder may infringe on the interests of the minority shareholders by paying a cash 
dividend. This preference for dividends may be even stronger in emerging markets with 
weak investor protection (Mitton 2004). 
Investor sentiment could also enhance or reduce the influence of state ownership 
or majority shareholders on dividend policy. First, as mentioned above, investor 
sentiment could influence state ownership or more significant shareholders to adjust 
dividend policy as a response to catering incentives or to deliver a signal. Second, the 
larger shareholders need to be concerned with investors’ requirements in case of a lack 
of free cash flow and the risk of underinvestment (Truong & Heaney 2007). Majority 
control gives the larger shareholders considerable power and discretion over dividend 
decisions and payout ratios (Zingales 1994, 1995; Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 
2004), which means a controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to maximise 
private benefits rather than shareholder wealth by occupying firm resources (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001). 
The same issue of the remaining firms’ values and resources is also faced by state-
controlling ownership. As a result, investor sentiment can be viewed as an approach to 
restricting the behaviour of controlling shareholders and protecting the benefits of 
smaller shareholders and outsiders.  
In view of the above considerations, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H5.1a: The propensity of SOEs to pay cash dividends is affected by investor sentiment 
H5.1b: Investor sentiment affects SOEs on changes of cash dividends. 
H5.2a: The propensity of firms with large shareholder concentration to pay cash divi-
dend is affected by investor sentiment 
H5.2b: Investor sentiment affects firms with large shareholder concentration on 
changes of cash dividends. 
 
5.3  Methodology 
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The data selection procedure is outlined in Section 3.2, Chapter 3. The model 
specifications and detailed definitions of the variables employed are given in Section 
3.3 of Chapter 3. Here we briefly link the hypotheses to the model specifications and 
the variables of interest. 
For testing hypotheses H5.1a and H5.2a, we estimate the logit regression model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (5.1) 
For testing hypotheses H5.2a and H5.2b, we estimate the model: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (5.2) 
where:  
𝛼0  is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the index variable of investor sentiment (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡)  
𝑋′𝑖𝑡  is the variable of ownership: either state ownership ( 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) or the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is the appropriate interaction term: 𝑆𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 or 𝑆𝐸_𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4  is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); size of the supervisory board (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the total shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm 
growth (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡); leverage (𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡); net cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡); R&D investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); 
and semi-mandatory dividend policy (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
The dependent variable in specification (5.1) is a dummy variable representing the 
dividend decision (defined as 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, or, as alternatives, 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 or 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡). 
The dependent variable in specification (5.2) is the change in cash dividend payment 
(defined as ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡). The precise definitions of the dependent, explanatory and control 
variables employed are detailed in section 3.4 of chapter 3. 
 
5.3.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics 
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of the dependent and main independent 
variables. The mean value of Payerit is 0.656 and the median value is 1.000, which 
indicates that more than half of the listed firms paid cash dividends between 2008 and 
2016. The mean value of Initiationit is 0.085 and the median value is 0.000, while the 
mean value of Continueit is 0.572 and the median value 1.000. The results show that 
amongst the payers, most are firms that previously paid dividends and continued to do 
so. ∆Dit presents the changes in dividend payment, whose mean value is -0.004 and 
median value 0.000, which indicates the firms paying cash dividends normally maintain 









As for investor sentiment, the difference between the mean value (10.562) and the 
median value (10.801) is quite small, which indicates the volatility of investor sentiment 
is gentle and its value changes only slightly during the statistical period. The mean value 
of IPO number (IPONit) is 13.945 and its performance also shows no major fluctuations. 
The mean value of the equity share ratio (ESit) is 0.716, which is high and indicates low 
stock market returns (Baker & Wurgler 2000; Yu & Yuan 2011). The mean value of 
the largest state shareholder (TopSOE𝑖𝑡) is 0.446, which means that nearly half of the 
listed firms held a relatively large number of shares or were even controlled by the state. 
The mean value of the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders (Top1opit) is 0.227, 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for Chapter 514  
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payerit 18,412 0.656 1.000 0.475 0.000  1.000  
Initiationit 18,412 0.085  0.000  0.280  0.000  1.000  
Continueit 18,412 0.572  1.000  0.495  0.000  1.000  
∆Dit 18,412 -0.004  0.000  0.287  -1.136  0.712  
Panel B: Sentiment Indexes 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sentimentit 18,412 10.562 10.801 0.623 9.411 11.512 
STurnit−1 18,412 8.239  8.169  0.392  7.710  8.987  
IPONit 18,412 13.945  14.134  0.899 12.077  15.269  
IPORit−1 18,412 0.474  0.408  0.282  0.242  1.357  
ESit 18,412 0.716  0.717  0.007  0.700  0.727  
Pit−1
D−ND  18,412 -0.099  -0.102  0.031  -0.147  -0.032  
TopSOEit 18,412 0.446  0.000  0.497  0.000  1.000  
Top1opit 18,412 0.227  0.200  0.180  0.003  0.632  
This table presents summary statistics for all the variables used for the regressions. The sample period is from 
2008 to 2016 and the sample comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges. All the variables, apart from dummy data, were also winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. 
The dependent variable Payerit equals 1 when a firm decided to pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise; Initiationit 
equals 1 when a listed firm did not pay a cash dividend in the previous year t-1, but decided to do so in year t, and 
0 otherwise. Continueit equals 1 when a listed firm paid a cash dividend in the previous year t-1 and continued to 
pay one in year t, and 0 otherwise. ∆Dit represents changes to the cash dividend. The independent variables include 
investor sentiment (Sentimentit); share turnover (STurnit−1); IPO number (IPONit); the first-day returns on IPOs 
(IPORit−1); the equity share ratio (ESit); the dividend premium (Pit−1
D−ND); the largest state-owned shareholder 
(TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). 
indicating that the degree of concentration of the largest shareholder is high and could 
significantly impact dividend payment (Nenova 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004).  
The control variables include the size of the supervisory board (Supsizeit); the 
shareholding ratio of the supervisory board (Supsharepit); the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); 
the shareholding ratio of the BoD ( Bshareopit ); independent director percentage 
(Indepit); firm size (InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage 
(D/Eit); net cash flow (CFit); R&D investment; and semi-mandatory dividend policy 
(SEOit). These are as same as those controlled for in the estimations of chapter 4 and 
their summary statistics are presented in Table 4.2. 
Figure 5.1 Investor sentiment, 2007-2016. Figure 5.1A shows the detrended log 
of the turnover ratio (Neal & Wheatley 1998). Turnover is the ratio of annual reported 
share volume to shares listed by CSMAR. Figure 5.1B shows the natural log of the 
annual number of initial public offerings, while Figure 5.1C shows the detrended log 
of average annual first-day returns on IPOs. The proxies of the IPO market were 
inspired by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Figure 5.1D shows the equity share ratio. This 
is the ratio of equity issuance to the total of equity and long-term debt issuances (Baker 
& Wurgler 2000). Figure 5.1E shows the dividend premium, which is the difference 
between the natural logs of the dividend payers’ and nonpayer’s average market-to-
book ratio each year (Baker & Wurgler 2004). Panel 5.1F shows investor sentiment, a 
composite index that captures the common component in the five proxies (turnover, 
IPO number, first-day returns on IPOs, equity share ratio and dividend premium). 
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According to Figure 5.1, the range of share turnover is small, from 8.987 to 7.710; 
however, the ratio continues to fluctuate. The turnover ratio decreased from 8.6 to 7.1 
between 2009 and 2012 and then rose again to 8.6 in 2015. The volatility of the number 
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to 0.24 between 2007 and 2011 and then increased slightly to 0.44 in 2006. Similarly, 
the equity share ratio decreased considerably in the first two years of the statistical 
period and then increased slightly between 2013 to 2016. The dividend premium 
remained negative and decreased significantly, which indicates that investors imposed 
a negative stock price premium and preferred nonpayer firms (Baker & Wurgler 2004). 
Although the premium grew slightly in 2013, it then fell again in the next year. Finally, 
the volatility of investor sentiment is gentle and its value changes only slightly during 
the statistical period. 
 
5.3.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.2 presents the univariate analysis of variables classified according to firms with 
dividend payers and nonpayers, including tests of the mean differences. The results 
show that the observation of cash dividend payers (12,267) is around twice the size of 
that of nonpayers (6,147). Nearly half of both payers and nonpayers are state-controlled 
and have highly concentrated ownership. The mean difference between investment 
sentiment for nonpayers and payers ( Sentimentit ) is 0.146, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and indicates that investors expect more on firms that are 
nonpayers to pay cash dividends. This result may hint that there may be a negative 
correlation between investor sentiment and dividend policy. Companies will tend to pay 
a cash dividend to deliver good signalling and attract investors according to signalling 
theory (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & Rock 1985; Frankfurter & Wood 2002). The mean 
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differences between the sentiment proxies, share turnover (STurnit−1), IPO number 
(IPONit), first-day returns on IPOs (IPORit−1), the equity share ratio (ESit) and dividend 
premium (Pit−1
D−ND), are quite small or even zero, but statistically positively significant 
at the 1% level. Similar statistics for the control variables are presented in Table 4.3 
and described in section 4.4.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Univariate Analysis of Dividend Payers and Nonpayers for Chapter 515  
 Payers Nonpayers Nonpayers - Payers 
VARIABLE N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Diff. t-stat 
Sentimentit 12,267 10.514 10.671 6,145 10.659 10.801 18,412 0.146*** 15.052 
TopSOEit 12,267 0.425  0.000  6,145 0.488  0.000  18,412 0.063***  8.146  
Top1opit 12,267 0.235  0.208  6,145 0.211  0.182  18,412 -0.024***  -8.437  
STurnit−1 12,267 8.214  8.169  6,145 8.290  8.285  18,412 0.076***  12.416  
IPONit 12,267 13.890  14.134  6,145 14.055  14.134  18,412 0.164***  11.745  
IPORit−1 12,267 0.451  0.349  6,145 0.519  0.408  18,412 0.068***  15.526  
ESit 12,267 0.716  0.717  6,145 0.716  0.717  18,412 0.000**  -2.483  
Pit−1
D−ND 12,267 -0.101  -0.104  6,145 -0.095  -0.102  18,412 0.006***  13.286  
This table presents the univariate analysis of payers and nonpayers. Payers are defined as firms which paid 
cash dividends, while nonpayers are those which did not do so. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016. The 
sample comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges. The 
definitions of the variables are given in Table A. In addition, all the variables apart from dummy data were 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables comprise investor sentiment (Sentimentit); share turnover (STurnit−1); IPO 
number (IPONit); first-day returns on IPOs (IPORit−1); the equity share ratio (ESit); dividend premium 
(Pit−1











Table 5.3 provides the Pearson’s correlation matrix of the independent and control 
variables for the supervisory board sample and dividend policy. The correlations 
between investor sentiment ( Sentimentit ) and the proxies of investor sentiment 
(STurnit−1, IPONit, IPORit−1, ESit and Pit−1
D−ND) are high, which can be explained by the 
fact that the investor sentiment variable is the index composed of these five proxies. At 
the same time, the index of investor sentiment and its proxies will not exist in the same 
regression, which means that high multicollinearity will not affect the accuracy of the 
regression results. The correlations for the other variables are statistically significant at 
the 1% level, with most of the correlations lying close to or below 0.35, which implies 













Table 5.3 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 516 
 
𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐭−𝟏 𝐈𝐏𝐎𝐍𝐢𝐭 𝐈𝐏𝐎𝐑𝐢𝐭−𝟏 𝐄𝐒𝐢𝐭 𝐏𝐢𝐭−𝟏
𝐃−𝐍𝐃 𝐓𝐨𝐩𝐒𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭 𝐓𝐨𝐩𝟏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐁𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 𝐁𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐀𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 ∆𝐑𝐄𝐕𝐢𝐭 𝐃/𝐄𝐢𝐭 𝐂𝐅𝐢𝐭 𝐑&𝐃𝐢𝐭 𝐒𝐄𝐎𝐢𝐭 
𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐭 1.000                     
𝐒𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐭−𝟏 0.922*** 1.000                    
𝐈𝐏𝐎𝐍𝐢𝐭 0.872*** 0.655*** 1.000                   
𝐈𝐏𝐎𝐑𝐢𝐭−𝟏 0.698*** 0.767*** 0.294*** 1.000                  
𝐄𝐒𝐢𝐭 0.421*** 0.570*** 0.224*** 0.356*** 1.000                 
𝐏𝐢𝐭−𝟏
𝐃−𝐍𝐃 0.485*** 0.361*** 0.343*** 0.597*** -0.095*** 1.000                
𝐓𝐨𝐩𝐒𝐎𝐄𝐢𝐭 0.076*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.101*** -0.044*** 0.090*** 1.000               
𝐓𝐨𝐩𝟏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.080*** -0.052*** -0.020*** -0.195*** 0.032*** -0.144*** 0.267*** 1.000              
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.067*** -0.028*** 0.058*** 0.360*** 0.112*** 1.000             
𝐒𝐮𝐩𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.039*** -0.069*** 0.006 -0.052*** -0.227*** -0.192*** -0.086*** 1.000            
𝐁𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢𝐭 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.020*** 0.059*** -0.033*** 0.054*** 0.261*** 0.061*** 0.353*** -0.048*** 1.000           
𝐁𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.115*** -0.105*** -0.078*** -0.137*** 0.031*** -0.115*** -0.471*** -0.310*** -0.257*** 0.400*** -0.194*** 1.000          
𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.092*** -0.085*** -0.061*** -0.113*** 0.025*** -0.094*** -0.368*** -0.251*** -0.206*** 0.322*** -0.157*** 0.786*** 1.000         
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐢𝐭 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.017** -0.047*** 0.013* -0.048*** -0.060*** 0.017** 0.267*** -0.151*** -0.426*** 0.088*** -0.217*** 1.000        
𝐈𝐧𝐀𝐢𝐭 -0.031*** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.076*** 0.051*** -0.072*** 0.320*** 0.329*** -0.052*** 0.109*** 0.281*** -0.256*** 0.144*** 0.013* 1.000       
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐢𝐭 -0.008 -0.005 0.012 -0.053*** -0.013* -0.040*** -0.120*** -0.021*** -0.038*** 0.006 0.002 0.165*** 0.028*** -0.018** 0.024*** 1.000      
∆𝐑𝐄𝐕𝐢𝐭 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.002 0.037*** -0.036*** -0.058*** -0.076*** 0.196*** -0.205*** -0.026*** 0.028*** -0.293*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.172*** 1.000     
𝐃/𝐄𝐢𝐭 0.022*** 0.061*** 0.051*** 0.094*** -0.039*** 0.085*** 0.288*** 0.155*** 0.047*** -0.001 0.156*** -0.350*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 0.402*** -0.408*** 0.043*** 1.000    
𝐂𝐅𝐢𝐭 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.062*** -0.023*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.062*** -0.051*** 0.055*** 0.065*** -0.029*** 0.132*** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.351*** -0.001 -0.156*** 1.000   
𝐑&𝐃𝐢𝐭 -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.025*** -0.055*** 0.018** -0.045*** -0.090*** -0.065*** -0.040*** 0.020*** -0.055*** 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.052*** -0.059*** 0.028*** -0.004 -0.145*** -0.030*** 1.000  
𝐒𝐄𝐎𝐢𝐭 -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.042*** -0.056*** 0.004 -0.050*** -0.085*** -0.028*** 0.267*** -0.151*** -0.019*** 0.073*** -0.217*** 0.021*** 0.087*** 0.031*** 0.159*** 0.055*** -0.030*** 0.053*** 1.000 
This table presents the correlation between all the independent variables, apart from the interaction terms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
To investigate the above hypotheses, we intend to verify how the companies with highly 
concentrated or state-controlled ownership influence dividend policy based on investor 
sentiment. The factors that are controlled for in regressions comprise measures of the 
board of director features, namely Bsizeit , Bshareopit  and  Indepit , and firm 
characteristics, as indicated by InAit , ROAit , ∆REVit , D/Eit , CFit  and R&Dit . InAit , 
ROAit and ∆REVit are also measures of the maturity of firms to certify the life-cycle 
theory (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; 
Denis & Osobov 2008). Chinese semi-mandatory dividend policy is controlled and 
indicated by SEOit.  
 
5.4.1 Investor Sentiment, Ownership and Propensity for Dividend Payment 
According to hypotheses H5.1a – H5.2a, we test the significance of the association 
between the interaction of investor sentiment and ownership structure (represented by 
interaction terms SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 and SE_Top1opit) and the propensity for cash dividend 
payments in Chinese listed firms. From previous research, we infer that investor 
sentiment could enhance or weaken the influence of state ownership or majority 
shareholders on dividend policy because of the catering incentives or information 
delivery (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006; Truong & 





Table 5.4 Logit Model: Investor Sentiment and Cash Dividend Payment17 
Logit Regression Model of Sentiment  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sentimentit -0.332***   -0.313*** -0.313*** 
 (-10.614)   (-5.783) (-5.783) 
TopSOEit  0.111**  -2.191***  
  (2.415)  (-3.197)  
Top1opit   0.995***  5.882*** 
   (8.330)  (2.954) 
SE_TopSOEit    0.215***  
    (3.337)  
SE_Top1opit     -0.473** 
     (-2.526) 
Supsizeit -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.070*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (-3.158) (-3.349) (-3.787) (-3.449) (-3.449) 
Supsharepit 22.148*** 24.130*** 22.892*** 24.082*** 24.082*** 
 (5.553) (5.978) (5.694) (5.927) (5.927) 
Bsizeit 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (3.360) (3.669) (2.902) (3.482) (3.482) 
Bshareopit 1.541*** 1.878*** 1.756*** 1.859*** 1.859*** 
 (7.476) (8.928) (8.277) (8.613) (8.613) 
Exeshareopit 0.903*** 0.943*** 0.915*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
 (2.921) (3.011) (2.948) (2.954) (2.954) 
Indepit -0.903** -0.841* -0.874* -0.944** -0.944** 
 (-1.977) (-1.842) (-1.917) (-2.060) (-2.060) 
InAit 0.792*** 0.768*** 0.802*** 0.762*** 0.762*** 
 (36.166) (34.510) (36.550) (34.109) (34.109) 
ROAit 23.939*** 23.708*** 23.581*** 24.181*** 24.181*** 
 (33.469) (33.575) (33.582) (33.565) (33.565) 
∆REVit -0.392*** -0.386*** -0.406*** -0.372*** -0.372*** 
 (-11.080) (-10.759) (-11.436) (-10.439) (-10.439) 
D/Eit -2.885*** -2.942*** -2.976*** -2.915*** -2.915*** 
 (-23.894) (-24.507) (-24.561) (-24.027) (-24.027) 
CFit 1.396*** 1.213*** 1.276*** 1.298*** 1.298*** 
 (4.740) (4.163) (4.370) (4.418) (4.418) 
R&Dit -0.570 0.141 -0.140 -0.218 -0.218 
 (-0.350) (0.086) (-0.086) (-0.134) (-0.134) 
SEOit -0.014 0.026 0.021 0.006 0.006 
 (-0.335) (0.637) (0.518) (0.137) (0.137) 
Constant -12.888*** -16.185*** -16.550*** -12.709*** -12.709*** 
 (-21.452) (-32.681) (-33.490) (-16.491) (-16.491) 
      
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.286 0.281 0.285 0.290 0.290 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The dependent 
variable Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 
2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, 
excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from dummy ones are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise 
the cross terms (SE_TopSOEit ) and (SE_Top1opit); investor sentiment (Sentimentit); the largest state-owned 
shareholder (TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit) and other control 
variables, which are the size of the supervisory board ( Supsizeit ); the shareholding ratio of supervisors 
(Supsharepit); the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); the shareholding ratio of the board of directors (Bshareopit); the 
shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent director percentage (Indepit); firm size (InAit); firm 
profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit);  leverage (D/Eit); net cash flow (CFit); share turnover (STurnit−1); 
R&D investment (R&Dit); and semi-mandatory dividend policy (SEOit). 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the logit model estimating the relationship between 
investor sentiment, the largest state-owned shareholder and the degree of shareholding 
concentration, and the propensity of firms to pay cash dividends using logit models. 
Columns (1)-(3) include individual terms without interaction effects while columns (4)-
(5) include the relevant interaction and constitutive terms. The coefficient of 
Sentimentit is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a 
significant negative relationship between investor sentiment (Sentimentit ) and the 
decision to pay cash dividends. The negative relationship between sentiment and the 
propensity to pay cash dividends follows signalling theory, which proposes that 
dividend payments are used to convey good information (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & 
Rock 1985; Frankfurter & Wood,2002). A low sentiment means that investors have no 
confidence or expectations of the stock market, and cash dividends become the main 
source of income. As a result, companies will tend to pay cash dividends to deliver 
positive signalling and to attract investors. Companies tend to pay cash dividends to 
deliver good signals and to attract investors. Moreover, investor sentiment can 
positively influence the propensity of the state-controlled shareholders to continue 
paying cash dividends. 
The coefficient of the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOE𝑖𝑡) is positive in 
column (2) (0.111) and that of the largest shareholding ratio (Top1opit) is also positive 
in column (3) (0.995), both of which are significant at the 1% level, indicating that state 
ownership and the degree of shareholding concentration per se increase the propensity 
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to pay cash dividends. However, in column (4), when the interaction term SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 
is included, the coefficient of TopSOE𝑖𝑡 changes to negative (-2.191) and significant 
although this is offset by the coefficient of interaction term which is positive (0.215) 
and significant at 1% level. This means that investor sentiment can influence the 
propensity of state-controlled shareholders to pay cash dividend positively.  
As mentioned in previous research, this result is reasonable and can be interpreted 
as follows. First, because of the corporate pyramid ownership in China, the state as the 
largest shareholder may be unwilling to pay cash dividends. The pyramid ownership 
structure is popular because of the private benefits of control rights and is more 
prevalent in countries with weaker laws and undeveloped economic environments (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang 2000; Attig, 
Gadhoum, & Lang 2003). A pyramid structure can establish an efficient internal capital 
market that helps to reduce external financing constraints (Manos, Murinde, & Green, 
2012). This results in higher utilisation of investable funds, but lower surplus funds and 
cash dividends within the corporate pyramid ownership structure (Stein 1997; Bradford, 
Chen, & Zhu 2013). Second, according to agency theory, the corporate governance of 
Chinese firms is fairly weak, and the controlling shareholders are more likely to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and outside investors and siphon off 
firms’ resources (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & 
Yang 2011). At the same time, a controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to 
maximise private benefits rather than shareholder wealth by occupying firm resources, 
which is referred to as tunnelling (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; 
Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001). Finally, as the capital constraint is 
already restricted to the NSOEs but loose to the SOEs, SOEs could pay less cash 
dividend than NSOEs because the latter has to attract more outside investors in order to 
raise fund resources. However, when investor sentiment rises, the largest state-owned 
shareholder cannot restrain cash dividend payments if they are reluctant to pay and to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and outside investors, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H5.1a. 
Unlike the results of column (4), the effect of the largest shareholding ratio 
(Top1opit) remains positive and is in fact enhanced (5.882) in column (5) when the 
interaction term SE_Top1opit is added. But this positive effect is offset by the negative 
coefficient of the interaction term (-0.473) which is significant at the 1% level, which 
means investor sentiment can negate the strong positive influence of highly 
concentrated ownership on the propensity to pay cash dividends. On one hand, majority 
control gives the larger shareholders considerable power and discretion over dividend 
decisions and payout ratios, leading to an agency problem, in that the controlling 
shareholders are more likely to expand their personal interests by manipulating cash 
dividend payment (Gugler 2003). However, on the other hand, the larger shareholders 
need to pay attention to investor sentiment in cases of firms being less valuable and 
lacking investments. Overall, consistent with hypothesis H5.2a, investor sentiment can 
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help to alleviate agency problems and protect smaller shareholders and outside 
investors.  
Among the control variables, the coefficient of Supsizeit  is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a significant negative relationship 
between the size of the supervisory board ( Supsizeit ) and decisions to pay cash 
dividends. This result supports the argument that a smaller supervisory board helps to 
reduce agency problems, monitors management better, and represents stakeholders’ 
benefits (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Well 1998; 
Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). As a result, a smaller supervisory board can increase the 
propensity to pay cash dividends. The coefficients of Supsharepit , Bsharepit  and 
Exesharepit are all positive and significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that 
the shareholdings of the supervisors ( Supsharepit ), directors ( Bsharepit ) and 
executives (Exesharepit) have a significant positive impact on the propensity to pay 
cash dividends, which supports the notion that insider ownership supports payment 
because of consideration of their personal wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, 
Bernardo, & Welch 2000; Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; Blouin, Ready, & Shackelford 
2004) and is consistent with the agency, bird in the hand and clientele effect theories. 
The results of other control variables are similar as in Table 4.4 of chapter 4.  
In summary, the estimation results of Table 5.4 confirm that, first, there is a signif-
icant positive association between the interaction term of investor sentiment and SOEs, 
and the propensity to pay cash dividends, while the association between both, investor 
sentiment and SOEs and cash dividend payment, is negative and significant, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H5.1a, that SOEs are more likely to pay cash dividends when 
investor sentiment favours dividend-paying firms. Second, there is a significant nega-
tive correlation between the interaction term of investor sentiment and the majority 
shareholder, and the propensity to pay cash dividends, while the correlation between 
investor sentiment is significant and negative and that between the shareholding ratio 
of the largest shareholder and dividend payment is significant and positive, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H5.2a, that the largest shareholders are more likely to pay 
dividends when investor sentiment favours dividend-paying firms. 
 
5.4.2 Investor Sentiment, Ownership and Changes to Dividend Payment 
In accordance with hypotheses H5.1b – H5.2b, this section tests how changes in cash 
dividend payments are affected by the interactions of investor sentiment and ownership 
structure (SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 and SE_Top1opit). According to previous research, we believe 
that investor sentiment could also enhance or weaken the influence of state ownership 
or majority shareholders on changes to dividend payments because of catering 
incentives or information delivery (Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Sen, 







Table 5.5 shows the estimates of the relationship between investor sentiment, the 
largest state ownership and the degree of shareholding concentration, and the changes 
to cash dividend payment. The coefficient of Sentimentit is positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This indicates that there is a significant positive correlation between 
investor sentiment (Sentimentit) and changes to cash dividends. The coefficients of the 
largest state ownership (TopSOEit) and of the largest shareholding ratio (Top1opit) are 
both are insignificant in colums (2) and (3), respectively. However, in column (4), with 
the interaction effect  SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 included, the coefficient of TopSOEit  is positive 
(0.509) and significant but this positive effect is offset by effect of SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 which 
Table 5.5 OLS Model: Investor Sentiment and Cash Dividend Changes 18    
OLS Regression Model of Sentiment  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sentimentit 0.009**   0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (2.480)   (2.807) (2.807) 
TopSOEit  -0.004  0.509***  
  (-0.752)  (4.264)  
Top1opit   0.011  0.120 
   (0.812)  (0.357) 
SE_TopSOEit    -0.047***  
    (-4.264)  
SE_Top1opit     -0.009 
     (-0.289) 
Constant -0.070 0.026 0.036 -0.191** -0.191** 
 (-1.138) (0.556) (0.769) (-2.082) (-2.082) 
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
R-squared 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018 
Adjust. R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable ∆Dit 
represents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting 
of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. 
All the variables apart from the dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
(SE_TopSOEit ) and (SE_Top1opit ); investor sentiment (Sentimentit ); the largest state-owned shareholder 
(TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same 
control variables as in the regressions. 
is negative (-0.047) and significant at the 1% level. When there is higher sentiment, 
payers would like to adjust their approach and pay more dividends to cater to investors 
(Baker & Wurgler 2004; Li & Lie 2006; Ferris, Sen, & Yui 2006). At the same time, 
higher investor sentiment leads to state-controlled shareholders paying less cash 
dividends, which means that these shareholders are more likely to expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders and outside investors. The coefficient of Top1opit  in 
column (5) is positive (0.120) but is not significant. This indicates that the degree of 
ownership concentration does not significantly impact on changes to paying cash 
dividends. In addition, the coefficient of the interaction term (SE_Top1opit) shows an 
insignificant correlation with the initiation of cash dividends. This suggests that 
investor sentiment has no influence on the effect of majority shareholders on listed 
firms’ cash dividend continuity. The results are similar to the those in Table 5.5, which 
proves that investor sentiment can positively influence firms with state-controlled 
shareholders to change their dividend payments. 
 
5.4.3 Alterative Representation of Investor Sentiment   
As the index of investor sentiment is composed of five proxies, share turnover 
(STurnit−1), IPO number (IPONit), the first-day returns on IPOs (IPORit−1), the equity 
share ratio (ESit), and dividend premium (Pit−1
D−ND), we decided to test which singular 
measure actually influenced the dividend policy of state-controlled companies or com-
panies with highly concentrated ownership. We built interaction terms for each of the 
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five proxies with both the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) and the share-
holding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit), then ran both logit and OLS regres-
sions, with the results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, to be compared with the results of 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. It emerges that the IPO market (IPONit and IPORit−1) 
mainly impacts on both the propensity for and the changes to dividend payment of state-
controlled companies or companies with highly concentrated ownership. IPO volume 
and IPO first-day returns are both found to be extremely sensitive to investor sentiment 
(Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh 2006; Baker & Wurgler 2006). Previous research finds a 
positive market reaction to dividend payment when companies initiate IPOs because of 
the valuation effects, which means the initiation of IPOs suggests that companies obtain 
more financial gains (Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson 1998; McCaffrey and Hamill 
2000; Kosedag and Michayluk 2000). Meanwhile, according to the signalling theory, 
the initiation of IPOs delivers positive information of future earnings, which bring out-
side investor confidence to firms’ value and profitability (Lipson, Maquieira, & Meg-
ginson 1998; Kosedag and Michayluk 2000; McCaffrey and Hamill 2000). Similarly, a 
high first-day return on IPOs is cited as a measure of investor enthusiasm, while a low 







Table 5.6 Alterative Representation: Investor Sentiment and Cash Dividend Payment  19 
Logit Regression Model of Sentiment Indexes  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
STurn_TopSOEit -0.073     
 (-0.250)     
STurn_Top1it 0.978     
 (1.057)     
IPON_TopSOEit  0.096    
  (1.205)    
IPON_Top1it  -0.440*    
  (-1.843)    
IPOR_SOEit   0.559*   
   (1.667)   
IPOR_Top1it   -0.073   
   (-0.059)   
ES_SOEit    -7.886  
    (-0.983)  
ES_Top1it    1.610  
    (0.067)  
Pit−1
D−ND_SOEit     -1.203 
     (-0.602) 
Pit−1
D−ND_Top1it     -2.940 
     (-0.503) 
STurnit−1 -0.748***     
 (-2.753)     
IPONit  -0.077    
  (-1.089)    
IPORit−1   0.174   
   (0.559)   
ESit    18.817***  
    (2.783)  
Pit−1
D−ND     0.467 
     (0.278) 
TopSOE𝑖𝑡 4.607 4.607 4.607 4.607 4.607 
 (0.910) (0.910) (0.910) (0.910) (0.910) 
Top1opit -2.322 -2.322 -2.322 -2.322 -2.322 
 (-0.155) (-0.155) (-0.155) (-0.155) (-0.155) 
Constant -22.187*** -22.187*** -22.187*** -22.187*** -22.187*** 
 (-5.081) (-5.081) (-5.081) (-5.081) (-5.081) 
Firm Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.299 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The dependent 
variable Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 
2008 to 2016, consisting of all the listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, 
excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from the dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses 
and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables 
comprise the cross terms ( STurn_TopSOEit , STurn_Top1it , IPONT_SOEit , IPON_Top1it , IPOR_SOEit , 
IPOR_Top1it , ES_SOEit , EST_op1it , Pit−1
D−ND_SOEit  and Pit−1
D−ND_Top1it ); the investor sentiment indexes 
(STurnit−1 , IPONit , IPORit−1 , ESit  and Pit−1
D−ND ); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit ); and the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as 






Table 5.7 Alterative Representation: Investor Sentiment and Cash Dividend Changes 20 
OLS Regression Model of Sentiment Indexes  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
STurn_TopSOEit -0.055*     
 (-1.769)     
STurn_Top1it 0.119     
 (1.201)     
IPON_TopSOEit  0.012    
  (1.385)    
IPON_Top1it  -0.043*    
  (-1.719)    
IPOR_SOEit   -0.018   
   (-0.492)   
IPOR_Top1it   0.039   
   (0.269)   
ES_SOEit    0.930  
    (1.083)  
ES_Top1it    0.330  
    (0.127)  
Pit−1
D−ND_SOEit     0.085 
     (0.404) 
Pit−1
D−ND_Top1it     -0.488 
     (-0.799) 
STurnit−1 0.049*     
 (1.740)     
IPONit  0.000    
  (0.011)    
IPORit−1   -0.065**   
   (-1.995)   
ESit    -0.109  
    (-0.149)  
Pit−1
D−ND     0.288 
     (1.623) 
TopSOE𝑖𝑡 -0.358 -0.358 -0.358 -0.358 -0.358 
 (-0.665) (-0.665) (-0.665) (-0.665) (-0.665) 
Top1opit -0.696 -0.696 -0.696 -0.696 -0.696 
 (-0.436) (-0.436) (-0.436) (-0.436) (-0.436) 
Constant     -0.218 
     (-0.469) 
      
Firm Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
Adjust. R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable ∆Dit 
represents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting 
of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. 
All the variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
( STurn_TopSOEit , STurn_Top1it , IPONT_SOEit , IPON_Top1it , IPOR_SOEit , IPOR_Top1it , ES_SOEit , 
EST_op1it, Pit−1
D−ND_SOEit and Pit−1
D−ND_Top1it), the investor sentiment indexes (STurnit−1, IPONit, IPORit−1, ESit  
and Pit−1
D−ND); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder 
(Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as in the regressions. 
5.4.4 Robustness Checks 
This section presents alternative estimation methods to examine the association 
between cash dividend payment, investor sentiment and ownership structure. We first 
replaced the logit and OLS models with probit and tobit ones, respectively. Both logit 
and probit models are appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable, while OLS 
and tobit models are both used for time-use data. Second, we used two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression to address the potential endogeneity concerns, which could 




Table 5.8 Robustness: Investor Sentiment and Cash Dividend Payment 21 
Probit Regression Model of Sentiment  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sentimentit -0.191***   -0.179*** -0.179*** 
 (-10.452)   (-5.686) (-5.686) 
TopSOE𝑖𝑡  0.055**  -1.184***  
  (2.030)  (-2.950)  
Top1opit   0.561***  3.270*** 
   (8.087)  (2.826) 
SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡    0.116***  
    (3.069)  
SE_Top1opit     -0.262** 
     (-2.407) 
Constant -7.478*** -9.370*** -9.586*** -7.384*** -7.384*** 
 (-21.852) (-33.792) (-34.717) (-16.779) (-16.779) 
Firm Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.293 0.290 0.290 0.290 
This table presents the results of the probit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The 
dependent variable Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise. 
The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A share on 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from 
dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors 
that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the 
cross terms (SE_TopSOEit ) and (SE_Top1opit); investor sentiment (Sentimentit); the largest 
state-owned shareholder ( TopSOEit ); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder 
(Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as in the regressions.  
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5.4.4.1 Probit and Tobit Estimations  
We replaced the logit model in Tables 5.4 with probit estimates to test the correlation 
between the propensity to pay cash dividends, investor sentiment and the features of 
ownership. In addition, we also replaced the OLS estimation in Table 5.5 with Tobit 
estimates. The test results are shown in tables 5.8 and 5.9. All the results remain 





Table 5.9 Regressions of Cash Dividend Payment 22 
Tobit Regression Model of Sentiment  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sentimentit 0.009**   0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (2.526)   (2.967) (2.807) 
TopSOE𝑖𝑡  -0.004  0.509***  
  (-0.731)  (4.306)  
Top1opit   0.011  0.120 
   (0.819)  (0.378) 
SE_TopSOE𝑖𝑡    -0.047***  
    (-4.317)  
SE_Top1opit     -0.009 
     (-0.304) 
Constant -0.070 0.026 0.036 -0.191** -0.191** 
 (-1.138) (0.556) (0.769) (-2.082) (-2.082) 
Firm Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.053 
This table presents the results of the tobit regressions of cash dividend payment. The dependent 
variable ∆Dit represents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is 
from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all the listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the variables apart from the dummy ones were 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms (SE_TopSOEit ) and 
(SE_Top1opit); investor sentiment (Sentimentit); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); and 
the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control 
variables as in the regressions. 
5.4.4.2 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation 
The problem of endogeneity exists in a statistical model when the explanatory variables 
are correlated with the error term (Wooldridge 2002; Chenhall and Moers, 2007). There 
are basically three major causes of endogeneity, namely omitted variables, 
measurement errors and simultaneity or reverse causation (Wooldridge, 2002; Chenhall 
and Moers, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). First, omitted variable endogeneity 
occurs when a relevant control variable is omitted from the equation because the data 
is unavailable (Wooldridge, 2000). Second, measurement error endogeneity raises 
when the key independent variable is measured imperfectly (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2007). Finally, simultaneity or reverse causation occurs when one or more than one of 
the independent variables is determined simultaneously by the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge 2002).   
Simultaneity or reverse causation could arise in this study. The dependent variables 
of dividend policy are influenced by the independent variable, investor sentiment; 
simultaneously, dividend payment could be the determinant of the level of this 
sentiment. To mitigate potential endogeneity bias, we used two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approaches to test the relationship between investor sentiment, ownership and 
dividend policy. We built the model as follows: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         (5.3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′0 + ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=2                                                                    (5.4) 
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Model (5.3) is the same model as model (5), used to test whether investor sentiment, 
SOE and the concentrated largest shareholders influence changes to dividend payments. 
Dependent variable ∆Dit is the change in cash dividend payment, which can be upwards, 
downwards or unchanged, calculated by the change in cash dividend payment from year 
t-1 to year t divided by the net income of year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the interaction terms 
(SETopSOE𝑖𝑡 , SETop1opit ) of investor sentiment (Sentimentit ), the largest state 
ownership ( TopSOE𝑖𝑡 ) and the concentrated ownership ( Top1opit ). 
∑ βkControls𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=2  represents the same independent variables and control variables as 
the previous ones. εit is the error term and α0 is the constant term. 
In model (5.4), the dependent variable Yit  represents investor sentiment 
(Sentimentit) and the degree of concentration of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). 
The main independent variable ∆Dit, which could be endogenous, is the change to cash 
dividend payment, can be upwards, downwards or unchanged, calculated by the change 
in cash dividend payment from year t-1 to year t divided by the net income of year t. 
To test the endogeneity of the changes to dividends to investor sentiment, IVit contains 
the instrumental variables, namely share turnover (STurnit−1); IPO number (IPONit); 






 represents the control variables, which are stock price (SPit); 
stock return (SRit); market-to-book ratio (M/Bit); firm size (InAit); firm profitability 
(ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); and net cash flow (CFit). To test the 
endogeneity of the changes in dividend to concentrated ownership, IVit is the variable 
of dummy SOE (TopSOE𝑖𝑡) and ∑ αk𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=2  presents the control variables of firm size 
(InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net cash 
flow (CFit). 
Table 5.10 presents the results of the endogeneity test by 2SLS. The results in 
column (1) first show a significantly positive association between investor sentiment 
and changes to dividend payments; and second, the degree of concentration of the 
largest shareholder is also correlated positively to changes in cash dividend, although 
are only shown in the 2SLS regression. The results in columns (2) and (3) provide no 
evidence that investor sentiment or the degree of concentration of the largest 
shareholder are determined by changes to dividend payments. In conclusion, our 















This chapter has studied the relationship between investor sentiment, ownership 
structure and dividend policy using a Chinese database and obtained several valuable 
results. First, different from the findings in previous research, there is a significant 
negative relationship between investor sentiment and cash dividend payment, which is 
not consistent with the catering theory but does fit signalling theory. Companies pay 
cash dividends in order to deliver positive signalling and to attract investors when there 
Table 5.10 OLS AND 2SLS Endogeneity Test 23 
(1) Independent Variable ∆Dit (2) Independent Variable Sentiment it (3) Independent Variable  Top1opit 
Variable OLS 2SLS Variable OLS 2SLS Variable OLS 2SLS 
Sentimentit  0.009** 0.013*** 0.009** ∆Dit 0.000 0.000 ∆Dit 0.003 0.001 
 (2.493) (3.308) (2.494)  (0.534) (0.560)  (0.817) -0.12 
Top1op𝑖𝑡 0.015 0.144*** 0.015 STurnit−1 0.578*** 0.578*** TopSOEit 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (1.125) -3.063 (1.126)  (67.155) (67.086)  (21.247) (21.251) 
TopSOEit -0.007 -0.012** -0.007 IPONit 0.385*** 0.385*** SPit  0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (-1.357) (-2.234) (-1.358)  (20.165) (20.156)  (11.165) (11.185) 
Supsizei𝑡 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 IPORit−1 0.537*** 0.537*** SRit -0.059*** -0.059*** 
 (-0.362) (-0.078) (-0.362)  (52.840) (52.788)  (-13.938) (-13.954) 
Supsharep𝑖𝑡 -0.088 0.103 -0.088 ESit 0.325*** 0.325*** M/Bit 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (-0.249) (0.287) (-0.250)  (12.774) (12.774)  (31.146) (31.164) 
Bsize𝑖𝑡 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 Pit−1
D−ND 0.373*** 0.373*** InAit 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (-1.497) (-0.834) (-1.498)  (6.890) (6.891)  (45.143) (45.164) 
Bshareop𝑖𝑡 -0.079*** -0.054** -0.079*** SPit  0.000*** 0.000*** ROAit -0.018 -0.017 
 (-3.230) (-2.045) (-3.232)  (10.158) (10.126)  (-0.658) (-0.627) 
Exeshareop𝑖𝑡 0.044 0.045 0.044 SRit 0.000*** 0.000*** ∆REV𝑖𝑡 -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (1.359) (1.394) (1.360)  (7.335) (7.338)  (-11.064) (-11.014) 
Indep𝑖𝑡 -0.082 -0.085* -0.082 M/Bit -0.000 -0.000 D/E𝑖𝑡 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.627) (-1.669) (-1.627)  (-1.335) (-1.335)  (-0.732) (-0.713) 
InAit -0.000 -0.005** -0.000 InAit 0.000*** 0.000*** CF𝑖𝑡 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (-0.059) (-2.203) (-0.060)  (3.201) (3.202)  (4.022) (4.046) 
ROAit 0.313*** 0.303*** 0.313*** ROAit -0.000*** -0.000*** Constant -1.049*** -1.049*** 
 (9.071) (8.717) (9.075)  (-4.211) (-4.222)  (-39.751) (-39.770) 
∆REV𝑖𝑡 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** ∆REV𝑖𝑡 -0.000* -0.000*    
 (10.965) (10.963) (10.970)  (-1.814) (-1.826)    
D/E𝑖𝑡 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** D/E𝑖𝑡 -0.000** -0.000**    
 (4.738) (4.937) (4.740)  (-2.168) (-2.177)    
CF𝑖𝑡 0.179*** 0.167*** 0.179*** CF𝑖𝑡 0.000*** 0.000***    
 (6.570) (6.073) (6.573)  (7.394) (7.378)    
R&Dit -0.302 -0.260 -0.302 Constant -0.013*** -0.013***    
 (-1.580) (-1.357) (-1.581)  (-8.886) (-8.873)    
SEOit 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021***       
 (4.647) (4.867) (4.649)       
Constant -0.078 -0.050 -0.078       
 (-1.309) (-0.850) (-1.310)       
This table presents the results of the endogeneity test. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all 
the listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. 
All the variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise investor sentiment 
( Sentimentit ); the largest state-owned shareholder ( TopSOEit ); and the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (Top1opit) and other control variables are the size of supervisory board (Supsizeit); the shareholding 
ratio of supervisors (Supsharepit); the size of the BoD (Bsizeit); the shareholding ratio of the board of directors 
(Bshareopit); the shareholding ratio of executives (Exeshareopit); independent director percentage (Indepit); 
firm size (InAit); firm profitability (ROAit); firm growth (∆REVit); leverage (D/Eit); net cash flow (CFit); share 
turnover (STurnit−1); R&D investment (R&Dit); and semi-mandatory dividend policy (SEOit). 
is low investor sentiment, which means investors have no confidence in or expectations 
of the stock market (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & Rock 1985; Frankfurter & Wood, 
2002). Second, investor sentiment influences the propensity of controlling shareholders 
to pay cash dividends. Stronger investor sentiment urges state-controlled companies to 
pay cash dividends, while weaker sentiment restricts the willingness of the majority 
shareholders to pay dividends, which helps to protect the benefits of firms and their 
smaller and outside investors. The state-controlled shareholders are unwilling to pay 
dividend because the SOEs have more efficient internal capital market (Manos, 
Murinde, & Green, 2012) and personal interest conflicts (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; 
Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011). The controlling shareholders also 
expand their personal interests by manipulating dividends (Gugler 2003; Mardani & 
Indrawati 2018). However, they need to pay attention to investor sentiment, which can 
reflect investors’ demands, in cases of firms being less valuable and lacking 
investments (Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001). 
A potential limitation of this study is that we did not consider the influence of risk 
and its effect on dividend policy. Some research proposes that when risk is controlled, 
there is little support for dividend catering theory (Hoberg & Prabhala 2009; Kuo, Philip 
& Zhang 2013). Although our results support signalling theory but not catering theory 
without controlling risk, it is still worth to develop a research to discuss the relationship 





STOCK LIQUIDITY, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND DIVI-
DEND POLICY 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis of the relationship between stock liquidity, 
ownership structure and dividend policy, including the decisions on and changes to cash 
dividends based on a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Stock liquidity refers to the ability 
to trade stocks at a low cost without frequent changes in price (Griffin 2010). It is 
considered to influence dividend policy for several reasons, as explained by different 
theories. First, according to the clientele transaction cost view, there is a negative 
relationship between stock liquidity and dividend payment because investors can create 
homemade dividends without cost by selling their holdings in a financial market with 
trading friction. As a result, firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to pay cash 
dividends (Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 2007). Second, the informational effect view 
argues that higher liquidity helps to reduce information asymmetry between outsiders 
and insiders and restrains the incentives of the former to expropriate from the latter for 
personal interests, which means stock liquidity influences dividend policy positively 
(Kyle 1985; Stiglitz 2000; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki 2003; Laporta et al. 2000). Third, 
stock liquidity is related to a firm’s maturity, including size, profitability and growth 
opportunities, which demonstrate the ability of a firm to pay dividend (Banerjee, 
Gatchev, & Spindt 2005). The relationship between stock liquidity and dividend policy 
has been extensively studied in the literature. Also studied is the relationship between 
corporate ownership and dividend policy, as noted in the previous chapter. For example, 
some research has focused on how different types of ownership, such as state, 
institution or managerial, affect dividend payment (e.g., Short, Zhang, & Keasey 2002; 
Farinha 2003; Lee & Xiao 2004; Amihud & Li 2006; Kumar 2006; Wang, Manry, & 
Wandler 2011; Lam, Sami, & Zhou 2012; Bradford, Chen, & Zhu 2013). Some studies 
have examined the relationship between the degree of ownership concentration and 
dividend payout policy. The distribution of stock among shareholders could cause 
agency problems between majority and minority shareholders, which significantly 
influences dividend payment (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck & Zingales 2004; Truong 
& Heaney 2007; Lin, Chiou, & Chen 2010; Wellalage, Fauzi, & Wang 2014; Su et al. 
2014). 
While the relationships between stock liquidity and dividend policy, and between 
corporate ownership and dividend policy, have been established, the links between 
these three factors have not been thoroughly explored. According to agency theory, 
controlling inside shareholders could expropriate not only minority shareholders but 
also outside shareholders by manipulating dividend policy (Berkman, Cole, & Fu 2009; 
Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011). However, they still need to show 
concern for investors’ requirements and firms’ value (Truong & Heaney 2007). Stock 
liquidity could influence both investors’ demands and companies’ decisions on 
dividend payment. Therefore, whether stock liquidity influences the largest 
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shareholders’ decisions on cash dividend decisions or payments is an important 
question. Many Chinese listed firms’ share distributions are not only highly 
concentrated, but the firms are also state-owned. A highly concentrated, state-controlled 
ownership as exists in Chinese listed firms provides an appropriate test base to assess 
whether stock liquidity influences SOEs’ decisions on cash dividend payment. 
This chapter thus aims to test the relationship between stock liquidity, ownership 
structure and the decisions on and level of dividend payments of listed Chinese firms. 
We estimate logit and OLS models to investigate how the largest and state shareholders 
will impact on these decisions and changes to cash dividend payments under the 
influence of stock liquidity. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 6.3 briefly describes the models and 
variables for the regressions, while Section 6.4 introduces the sample selection and 
discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 6.5 discusses the empirical findings and 
robustness analyses and section 6.6 draws the conclusions. 
 
6.2  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Previous research has investigated the correlation between stock liquidity and dividend 
policy. According to the view of the information effect, higher stock liquidity will affect 
dividend payment negatively because stock liquidity can transfer information to outside 
investors that is not reflected in the price and reduce information asymmetry (Kyle 1985; 
Holmström & Tirole 1993; Banerjee, Gatchev, & Spindt 2007). According to agency 
theory, inside shareholders prefer to maintain more cash for private interests than to pay 
dividends and distribute inside funds (Stiglitz 2000; Laporta et al. 2000; Leuz, Nanda, 
& Wysocki 2003). As a result, high stock liquidity helps to reduce the opacity of the 
information environment and the expropriation of insiders and increase the incentives 
of insiders to pay cash dividend (La Porta et al. 2000; Li & Zhao 2008; Petrasek 2012; 
Jiang, Ma, & Shi 2017). 
As described in chapter 5 (section 5.2), the features of Chinese ownership are state 
control and high concentration, which means the agency problem will be worse. Large 
insider shareholders of Chinese listed companies could be more reluctant to pay cash 
dividends. Moreover, large concentrated ownership increases the degree of information 
asymmetry (Agarwal 2007; Brockman & Yan 2009). When stock liquidity increases, 
more information is shared with outsiders, which could limit the expropriation from 
insiders and force shareholders to pay dividends. We, therefore, propose the hypotheses 
below: 
H6.1a: The propensity of SOEs to pay cash dividends is affected by stock liquidity 
H6.1b: Stock liquidity affects SOEs on changes of cash dividends 
H6.2a: The propensity of firms with large shareholder concentration to pay cash 
dividend is affected by stock liquidity 





6.3  Methodology  
The data selection procedure is described in Section 3.2 and the models including 
variable definitions are given in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. Here we briefly state the 
specifications for each set of hypotheses:  
For testing hypotheses H6.1a – H6.2a: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (6.1) 
For testing hypotheses H6.1b – H6.2b: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋_𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (6.2) 
where:  
𝛼0   is the constant term 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) 
𝑋′𝑖𝑡  is the variable of ownership: state ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or shareholding ratio of 




 is the interaction term between the variable of market liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡) and the 
variable of ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) or (𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡): 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑖𝑡 or 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡  
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=4   is the set of control variables: the size of the BoD (𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡); the 
shareholding ratio of the board of directors ( 𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); independent director 
percentage ( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ); the size of the supervisory board ( 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); the total 
shareholding ratio of supervisors (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡); firm size (𝐼𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡); firm profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ); firm growth ( ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ); leverage ( 𝐷/𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); net cash flow ( 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ); R&D 
investment (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡); dividend premium (𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐷−𝑁𝐷); and semi-mandatory dividend policy 
(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡). 
As with Chapter 5, the dependent variable in the specification (6.1) is a dummy 
variable representing the dividend decision (defined as 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 , or, as alternatives, 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 or 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡). The dependent variable in the specification (6.2) is the 
change in cash dividend payment (defined as ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡). The precise definitions of the 
dependent, explanatory and control variables employed are detailed in section 3.4 of 
chapter 3. 
 
6.4 Data Description 
6.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics of the mean independent variables in the 
regressions. The illiquidity ratio (Illiqit), bid-ask-spread (BASit) and firms’ turnover 
ratio (TurnOverit) are three alternative variables used to measure stock liquidity. To 
calculate Iliqit, the daily volume is measured in million yuan to adjust the value into a 
normal range. The difference between the mean (0.052) and median (0.229), as well as 
the min. (0.010) and max. (76.923), is quite large, which means that firms’ liquidity 
ratios fluctuate and that there is a considerable difference between them. Similarly, the 
difference in TurnOverit between the min. (2.202) and max. (167.953) is large, which 
indicates that the yearly turnover ratio of each firm varies. The summary statistics for 
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the dependent variables are shown in Table 5.1 and described in section 5.4.1, while 
those for the control variables are shown in Table 4.2 and described in section 4.4.1. 
 
 
6.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 6.2 shows the univariate analysis of the main independent variables, namely stock 
illiquidity (Iliqit, ABSit and TurnOverit), state-controlled shareholder (TopSOEit) and 
the degree of concentration of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). The variables are 
divided into two groups, payers and nonpayers. The mean difference of Iliqit between 
nonpayers and payers (0.020) is significantly positive, which indicates that the liquidity 
of the firms paying cash dividends is much higher than that of the companies which do 
not pay dividends. This result is consistent with the view of the relationship between 
stock liquidity and dividend payment in which high stock liquidity helps to reduce the 
opacity of the information environment and the expropriation of insiders and increases 
the incentives of insiders to pay cash dividends (La Porta et al. 2000; Li & Zhao 2008; 
Petrasek 2012). Similar statistics for dependent variables are presented in Table 5.2 and 
Table 6.1 Summary Statistics for Chapter 624 
VARIABLE N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Illiqit 18,412 0.052 0.229  27.962  0.010  76.923  
BASit 18,412 0.042 0.040 0.012 0.021 0.075 
TurnOverit 18,412 26.117 20.962 5.274 2.202 167.953 
TopSOE𝑖𝑡 18,412 0.446  0.000  0.497  0.000  1.000  
Top1opit 18,412 0.227  0.200  0.180  0.003  0.632  
This table presents the summary statistics of the mean variables used for the regressions. The sample period is from 
2008 to 2016 and the sample comprises all listed firms that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges. In addition, all the variables apart from the dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. The variables comprise illiquidity (Iliqit); bid-ask-spread (BASit); firm turnover ratio (TurnOverit); the 
largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). 
described in section 5.4.2, while the control variables are shown in Table 4.3 and 




Table 6.3 provides the Pearson correlation matrix of the independent and control 
variables for the supervisory board sample and dividend policy. A correlation 
coefficient close or equal to +1 or -1 suggests high or perfect multicollinearity among 
the variables. In this table, the correlations between most of the variables are correlated 
at the 1% level, with most lying close to or below 0.35, which implies low 






Table 6.2 Univariate Analysis of Dividend Payers and Nonpayers for Chapter 6 25 
 Payers Nonpayers Nonpayers - Payers 
VARIABLE N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Diff. t-stat 
Illiqit 12,267 0.047 0.156 6,145 0.067 0.505 18,412 0.020*** 7.319 
BASit 12,267 0.415 0.039 6,145 0.044 0.042 18,412 0.003*** 15.432 
TurnOverit 12,267 25.219 19.656 6,145 27.909 23.273 18,412 2.690*** 8.827 
TopSOEit 12,267 0.425  0.000  6,145 0.488  0.000  18,412 0.063***  8.146  
Top1opit 12,267 0.235  0.208  6,145 0.211  0.182  18,412 -0.024***  -8.437  
This table presents the univariate analysis of payers and nonpayers. Payers are defined as firms which paid cash dividends, 
while nonpayers are those which did not. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016 and the sample comprises all listed firms 
that issued A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges. In addition, all the variables apart from the dummy ones 
were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The variables comprise illiquidity (Illiqit); bid-ask-spread (BASit); firm turnover ratio (TurnOverit); the 





Table 6.3 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 626 
 
Illiqit BASit TurnOverit STurnit−1 Pit−1
D−ND TopSOE𝑖𝑡 Top1opit Supsizei𝑡 Supsharep𝑖𝑡 Bsize𝑖𝑡 Bshareop𝑖𝑡 Exeshareop𝑖𝑡 Indep𝑖𝑡 InAit ROAit ∆REV𝑖𝑡 D/E𝑖𝑡 CF𝑖𝑡 R&Dit SEO𝑖𝑡 
Illiqit 1.000                    
BASit -0.038*** 1.000                   
TurnOverit -0.039*** 0.520*** 1.000                  
STurnit−1 0.044*** 0.349*** 0.072*** 1.000                 
Pit−1
D−ND 0.485*** 0.211*** 0.062*** 0.361*** 1.000                
TopSOEit 0.076*** -0.075*** -0.195*** 0.064*** 0.090*** 1.000               
Top1opit -0.080*** -0.210*** -0.366*** -0.052*** -0.144*** 0.267*** 1.000              
Supsizeit 0.047*** -0.061*** -0.128*** 0.041*** 0.058*** 0.360*** 0.112*** 1.000             
Supsharepit -0.059*** 0.014* 0.108*** -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.227*** -0.192*** -0.086*** 1.000            
Bsizeit 0.037*** -0.086*** -0.155*** 0.032*** 0.054*** 0.261*** 0.061*** 0.353*** -0.048*** 1.000           
Bshareopit -0.115*** 0.067*** 0.238*** -0.105*** -0.115*** -0.471*** -0.310*** -0.257*** 0.400*** -0.194*** 1.000          
Exeshareopit -0.092*** 0.058*** 0.202*** -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.368*** -0.251*** -0.206*** 0.322*** -0.157*** 0.786*** 1.000         
Indepit -0.032*** 0.006 0.035*** -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.060*** 0.017** 0.267*** -0.151*** -0.426*** 0.088*** -0.217*** 1.000        
InAit -0.031*** -0.218*** -0.323*** -0.022*** -0.072*** 0.320*** 0.329*** -0.052*** 0.109*** 0.281*** -0.256*** 0.144*** 0.013* 1.000       
ROAit -0.008 -0.080*** -0.072*** -0.005 -0.040*** -0.120*** -0.021*** -0.038*** 0.006 0.002 0.165*** 0.028*** -0.018** 0.024*** 1.000      
∆REVit 0.045*** -0.093*** -0.139*** 0.057*** -0.036*** -0.058*** -0.076*** 0.196*** -0.205*** -0.026*** 0.028*** -0.293*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.172*** 1.000     
D/Eit 0.022*** -0.021*** -0.104*** 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.288*** 0.155*** 0.047*** -0.001 0.156*** -0.350*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 0.402*** -0.408*** 0.043*** 1.000    
CFit 0.049*** 0.020*** 0.050*** 0.036*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.062*** -0.051*** 0.055*** 0.065*** -0.029*** 0.132*** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.351*** -0.001 -0.156*** 1.000   
R&Dit -0.041*** 0.034*** 0.029*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.090*** -0.065*** -0.040*** 0.020*** -0.055*** 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.052*** -0.059*** 0.028*** -0.004 -0.145*** -0.030*** 1.000  
SEOit -0.059*** 0.029*** 0.053*** -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.085*** -0.028*** 0.267*** -0.151*** -0.019*** 0.073*** -0.217*** 0.021*** 0.087*** 0.031*** 0.159*** 0.055*** -0.030*** 0.053*** 1.000 
This table presents the correlation between all the independent variables apart from the interaction terms. The definitions of the variables are given in Table A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
6.5 Empirical Analysis 
To investigate the above hypotheses, we aim to determine how companies with a highly 
concentrated or state-controlled ownership influence dividend policy, including the 
propensity for and changes to the payment of dividends, based on their level of stock 
liquidity. In this process, factors that are controlled for comprising measures of the 
features of the board of directors, namely Bsizeit, Bshareopit and Indepit, and firm 
characteristics as indicated by InAit , ROAit , ∆REVit , D/Eit , CFit  and R&Dit . InAit , 
ROAit and ∆REVit are also measures of the maturity of firms in order to verify life-cycle 
theory (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; 
Denis & Osobov 2008). Chinese semi-mandatory dividend policy is controlled and 
indicated by the dummy variable SEOit.  
 
6.5.1 Stock Liquidity, Ownership and Propensity for Dividend Payments 
According to hypotheses H6.1a – H6.2a, we test the significance of the association be-
tween the interaction of stock liquidity and ownership structure (Illiq_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 and 
Illiq_Top1opit) and the propensity for cash dividend payment. With reference to previ-
ous research, we suspect that stock liquidity could enhance the impact of state owner-
ship or majority shareholders on dividend policy as it helps to reduce the opacity of the 
information environment and the expropriation of insiders (La Porta et al. 2000; Li & 
Zhao 2008; Petrasek 2012). 
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Table 6.4 presents the relationship between stock liquidity, the largest state owner-
ship and the degree of shareholding concentration, and the propensity of firms to pay 
cash dividends using logit models. Column (1) shows that the coefficient of Illiqit is 
negative (-0.004) and significant at the 1% level. Although this indicates that stock li-
quidity influences the propensity to pay cash dividends positively, the value is too small 
to impact such payment in practice. In column (2), The coefficient of largest state own-
ership (TopSOE𝑖𝑡) is positive (0.117) and significant at the 5% level, while that of the 
largest shareholding ratio (Top1opit) in column (3) is also positive (0.944) and signif-
icant at the 1% level. The results indicate that state ownership and degree of sharehold-
ing concentration increase the propensity pay cash dividends. Columns (4) and (5) show 
that the coefficients of the added interaction terms Illiq_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 and Illiq_Top1opit, 
respectively, are positive but not significant, which means that are no potentially medi-
ating effects on dividend policy arising from the interaction effects. The results do not 
support hypotheses H6.1a – H6.2a, which may be for several reasons. 
First, compared to developed countries such as the UK and the US, China, as a 
developing country, has a stock market with a more opaque information environment. 
Disclosure regulations and accounting standards in China are less developed (Allen, 
Qian, & Qian 2005; Jiang, Ma, & Shi 2017). In this relatively weak investor protection 
environment, Chinese concentrated ownership brings about more serious agency prob-
lems between controlling and minority investors. Controlling shareholders often use 
their discretion in the disclosure of the accounting information of firms as to whether 
to withhold private information from outsiders or to disguise their opportunistic behav-
iour, which could exacerbate the information asymmetry (Firth et al. 2013; Gu, Li, & 
Yang 2013; Ke, Lennox, & Xin 2015). Second, compared to developed countries, div-
idend policy in China is less stable and the demands of outsiders usually change (Ke, 
Lennox, & Xin 2015; Jiang, Ma, & Shi 2017). At the same time, dividend policy de-
pends largely on the will of insiders. Although stock liquidity can transfer information 
to outsiders and push insiders to make the right dividend decisions, it cannot eliminate 
the huge agency conflicts in practice. Third, majority shareholders are given great con-
trolling power because of concentrated ownership. Therefore, large shareholders are 
not only engaged in controlling companies but also in managing them, including the 
dividend policy of the firms (Ibrahim 2006; Mirza & Azfa 2010).   
 
Table 6.4 Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Payment 27 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Illiqit -0.004***   -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.505)   (-3.809) (-3.809) 
TopSOEit  0.117**  0.007  
  (2.534)  (0.108)  
Top1opit   0.944***  0.942*** 
   (7.726)  (5.521) 
Illiq_TopSOEit    0.002  
    (1.413)  
Illiq_Top1opit     0.001 
     (0.133) 
Constant -18.501*** -17.234*** -16.873*** -18.070*** -17.978*** 
 (-32.116) (-33.924) (-33.112) (-31.157) (-30.914) 
Firm Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.295 0.297 0.298 0.299 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The dependent variable 
Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms do pay cash dividends and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, 
consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial 
firms. All the variables apart from the dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms (Illiq_TopSOEit ) and 
(Illiq_Top1opit); illiquidity (Illiqit); the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit); and the shareholding ratio of the 
largest shareholder (Top1opit), with other control variables the same as in previous regressions. 
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In summary, there is no significant correlation between the interaction terms of 
market liquidity and ownership on the propensity for dividend payment. As a result, 
hypothesis H6.1a, that SOEs are more likely to pay dividends when stock liquidity is 
higher, and H6.2a, that the largest shareholders are more likely to pay dividends when 
stock liquidity is higher, are rejected. 
6.5.2 Robustness Using Alternative Proxies for Dividend Payers 
This section assesses the consistency of the above results testing the association be-
tween the interaction terms of market liquidity and ownership structure (Illiq_TopSOE𝑖𝑡 
and Illiq_Top1opit) and decisions on cash dividend payment. We divide the firms that 
pay cash dividends (payers) into two groups, initiation (Initiationit) and continuing 
(Continueit), which are the same as those defined in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3). Ac-
cording to previous research, we believe that market liquidity could enhance the impact 
of state ownership or majority shareholders on dividend decisions because it helps to 
reduce the opacity of the information environment and the expropriation of insiders (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Li & Zhao 2008; Petrasek 2012). 
Table 6.5 presents the results showing the relationship between market liquidity, 
largest state ownership and the degree of shareholding concentration, and decisions on 
cash dividend payment. In the logit regression of cash dividend initiation (left panel), 
the coefficient of Illiqit is negative (-0.005) and is statistically significant. However, 
with the interaction terms Illiq_TopSOE𝑖𝑡  and Illiq_Top1opit  the effect becomes 
insignificant, which cannot support the notion that market liquidity will influence the 
propensity of SOEs and firms with high concentrated ownership to pay dividends. 
Similarly, the results on dividend continuity (right panel) provide no evidence that 
market liquidity will influence the willingness of either SOEs or majority shareholders 
to continue paying dividends, which is not consistent with our hypotheses.  
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Table 6.5 Logit Model: Cash Dividend Initiation and Continuity 28 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
Initiationit Continueit 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Liqit -0.005***   0.003 0.003 -0.003***   -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-4.943)   (1.590) (1.590) (-4.263)   (-2.468) (-2.468) 
TopSOEit  0.047  0.163*   0.122***  -0.002  
  (0.731)  (1.899)   (2.639)  (-0.037)  
Top1opit   -0.072  0.714***   0.983***  1.104*** 
   (-0.453)  (3.304)   (7.982)  (6.705) 
Liq_TopSOEit    -0.004     0.003  
    (-1.950)     (1.922)  
Liq_Top1opit     -0.023     -0.006 
     (-1.898)     (-1.577) 
Constant -4.401*** -2.552*** -2.643*** -4.379*** -4.779*** -18.322*** -17.125*** -16.766*** -17.735*** -17.680*** 
 (-6.672) (-4.585) (-4.695) (-6.510) (-7.126) (-31.760) (-33.554) (-32.739) (-30.455) (-30.334) 
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.241 0.240 0.243 0.243 0.244 
This table presents the results of the logit regressions of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable Initiationit takes a value of 1 when firms that did not pay a cash dividend in the previous 
year started to pay one the following year, and 0 otherwise. Continueit takes a value of 1 when firms that paid a cash dividend in the previous year continued to do so the following year, and 0 
otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All variables apart 
from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Illiq_TopSOEit  and Illiq_Top1opit, illiquidity (Illiqit), the largest state-owned share-
holder (TopSOEit) the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit) and other control variables which are the same as those previous regressions. 
6.5.3 Stock Liquidity, Ownership and Changes to Dividend Payment 
To test hypotheses H6.1b-H6.2b, this section examines the association between the in-
teraction items of stock liquidity and ownership structure ( Illiq_TopSOE𝑖𝑡  and 
Illiq_Top1opit) and changes to cash dividend payments. Following previous research, 
we believe that market liquidity could enhance the impact of state ownership or major-
ity shareholders on dividend increases because it helps to reduce the opacity of the in-
formation environment and the expropriation of insiders (La Porta et al. 2000; Li & 
Zhao 2008; Petrasek 2012). 
Table 6.6 presents the results showing the association between stock liquidity, the 
largest state ownership and the degree of shareholding concentration, and changes to 
the cash dividend payment. In the OLS regression of cash dividend changes, the 
coefficients of all the main variables are either 0.000 or insignificant, which first 
suggests that market liquidity has no significant impact on changes to dividend payment, 
and second that shareholders will not change dividends based on the level of liquidity. 
Hypothesis H1b, that SOEs are more likely to increase cash dividends when stock 
liquidity is higher, and H2b, that the largest shareholders are more likely to increase 
cash dividends when stock liquidity is higher, are therefore rejected. Besides the 
possible reasons of opaque information environment and serious agency problem 
mentioned above, another reasonable explaination could be that companies would like 
to maintain a stable dividend policy because they want to show their profitability and 
attract outside investors (Lintner 1962; Fama 1974; Baker & Powell 2000; Omet 2004). 
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Moreover, firms change their dividend payments as a result of other factors, such as 
firm characteristics and investor demands (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz 2006; Bulan, 
Subramanian, & Tanlu 2007; Denis & Osobov 2008; Fajaria & Isnalita 2018; Romus, 




6.5.4 Robustness Check 
This section presents two robustness tests of the association between cash dividend 
payment, investor sentiment and ownership structure. First, we replace the main varia-
bles with different proxies to confirm that the results are consistent. Second, we re-
Table 6.6 Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Payment Changes 29 
OLS Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Illiqit 0.000***   0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.286)   (3.599) (3.599) 
TopSOEit  -0.004  0.001  
  (-0.801)  (0.134)  
Top1opit   0.010  0.026 
   (0.746)  (1.365) 
Illiq_TopSOEit    0.000  
    (0.368)  
Illiq_Top1opit     0.000 
     (0.002) 
Constant 0.115** 0.021 0.031 0.115** 0.103* 
 (2.092) (0.455) (0.660) (2.046) (1.812) 
Firm Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Adjust. R-squared 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable ∆Dit rep-
resents the changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consist-
ing of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial 
firms. All variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
Illiq_TopSOEit  and Illiq_Top1opit, illiquidity (Iliqit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the share-
holding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit) and other control variables which are  the same as in previous 
regressions. 
placed the logit and OLS models with probit and tobit ones. Both logit and probit mod-
els are appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable, while OLS and tobit models 
are both used for time-use data. It is not necessary to check for endogeneity problems 
because the main variables are insignificantly correlated to the dependent ones. 
 
6.5.4.1 Main Variable Replacement 
We replaced the main variable of market liquidity (Illiqit) which other variables also 
able to represent the level of market liquidity. Bid-Ask spread (BASit) and firm turnover 
ratio (Turnoverit) were used as the replacement variables. Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show 
the results of the same logit and OLS models with the replacement variables. In table 
6.7, the effect of Bid-Ask spread is negative and significant, but crucially the interaction 
effects remain insignificant, and the same applies to the results of Tables 6.8 and 6.9. 















Table 6.7 Alternative Variable BAS: Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Payment 30 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity   
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BASit -5.324***   -5.045* -5.045* 
 (-3.052)   (-1.747) (-1.747) 
TopSOEit  0.092**  -0.354**  
  (1.989)  (-2.313)  
Top1opit   0.999***  2.085*** 
   (8.117)  (4.690) 
BAS_TopSOEit    10.277  
    (1.251)  
BAS_Top1opit     -24.878 
     (-1.485) 
Constant -16.202*** -16.202*** -16.202*** -16.279*** -16.279*** 
 (-29.892) (-29.892) (-29.892) (-29.591) (-29.591) 
      
Variables Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.297 0.298 0.298 0.298 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The dependent variable 
Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, 
consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial 
firms. All the variables apart from dummy variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics 
using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
BAS_TopSOEit  and BAS_Top1opit, market liquidity (BASit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit) and other control variables which are the same as in previous 
regressions. 
Table 6.8 Alternative Variable BAS: Cash Dividend Initiation and Continuity 31 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
Initiationit Continueit  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BASit  0.765   4.060 4.060 -3.712**   -5.133* -5.133* 
 (0.333)   (1.081) (1.081) (-2.262)   (-1.920) (-1.920) 
TopSOEit  0.041  0.168   0.084*  -0.294**  
  (0.633)  (0.824)   (1.934)  (-2.039)  
Top1opit   -0.131  0.241   0.964***  1.509*** 
   (-0.819)  (0.475)   (8.566)  (3.758) 
BAS_TopSOEit    -3.014     8.865  
    (-0.669)     (1.213)  
BAS_Top1opit     -9.119     -12.428 
     (-0.784)     (-1.351) 
Constant -2.469*** -2.469*** -2.469*** -2.327*** -2.327*** -15.395*** -15.395*** -15.395*** -15.390*** -15.390*** 
 (-3.866) (-3.866) (-3.866) (-3.704) (-3.704) (-30.905) (-30.905) (-30.905) (-30.513) (-30.513) 
Variables Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.251 0.250 0.253 0.253 0.254 
This table presents the results of the logit regressions of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable Initiationit takes a value of 1 when firm that did not pay cash a dividend in the previous 
year started to pay one in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Continueit takes a value of 1 when firms that paid a cash dividend in the previous year continued to do so in the following year, 
and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All the 
variables apart from dummy ones wre winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms BAS_TopSOEit  and BAS_Top1opit, market liquidity (BASit), the 





Tables 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12 show the results of the same logit and OLS models with 
the replaced variable of market liquidity by Turnoverit, with the results remaining con-






Table 6.9 Alternative Variable BAS: Stock liquidity and Cash Dividend Change 32    
OLS Regression Model of Stock Liquidity   
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BASit 0.158   0.184 0.184 
 (0.799)   (0.579) (0.579) 
TopSOEit  -0.005  0.020  
  (-1.035)  (1.142)  
Top1opit   0.010  -0.039 
   (0.758)  (-0.818) 
BAS_TopSOEit    -0.586  
    (-1.496)  
BAS_Top1opit     1.135 
     (1.032) 
Constant 0.126** 0.126** 0.126** 0.127** 0.127** 
 (2.278) (2.278) (2.278) (2.275) (2.275) 
Variables Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
R-squared 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018 
Adjust. R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of cash dividend payments. The dependent variable ∆Dit 
represents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting 
of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. 
All the variables apart from the dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
BAS_TopSOEit  and BAS_Top1opit, market liquidity (BASit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit) and other control variables which are the same as in pre-
vious regressions. 
 
Table 6.10 Alternative Variable Turnover: Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Payment  33 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity   
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Turnoverit 0.002**   0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (2.308)   (2.847) (2.847) 
TopSOEit  0.092**  0.126*  
  (1.995)  (1.759)  
Top1opit   1.122***  1.310*** 
   (8.842)  (6.943) 
Turn_TopSOEit    -0.001  
    (-0.623)  
Turn_Top1opit     -0.009 
     (-1.458) 
Constant -16.942*** -16.942*** -16.942*** -16.924*** -16.924*** 
 (-31.644) (-31.644) (-31.644) (-31.580) (-31.580) 
      
Firm Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.294 0.293 0.296 0.297 0.297 
This table presents the results of the logit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The 
dependent variable Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise. The 
sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shared on the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All variables apart from dummy ones 
were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust 
to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms 
Turn_TopSOEit  and Turn_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Turnoverit), the largest state-owned share-
holder (TopSOEit) the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control con-
tains the same control variables as in the regressions.  
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Table 6.11 Alternative Variable Turnover: Cash Dividend Initiation and Continuity34 
Logit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
Initiationit  Continueit  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Turnoverit -0.001   -0.004* -0.004* 0.003***   0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (-0.699)   (-1.811) (-1.811) (2.992)   (3.681) (3.681) 
TopSOEit  0.041  -0.041   0.085*  0.154**  
  (0.626)  (-0.430)   (1.949)  (2.296)  
Top1opit   -0.168  -0.360   1.086***  1.239*** 
   (-1.024)  (-1.559)   (9.362)  (7.288) 
Turn_TopSOEit    0.003     -0.003  
    (1.160)     (-1.357)  
Turn_Top1opit     0.010     -0.008 
     (1.422)     (-1.402) 
Constant -2.296*** -2.296*** -2.296*** -2.327*** -2.327*** -16.080*** -16.080*** -16.080*** -16.050*** -16.050*** 
 (-3.659) (-3.659) (-3.659) (-3.704) (-3.704) (-32.644) (-32.644) (-32.644) (-32.536) (-32.536) 
Variables Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.250 0.250 0.253 0.253 0.253 
This table presents the results of the logit regressions of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable Initiationit takes a value of 1 when firms that did not pay cash dividends in the previous 
year started to do so in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Continueit takes a value of 1 when firms that paid cash dividends in the previous year continue to do so in the following year, and 0 
otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All variables 
apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Turn_TopSOEit  and Turn_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Turnoverit), 
the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as in the regressions. 
 
 
6.5.4.2 Alternative Estimation Methods 
We replaced the logit model with the probit one to test the association between the 
propensity to pay cash dividends, stock liquidity and features of ownership. At the same 
time, the OLS models to test the correlation between the level of and change to cash 
dividend payment, stock liquidity and features of ownership were replaced by tobit 
models. The test results are shown in Tables 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15. The results are con-
sistent with our previous analysis. 
 
Table 6.12 Alternative Variable Turnover: Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Change 35 
OLS Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Turnoverit 0.000*   -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.759)   (-0.028) (-0.028) 
TopSOEit  -0.005  -0.009  
  (-1.013)  (-1.121)  
Top1opit   0.015  -0.008 
   (1.073)  (-0.432) 
Turn_TopSOEit    0.000  
    (0.642)  
Turn_Top1opit     0.001* 
     (1.788) 
Constant 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 0.113** 0.113** 
 (2.174) (2.174) (2.174) (2.102) (2.102) 
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
R-squared 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018 
Adjust. R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable ∆Dit rep-
resents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting 
of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. 
All variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using stand-
ard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Turn_TopSOEit  
and Turn_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Turnoverit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the share-










Table 6.13 Probit Model: Stock liquidity and Cash Dividend Payment 36 
Probit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity   
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Illiqit -0.002***   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.549)   (-3.956) (-3.956) 
TopSOEit  0.063**  0.000  
  (2.316)  (0.003)  
Top1opit   0.535***  0.523*** 
   (7.579)  (5.267) 
Illiq_TopSOEit    0.001  
    (1.410)  
Illiq_Top1opit     0.001 
     (0.312) 
Constant -10.758*** -10.007*** -9.796*** -10.504*** -10.443*** 
 (-33.174) (-35.274) (-34.349) (-32.120) (-31.822) 
      
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.292 0.291 0.293 0.294 0.294 
This table presents the results of the probit regression of the propensity to pay cash dividends. The dependent variable 
Payerit takes a value of 1 when firms pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, 
consisting of all listed companies that issued A shared on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial 
firms. All variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Illiq_TopSOEit  and 
Illiq_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Illiqit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as in the regressions.  
Table 6.14 Probit Model: Cash Dividend Initiation and Continuity 37 
Probit Regression of Stock Liquidity  
Initiationit Continueit 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Illiqit -0.003***   0.001 0.001 -0.001***   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.945)   (1.572) (1.572) (-3.266)   (-5.314) (-5.314) 
TopSOEit  0.024  0.081*   0.054**  -0.028  
  (0.737)  (1.850)   (2.071)  (-0.780)  
Top1opit   -0.027  0.370***   0.527***  0.371*** 
   (-0.332)  (3.329)   (8.013)  (3.981) 
Illiq_TopSOEit    -0.002     0.002  
    (-1.956)     (1.656)  
Illiq_Top1opit     -0.012     0.002** 
     (-1.692)     (2.490) 
Constant -2.368*** -1.450*** -1.488*** -2.355*** -2.581*** -10.020*** -9.482*** -9.266*** -9.776*** -9.641*** 
 (-7.062) (-5.092) (-5.175) (-6.895) (-7.555) (-33.151) (-36.099) (-35.018) (-32.032) (-31.456) 
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.249 0.249 0.251 0.252 0.252 
This table presents the results of the probit regressions of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable Initiationit takes a value of 1 when firms that did not pay cash dividends in the previous 
year started to do so in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Continueit takes a value of 1 when firms that paid cash dividends in the previous year continued to do so in the following year, and 
0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All variables 
apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Illiq_TopSOEit  and Illiq_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Illiqit), the largest 







This chapter has studied the relationship between market liquidity, ownership structure 
and dividend policy using data for Chinese listed firms. We find that market liquidity has 
no significant mediating impact on firms which are SOEs or controlled by majority 
shareholders in making decisions on cash dividend payment. At the same time, state-
controlled or majority shareholders will not change their propensity to paying dividends 
or adjusting dividend payments because of market liquidity. In other words, Chinese 
Table 6.15 Tobit Model: Stock Liquidity and Cash Dividend Change 38  
Tobit Regression Model of Stock Liquidity  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Illiqit 0.000***   0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.217)   (3.430) (3.430) 
TopSOEit  -0.004  0.001  
  (-0.777)  (0.131)  
Top1opit   0.010  0.026 
   (0.748)  (1.390) 
Illiq_TopSOEit    -0.000  
    (-0.950)  
Illiq_Top1opit     -0.000 
     (-1.302) 
Constant 0.115** 0.021 0.031 0.115** 0.103* 
 (2.094) (0.444) (0.650) (2.065) (1.833) 
Variable Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 18,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.050 
This table presents the results of the probit regression of cash dividend payment. The dependent variable ∆Dit rep-
resents changes to dividends, either upwards or downwards. The sample period is from 2008 to 2016, consisting of 
all listed companies that issued A shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges, excluding financial firms. All 
variables apart from dummy ones were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. t-statistics using standard 
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The independent variables comprise the cross terms Illiq_TopSOEit  and 
Illiq_Top1opit, investor sentiment (Illiqit), the largest state-owned shareholder (TopSOEit) the shareholding ratio 
of the largest shareholder (Top1opit). Variable control contains the same control variables as in the regressions.  
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companies with concentrated state-controlled shareholders are not sensitive to stock mar-
ket liquidity. This could be because of the less developed disclosure regulations and ac-
counting standards (Allen, Qian, & Qian 2005; Jiang et al. 2017), the strong controlling 
power of the controlling shareholder (Ibrahim 2006; Mirza & Azfa 2010) and the serious 
agency conflict between different shareholders (Gu, Yang, & Yu 2013; Dong et al. 2014; 






















This chapter provides the conclusions of the thesis. In evaluating the main findings of 
the empirical analyses covered in the previous three chapters, this concluding chapter 
offers the implications and provides suggestions for future research. Section 7.2 
evaluates the main findings of the three empirical analyses conducted in this study, while 
Section 7.3 discusses the implications with suggestions for future research. 
 
7.2 Main Findings and Evaluation 
The thesis investigates the relationship between corporate governance and dividend 
policy, including how corporate structure, specifically the supervisory board and 
corporate ownership, with reference to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, 
influence the dividend policy of firms listed on the Chinese stock market. Moreover, 
corporate governance is combined with stock market factors, namely investor sentiment 
and stock liquidity, to discover how the impacts of board structure and ownership are 
enhanced or weakened according to the reaction and variation in the stock market. 
 
7.2.1 Supervisory Boards and Dividend Policy 
We investigated the effects of the supervisory board on dividend policy decisions, 
including the propensity for, the level of and changes to cash dividends based on a 
sample of Chinese listed firms. The results of the empirical analysis, conducted in 
chapter 4, first show how the Chinese supervisory board impacts cash dividends 
decisions, and second, what board problems need to be improved and solved. First, the 
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Chinese supervisory board should maintain a small board size that helps to monitor 
management’s behaviour effectively and to stand up for shareholders’ benefits (Wu 2004; 
Guest 2009; Lublin 2014). Second, a higher emolument reception gives the members of 
the supervisory board incentives that motivate them to stand up for shareholders’ 
benefits (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk & Fried 2003). Third, the significant 
positive relationship between the shareholding ratio of the supervisory board and cash 
dividend payment indicates that on one hand, supervisors who are also shareholders can 
inhibit management’s jobbery by encouraging dividend payment; on the other hand, 
according to the agency theory, they are eager to gain cash dividends for personal 
advantages (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Allen, Bernardo, & Welch, 2000).  
The empirical analysis reveals that some other issues stand out from the research. 
First, employee representatives show no correlation with dividend policy and are unable 
to represent stakeholders’ benefits nor work on monitoring management decisions. 
Second, members who are also shareholders may influence dividend policy based on 
their own benefits. Third, the Chinese supervisory board lacks independence. In fact, the 
“two-tier system” in China is in effect a one-tier system in nature. These issues need to 
be realised in an attempt to improve the function and effectiveness of the Chinese 
supervisory board. For example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
effectively the management department of the Chinese stock market, should learn from 
the German market about how to protect the employee representatives by formulating 
relevant regulations or laws and supporting them through professional organisations 
such as unions, so that the employee representatives can obtain considerable power and 
work more efficiently. Meanwhile, the codetermination should be introduced to help to 
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protect the interests of the firm and its employees and develop the monitoring function 
of the supervisory board (Wiedemann 1980; Gorton & Schmid 2000; Renaud 2007).   
 
7.2.2 Investor Sentiment, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy 
The next empirical analysis investigated the relationship between investor sentiment, 
corporate ownership, with reference to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders, 
and dividend payout policy, including decisions on and changes to cash dividends, based 
on a sample of Chinese-listed firms. The issue of how specific ownership, concentrated 
or state, influences dividend policy based on investor sentiment has not been explored 
and this gap, facilitated by the unique setting of Chinese listed firms, is filled in this 
research. The results of this empirical analysis, conducted in chapter 5, first show that, 
contrary to findings in previous research, there is a significant negative relationship 
between investor sentiment and cash dividend decisions, which is not consistent with 
catering theory but does fit signalling theory (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller & Rock 1985). 
It indicates that companies decide to pay cash dividends in order to deliver positive 
signalling and to attract investors when investors have no confidence in or expectations 
of the Chinese stock market. Second, investor sentiment influences the propensity of 
companies with state-controlled and majority shareholders to pay cash dividends, that 
helps to protect the benefits of firms and outside investors and reduce the expropriation 
from majority shareholders to minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Gugler 
2003).  
 
7.2.3 Stock Liquidity, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy 
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Finally, the empirical analysis investigated the relationship between stock liquidity, 
corporate ownership (with reference to concentrated and state-controlled shareholders) 
and dividend policy, including the decisions on and changes to cash dividends, based on 
a sample of Chinese-listed firms. Following previous research, we estimate logit and 
OLS models to investigate how state ownership and concentrated shareholdings 
influence dividend policy in the presence of stock liquidity. Previous research explores 
the relationship between either stock liquidity and dividend policy (La Porta et al. 2002; 
Li & Zhao 2008; Petrasek 2012) or ownership and dividend policy (Berkman, Cole, & 
Fu 2009; Jiang, Lee, & Yue 2010; Peng, Wei, & Yang 2011). Consequently, the gap 
related to how specific ownership, concentrated or state, influences dividend policy 
based on stock liquidity is covered in this research. The results of this analysis, conducted 
in chapter 6, show that the magnitude of the effect of stock liquidity is minimal (as the 
estimated coefficient of this variable is close to 0) which means, in practice, stock 
liquidity has little influence on the dividend policy of the Chinese firms.  Furthermore, 
stock liquidity has no significant mediating impact on firms which are SOEs or 
controlled by majority shareholders when they make decisions of cash dividend 
payments. At the same time, state-controlled or majority shareholders will not change 
their propensity for paying dividends or adjusting dividend payments because of stock 
liquidity. In other words, Chinese companies with concentrated or state-controlled 
shareholders are not sensitive to stock liquidity. This could be because of the less 
developed disclosure regulations and accounting standards and the strong controlling 
ability of the controlling shareholders (Allen, Qian, & Qian 2005; Firth et al. 2013; Gu, 




7.3  Implications and Further Research 
The study extends and complements the current literature on dividend policy linking 
with the influences from supervisory board structures, ownership, investor sentiment and 
stock liquidity. The main contribution is to reveal how different characteristics of the 
“two-tier” Chinese supervisory board structure influences dividend policy and this 
process interacts with the environmental factors such as investor sentiment and stock 
liquidity. Based on the findings related to the supervisory board and dividend policy, the 
main implication emerging from the interpretation of the findings is to suggest 
improvements in the function and effectiveness of Chinese supervisory boards to ensure 
all shareholders benefit from dividend payments. In particular, the research provides 
some evidence of the effects of investor sentiment and stock liquidity interacting with 
the controlling and state-controlled shareholders to influence the propensity of Chinese 
listed firms to pay cash dividends, including the level and changes in such payments, an 
area which has not been explored in previous research.  
There are some important extensions to this study which could provide guidance on 
the limitations of the current study and offer the potential for future research in the area. 
For example, some data cannot be collected because it is not reported in the databases. 
In the study of investor sentiment, ownership structure and dividend policy, we measured 
the index of investor sentiment with only five of the six sentiment proxies because data 
on closed-end fund discounts are unavailable. This could lead to potential omitted 
variable bias in the model. Also, we did not consider the influence of risk and its effect 
on dividend policy. Some research proposes that investor sentiment may be irrelevant 
when risk is controlled for (Hoberg & Prabhala 2009; Kuo, Philip & Zhang 2013). It will 
248  
  
be of interest to discuss the relationship between risk, investor sentiment and dividend 
policy in a future study. 
On the other hand, this thesis focuses on China alone, largely because of the 
characteristics of highly concentrated and state-controlled ownership of Chinese firms. 
It would be interesting to extend the current research to different or similar research 
backgrounds, especially the dividend policy of firms with highly concentrated 
controlling shareholders, and investigate if the results would perhaps be similar in other 
countries. In addition, the database of this research contains all A-listed firms; however, 
it would be interesting to distinguish between the main boards, SME boards and GEM 
firms, or develop research in different stock exchanges, especially for B-listed 
companies owned by overseas investors. Moreover, this research only focuses on the 
dividend policy of companies with state-controlled ownership; however, there are firms 
with other types of ownership, such as institutional, family-controlled and personal, 
which could be investigated to establish how their dividend policy is influenced by 
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